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This Article analyzes the rights claims and theoretical frameworks
deployed by Christian Right and gay rights cause lawyers in the
context of gay-inclusive school programming to show how two
movements with conflicting normative positions are using similar
representational and rhetorical strategies. Lawyers from both
movements cast constituents as vulnerable minorities in a pluralis-
tic society, yet they do so to harness the homogenizing power of
curriculum and thereby entrench a particular normative view. Ex-
ploring how both sets of lawyers construct distinct and often in-
compatible models of pluralism as they attempt to influence
schools' state-sponsored messages, this Article exposes the
strengths as well as the limitations of both movements' strategies.
Christian Right lawyers'free speech strategy-articulating relig-
ious freedom claims through the secular language of free speech
doctrine-operates within an inclusion model of pluralism. This
model stresses public participation and engagement with differ-
ence. After making significant advances over the past several
years, lawyers have begun to employ the inclusion model with
some success in the school programming domain, despite signfi-
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cant doctrinal and remedial limitations. At the same time, Chris-
tian Right lawyers assert parental rights and free exercise claims
in curricular challenges. Such claims rely on an accommodation
model of pluralism that permits selective withdrawal based on re-
ligious beliefs and thereby resists active engagement with differ-
ence. This strategy struggles in the face of a well-accepted view of
civic education that values exposure to diversity-a view bound
up with the success of the Christian Right's inclusion model of
pluralism. Gay rights lawyers respond to Christian Right claims
by drawing on a left multicultural model of pluralism. This model
conceptualizes lesbians and gay men as identity holders (rather
than sex actors), and in doing so succeeds in justifying the inclu-
sion of sexual orientation in programming that prioritizes diver-
sity. The left multicultural claim stalls, however, when it demands
the state's affirmative cultivation of respect by asserting students'
rights to gay-inclusive instruction. In the end, both the Christian
Right and gay rights movements make important advances yet face
significant tensions as they craft doctrinal claims that operate
within competing models of pluralism.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .................................... ............... 305
I. Representing Christian Right and Gay Rights Movements .. 319
A. The Gay Rights Movement ........................... 320
B. The Christian Right Movement ....................... 322
II. Turning to Schools ....................................... 327
III. Situating Doctrinal Claims Within Models of Pluralism .... 338
A. Inclusion Based on Free Speech ...................... 339
B. Accommodation Based on Parental Rights and Free
Exercise ............................................ 347
1. Parental Rights Claims .......................... 350
2. "Hybrid" Parental Rights/Free Exercise Claims ... 354
IV. Ideological Stakes and Implications ....................... 359
A. "Mere Exposure" and Liberal Pluralism .............. 360
B. M ozert Redux ....................................... 365
C. Identity Politics and Sex(ual Orientation) .............. 369
V. The Limits of Multiculturalism ............................ 374
A. Affirmative Rights ................................... 374
B. Law as a Political Tool .............................. 377
Conclusion ..................................................... 381
[Vol. 32
Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition
INTRODUCTION
Gay rights advocates and religious conservatives seem to have little in
common. They engage in bitter public disputes, adversarial litigation, and
counterpunching media campaigns in what has come to be thought of as a
"culture war."' Yet a closer look reveals that commonalities emerge in the
realm of representational strategies. Both sides believe in the potential of
court-centered advocacy and in the power of minoritizing rights claims.'
Both sides frame these rights claims in the language of pluralism. Both
sides see schools as a compelling location to advance pluralist ideals. And
both sides attempt to articulate brands of pluralism that accommodate more
far-reaching normative agendas.
These commonalities have engaged both sides in a battle over what a
pluralistic society, specifically with regard to sexual orientation and religion,
ought to look like. How does a pluralistic society account for differences in
sexual orientation? Do lesbians and gay men form a stable, identity-based
group with collective claims? May parents shield their children from in-
struction that presents their orthodox religious beliefs as subjective? What if
such parents (and their children) otherwise want to participate fully in soci-
I I use the singular "culture war," since this term tracks the most common language
used by both religious conservatives and scholars. See, e.g., Kevin den Dulk, Purpose-
Driven Lawyers: Evangelical Cause Lawyering and the Culture War, in THE CULTURAL
LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS 56 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2008); Thomas
More Law Center, Another Marine Officer Has Landed: Brandon Bolling Joins the
Thomas More Law Center, Sept. 24, 2007, http://www.thomasmore.org/qry/page.taf?
id=63&_function=detail&sbtblctuidl =93 (announcing new attorney hire, Thomas
More Law Center ("TMLC") Chief Counsel, Richard Thompson, explained that lawyers
with combat backgrounds "make great lawyers in the Culture War"). Even James
Davison Hunter, whose foundational scholarly account on the topic appeals to "culture
wars" in its title, repeatedly refers to the singular "culture war" throughout the text.
JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA xi, xii, 34,
43, 46, 48-51, 67 (1991). Indeed, Hunter situates the struggle over gay rights as a central
issue in the "culture war." See id. at 189 ("Both sides of the contemporary cultural
divide understand the critical importance of homosexuality for the larger culture war.").
2 use the term "minoritizing" throughout this Article to reflect a discursive and
representational strategy in which advocates prioritize group-based difference to paint
their constituents as an identifiable, vulnerable minority group and as like other minority
groups, regardless of the descriptive accuracy of the claim. Janet Halley uses this term,
which she borrows from Eve Sedgwick, when she discusses gay rights advocates' "like
race" arguments. Janet E. Halley, "Like Race" Arguments, in WHAT'S LEFT OF THEORY?
NEW WORK ON THE POLITICS OF LITERARY THEORY 40, 48 (Judith Butler, John Guillory, &
Kendall Thomas eds., 2000). Halley explains that "often pro-gay advocates draw minori-
tizing models out of the legal representations of race groups, invoking a pictorial resem-
blance between racial minorities and gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals." Id. at 49-50; see
also EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 88 (1990) (associating a
minoritizing view of sexual definition with "gay identity," "essentialist," and "civil
rights models"). Hans Hacker uses a somewhat similar term-"minoritarian"-to de-
scribe the strategies of lawyers at Christian public interest law firms. He argues that
these litigators "represent a minoritarian offshoot within the movement": instead of
"casting Christian's [sic] claims as part of majoritarian politics ... they provide courts
with arguments presenting Christians as a protected minority .... " HANS J. HACKER,
THE CULTURE OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN LITIGATION 36-37 (2005).
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ety? In contemplating these questions, the gay rights and Christian Right3
movements attempt to give content to ideas of pluralism, diversity, and toler-
ance.4 Drawing on doctrinally different yet rhetorically similar rights
claims, these movements reveal a difficult tension over how, if at all, a soci-
ety committed to pluralism and diversity can accommodate the sincere relig-
ious claims of conservative Christians and the legitimate equality claims of
lesbians and gay men.'
Nowhere is the tension between religious objections and claims for gay
inclusion more pronounced than in the school programming domain. At
stake is not merely the state's facilitation of pluralism through inclusion, but
I I use the label "Christian Right" throughout this Article because it is descriptively
accurate and tracks the terminology most commonly used in the relevant scholarly litera-
ture. See MELISSA M. DECKMAN, SCHOOL BOARD BATrLES: THE CHRISTIAN RITrr IN Lo-
CAL POLITICS, at xii (2004); see also HACKER, supra note 2, at 1; James Davison Hunter,
The Enduring Culture War, in JAMES DAVISON HUNTER & ALAN WOLFE, Is THERE A CUL-
TjRE WAR? A DIALOGUE ON VALUES AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 10, 24-25 (2006). The
term connotes an identifiable, well-documented social movement and captures a range of
social conservative Christian positions, including segments of fundamentalist Christian-
ity, evangelical Christianity, and Catholicism. See STEVEN P. BROWN, TRUMPING RELIG-
ION: THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT, THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE, AND THE COURTS 2 (2002)
("Although evangelical Protestants serve as its primary base, the New Christian Right is
also ecumenically fluid, drawing support from Roman Catholics . . .and others who,
despite considerable theological differences with evangelicals, may at times sustain vari-
ous aspects of the movement's conservative social and political agenda."). Indeed, this
inter-denominational alliance reflects the embrace of religious pluralism in the United
States. See Rhys H. Williams, The Languages of the Public Sphere: Religious Pluralism,
Institutional Logics, and Civil Society, 612 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Scl. 42,
45-46 (2007). Most of the prominent social conservative public interest law firms dis-
cussed in this Article spring from the evangelical tradition. See, e.g., HACKER, supra note
2, at 22 (explaining that Jay Sekulow, general counsel of the American Center for Law
and Justice ("ACLJ"), first started a public interest law firm named Christian Advocates
Serving Evangelism). TMLC is an exception. It was founded by a prominent Catholic,
but frames itself in general Christian terms. See Marci Elliott, Ave Maria Founder Tom
Monaghan is a Man of Faith, Plans and Action, NAPLES DAILY NEWS, Apr. 13, 2003, at
Al; Thomas More Law Center, History, http://www.thomasmore.org/qry/page.tafid=24
(last visited Mar. 14, 2009); Thomas More Law Center, About Us, http://www.thomas-
more.org/qry/page.tafid=23 (last visited Mar. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Thomas More Law
Center, About Us].
4 See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN
THE LIBERAL STATE 142-43 (1991) (arguing that within liberal thought, "[n]o political
community can exist simply on the basis of diversity or of natural harmony; every com-
munity must rest on-indeed, is constituted by-some agreement on what is just").
Wendy Brown explores the resurgence of tolerance as a desirable value and its deploy-
ment across the political spectrum. See WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: TOLER-
ANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND EMPIRE 3 (2006) ("[Tlolerance knows no political
party: it is what liberals and leftists reproach a religious, xenophobic, and homophobic
right for lacking, but also what evangelical Christians claim that secular liberals refuse
them .... ).
I My framing of two opposing groups-gay/progressive individuals and social con-
servative Christians-presents them as mutually exclusive and has an essentializing ef-
fect. While I recognize that the two may overlap in some ways, I use this rather strict
distinction to track the oppositional narrative that characterizes both cultural and legal
discourse. Furthermore, I realize that lively debate occurs within these movements, but I
speak of each movement in a fairly cohesive way for the sake of clarity and convenience.
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rather the state's endorsement of a particular vision through mandatory,
state-run curriculum. Both gay rights and Christian Right cause lawyers6
craft rights claims that construct constituents, including parents and children,
as vulnerable minorities whom the courts must protect to preserve their
meaningful place in a diverse society. These claims allow lawyers to invoke
pluralist ideals in an attempt to have schools' state-sponsored messages em-
body their broader worldview.
But when movement leaders operate in a "culture war" in which they
seek to naturalize their own normative vision, often by discrediting the other
movement's inclusion claims, are they in some ways failing to live up to the
liberal ideals of tolerance and pluralism they celebrate? 7 If both the Chris-
tian Right and gay rights movements invoke pluralism in the interest of im-
posing their worldviews on all children, are they actually anti-pluralist?8 Or
are they instead embracing distinct notions of pluralism that align with their
normative agendas and work with different doctrinal claims?9 When dis-
cussing the Christian Right and gay rights movements, might we be better
off speaking of "pluralisms"? 0
In this Article, I analyze the rights claims deployed by Christian Right
and gay rights lawyers in the school programming domain to understand
6 As used in legal scholarship, "cause lawyering" connotes a form of lawyering "di-
rected at altering some aspect of the social, economic, and political status quo." Austin
Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional Au-
thority: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITtES 3, 4 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998). In this
Article, I deal specifically with identity-based social movement lawyering, in which law-
yers represent a fairly coherent and organized group seeking to change power distribu-
tions. See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To, Social
Movements: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1, 2 (Austin
Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2006) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, What Cause Law-
yers Do].
I See Alan Wolfe, A Response, in HUNTER & WOLFE, supra note 3, at 97, 106-107.
As "culture war" scholar James Davison Hunter argues, a pluralistic society inevitably
yields cultural conflict because a diverse group of actors and institutions are competing
for power and legitimacy. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 33. Interest groups struggle to
create and shape meaning according to their respective worldviews, and as Hunter ex-
plains, the culture war involves "the power to project one's vision of the world as the
dominant, if not the only legitimate, vision of the world, such that it becomes unques-
tioned." Id.
8 Cf. Martin E. Marty, Pluralisms, 612 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 14, 17
(2007) (referring to Judge Roy Moore's attempt to post the Ten Commandments on a
courthouse wall as part of an "antipluralist ethos").
9 Throughout this Article, I explicate different versions of pluralism that these move-
ments, at various moments, embrace. While I set up these competing visions of pluralism
throughout the piece, the most theoretically grounded discussion occurs infra Part IV.
10 See Marty, supra note 8. As more and more institutions and constituencies join
American pluralist society and interpret pluralism in unique and competing ways, plural-
ism's very meaning becomes highly contested. See Wade Clark Roof, Introduction, 612
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 6, 9-10 (2007); see also DIANA L. ECK, A NEW
RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A "CHRISTIAN COUNTRY" HAS BECOME THE WORLD'S MOST
RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION 77 (2001) ("Today, the United States is in the process of
understanding and negotiating the meaning of its pluralism anew.").
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how these claims draw on competing visions of a pluralistic society. Ana-
lyzing the broader theoretical frameworks on which movement advocates
rely reveals how such frameworks influence the outcomes of doctrinal fram-
ings and suggests the limitations of representational strategies.
This Article takes as its starting point an acceptance of the fact of plu-
ralism-the fact that American society features (and permits) diversity on a
number of axes. William Galston, who conceptualizes pluralism within lib-
eral theory, offers a productive baseline when he focuses on "individuals
and groups leading their lives as they see fit, within a broad range of legiti-
mate variation, in accordance with their own understanding of what gives
life meaning and value."" This definition captures what John Rawls de-
scribes as a "diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical,
and moral doctrines."'" This baseline notion of pluralism, which I take as a
starting point, resists a more normative component. For instance, I do not
take as given, as Amy Gutmann does, that pluralism "enriches our lives by
expanding our understanding of differing ways of life;"' 3 nor do I start from
the premise, as Diana Eck does, that pluralism moves beyond mere diversity
toward "the energetic engagement with diversity."'14 Rather, I begin with
pluralism in a form that is relatively empty from a normative perspective.
It is Christian Right and gay rights advocates to whom I leave the work
of expressing pluralism's normative implications. That is, lawyers from both
movements take the fact of pluralism as their starting point, but they then
construct brands of pluralism that take distinct views on, among other things,
whether pluralism implies an engagement with difference, whether and
when pluralism allows the preservation of non-liberal doctrines, and whether
and when pluralism requires state facilitation of respect. Accordingly, I do
not endorse a model of pluralism. Instead, I show the way in which cause
lawyers negotiate the terrain of pluralism to construct compelling theoretical
frameworks and corresponding doctrinal claims that further their move-
ment's respective agendas. Pluralism functions as a representational tool
with far-reaching strategic, doctrinal, and ideological implications.
This Article claims that Christian Right lawyers' successful turn toward
a free speech claim for religious freedom, which operates within what I term
an inclusion model of pluralism, breaks down in the face of legitimate gay
inclusion claims and state-sponsored messages which seek to cultivate toler-
ance. At the same time, Christian Right lawyers' use of free speech claims
makes their alternative appeal to more overtly religious claims, and what I
label an accommodation model of pluralism, less persuasive. Here I am dis-
tinguishing between two models of pluralism. The inclusion model priori-
" WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM 3 (2002).
I2 JoHN RAwLS, POLmCAL LIBERALIsM 36 (1996). This is what Rawls terms "reason-
able pluralism." Id.
13 AMY GuTMAN14, DEMOCRATnC EDUCATION 33 (1987).
' Diana Eck, The Pluralism Project, What is Pluralism?, http://www.pluralism.org/
pluralism/what-is-pluralism.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
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tizes participation and engagement with difference in a pluralistic society; in
this model, Christian Right advocates seek to have their constituents' voices
actively included in the public sphere. The accommodation model, on the
other hand, emphasizes the preservation of distinctive religious value sys-
tems in a pluralistic society; in this model, advocates ask that their constitu-
ents be allowed to selectively withdraw from public life in order to adhere to
their religious beliefs. 5
Starting in the early 1980s, Christian Right lawyers made a concerted,
instrumental turn toward free speech claims. By moving outside of more
religiously grounded doctrine, movement advocates were able to use the free
speech claim for religious freedom to frame religiously motivated claims in
more liberal, secular, and pluralistic terms: Christians are to be included in a
diverse society on equal terms, the state ought not discriminate against them
based on their religion, and their religious expression must be treated in the
same way that the state treats secular expression. 6 Christian Right lawyers'
shift toward this pluralistic vision partly represents a pragmatic rhetorical
move, which worked with a novel and promising doctrinal framing, to deal
with the movement's failed attempts to maintain the legally-sanctioned
majoritarian dominance of Christianity. Dominant Christianity (or, more
precisely, Protestantism) has been historically resistant to religious pluralism
in America, and such resistance still manifests itself today in the image of
America as a "Christian nation."' 7 The turn toward an inclusion model of
pluralism, which recognizes the legitimacy of claims by other religions as
well as those of non-believers, allowed advocates to translate religiously mo-
tivated demands into secular claims."
The free speech claim for religious liberty has met with great success,
especially in the public education arena. The Supreme Court accepted this
15 These models track the dichotomy Hans Hacker draws between the Christian
Right's free expression argument and its selected attempts at accommodation. See
HACKER, supra note 2, at 2-4.
16 Id. at 37 ("Equal access, then, means that contributions to discourse based on a
religious worldview cannot be excluded from public life simply because of their religious
content .... The arguments presented by the movement in court have integrated strains
of liberalism and legal sophistication.").
17 See GLrMANN, supra note 13, at 31 (noting that in the mid-nineteenth century
school context, Protestant resistance to an increasing Catholic presence manifested itself
in an unwillingness to move away from the King James Bible); Marty, supra note 8, at 21("[M]ost Christians in power were dragged screaming into the era in which religious
pluralism began to be sanctioned .... Christians regularly dissented against encroaching
religious philosophies and polities ...."); Robert Wuthnow, Religious Diversity in a
"Christian Nation": American Identity and American Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND
THE NEW RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 151, 164-165 (Thomas Banchoff ed., 2007) (discussing
current Christian Right rhetoric that equates moral decay with religious pluralism and a
turn away from America as a Christian nation).
IS See Ted. G Jelen, The Constitutional Basis of Religious Pluralism in the United
States: Causes and Consequences, 612 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 26, 37
(2007).
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novel framing in a series of decisions in the 1980s and 1990s. 19 Christian
Right lawyers, however, are beginning to face the free speech strategy's lim-
itations as they struggle to use this move (and its appeal to inclusion) to craft
cognizable claims in new contexts.20 Advocates have attempted to articulate
free speech claims in the school programming domain, arguing that curricu-
lum should include the Christian perspective if it also includes the perspec-
tives of other groups, such as lesbians and gay men.2' Viewpoint
discrimination principles, however, do not generally govern school program-
ming, which is a form of government speech. 22 Beyond its doctrinal limita-
tions, the free speech strategy in the school programming domain suggests a
"balanced" curriculum as a remedy. This remedy may undermine the pref-
erences of Christian Right constituents, who may not want their children
exposed to any instruction touching on sexual orientation. In fact, these con-
stituents might prefer that school programming exclude sexual orientation
altogether, further entrenching traditional (Christian) notions of family and
sexuality.
Despite its doctrinal and remedial shortcomings, some courts have ac-
cepted the free speech claim in the school programming context. 23 As I will
show, such decisions demonstrate the currency of the inclusion model of
pluralism. Equipped with this model, courts may prioritize a proliferation of
perspectives over notions of deference and local school control that tradi-
tionally govern such disputes. 24 And courts may find free speech claims
more viable than the parental rights and free exercise claims that have histor-
ically captured school programming challenges. 25
Nonetheless, when tracking both doctrine and remedy, parental rights
and free exercise claims may represent the more consistent claims of relig-
ious parents in the school programming context. In making such claims,
Christian Right cause lawyers depart from their favored inclusion model of
19 See discussion of Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993);
Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981),
infra Part III.A.
20 See discussion of Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir.
1993); Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., No.
AW-05-1194, 2005 WL 1075634 (D. Md. May 5, 2005), infra Part I.A.
21 See discussion of Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum, 2005 WL 1075634, infra
Part III.A.22 See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998) (ex-
plaining that a public broadcasting station's content, like a public school curriculum, need
not be viewpoint neutral); Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941 (E.D. Ky.
2006) ("As a general matter, government speech-speech by the school itself-too, is
given a certain amount of latitude in that it need not be neutral, so long as the speech does
not run afoul of the Establishment Clause or the Equal Protection Clause."), affd on
other grounds by 521 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2008).23 See discussion of Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D.
Mich. 2003); Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum, 2005 WL 1075634, infra Part III.A.
24 See discussion infra Part III.A.
15 See discussion infra Part III.
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pluralism and instead appeal to an accommodation model of pluralism that
accounts for (religious) diversity by accommodating illiberal tendencies
even within a liberal society. That is, lawyers still focus on pluralist values,
but they emphasize guarding and preserving difference over meaningfully
engaging with such difference. In doing so, lawyers turn the priorities of the
inclusion model on its head. They present parental and free exercise rights
as necessary to preserve distinctive religious value systems and to allow par-
ents to pass those values onto their children, even if they resist liberal im-
pulses toward tolerance and critical deliberation. 26 In this way, the religious
pluralism to which advocates appeal departs from one that acknowledges the
legitimacy of competing perspectives, instead allowing religious objectors to
wall themselves off and to resist the tendency to consider competing truth
claims.
But the Christian Right strategy stalls in this context for reasons related
not only to doctrinal constraints, but also to the resonance and currency of
the inclusion model. The Christian Right free speech strategy's success
largely reflects courts' view of education in a liberal, democratic society.
The pluralist ethic endorsed by the inclusion model resonates with a norma-
tive view of civic education in which exposure to competing value systems
is not only acceptable, but desirable. By seizing on such priorities to further
the Christian Right cause, lawyers for the movement are partly responsible
for further cementing the inclusion model of pluralism that forecloses their
parental rights and free exercise claims in the school programming domain.
As I will show, courts resist the accommodation model to the extent that it
stresses withdrawal over engagement.
Recognizing that parental rights and free exercise claims depart from
entrenched notions of liberal pluralism, and therefore enjoy less currency
with courts, Christian Right advocates appeal to the special status of sex
even within a liberal, pluralistic society to carve out the issue of sexual ori-
entation.17 They present lesbians and gay men as a sex-based, rather than an
identity-based, group, hopeful that a liberal, democratic theory of education
can account for maintaining sex as a private, family matter.2 8 This move
locates issues of sexual orientation outside of school programming, allowing
the continued exclusion of lesbians and gay men and the implicit endorse-
ment of traditional values regarding sexuality.
In response, gay rights cause lawyers appeal to their own model of
pluralism, which sounds in left multiculturalism. 29 This model evinces a dis-
26 See discussion of parental rights and free exercise claims, infra Part IJI.B.
27 See discussion of Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008), infra Part IV.C.
28 See GUTMANN, supra note 13, at 5-6.
I 1 use the term left multiculturalism to connote the brand of multiculturalism
deployed by gay rights advocates. Rather than focus on the group rights of cultural or
religious sub-groups in a way that might recognize the claims of social conservative and
potentially even non-liberal traditions, the left multicultural model concentrates on the
claims of certain subordinated identity-based groups, including racial and ethnic minori-
ties, women, and sexual minorities. As described by Mark Kelman and Gillian Lester,
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tinction between what I term weak and strong left multicultural claims. In
its weak form, the left multicultural model justifies inclusion of lesbians and
gay men by stressing their coherent, group-based identity in a diverse soci-
ety." Gay rights lawyers position lesbians and gay men as identity holders
rather than sex actors, and thereby supplant religious notions of sex with left
multicultural notions of identity. As courts and the public continue to ratify
the concept of sexual orientation as a stable identity category, Christian
Right lawyers find that their appeal to a sex-based concept fails to resonate.
Instead, lesbians and gay men continue to cement their status as an identifi-
able minority group in a pluralistic society.
But just as Christian Right lawyers struggle to articulate a coherent
model of pluralism that can also further the movement's broader normative
agenda, gay rights lawyers run up against the limitations of left multicul-
turalism when they use problematic doctrinal claims to make strong mul-
"left multiculturalism makes an egalitarian descriptive claim: that members of dominant
social groups (defined by race, gender, physical ability, and sexual preference) control
social institutions and misjudge the relative ... contributions of 'outsiders' and members
of their own group." Mark Kelman & Gillian Lester, Ideology and Entitlement, in LEFr
LEALisM/LEFr CRMQUE 134, 147 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). Moreover,
a left multicultural model seeks the active participation of subordinated groups rather
than focusing on rights to exemption or withdrawal based on cultural or religious differ-
ence. For instance, in the context of group-based claims by the learning disabled, Kel-
man and Lester focus on state intervention to remedy discrimination that prevents the
group's full participation in the workplace and public education. See id. at 150-52. The
group's claims function as rights-based entitlement claims rather than as claims to self-
government or exemption. Compare id. at 150 (describing "'group entitlement' trumping
claims"), with Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in Is MULTICUL-
TURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7, 10-11 (Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, & Martha C.
Nussbaum eds., 1999) (describing a multiculturalist model in which "special group rights
or privileges" allow usually less liberal sub-groups, comprised of "indigenous native
populations, minority ethnic or religious groups, and formerly colonized peoples," to
claim "rights to govern themselves," "to be exempt from certain generally applicable
laws," or "to be 'left alone'").
30See Cameron McCarthy, After the Canon: Knowledge and Ideological Representa-
tion in the Multicultural Discourse on Curriculum Reform, in RACE, IDENTITY, AND REP-
RESENTATION IN EDUCATION 289, 290 (Cameron McCarthy & Warren Crichlow eds.,
1993) (advocating for a "critical multiculturalism" that moves beyond "the language of
'inclusivity'" characteristic of traditional articulations of multiculturalism in curriculum
reform); Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Premature Predictious [sic] of Multiculturalism?, 100
MICH. L. REv. 1470, 1478 (2002) (explaining that the concept of "inclusiveness" is often
key to definitions of multiculturalism); Jeffrey Ayala Milligan, Gender and the Limits of
Inclusion: Should Multiculturalism "Include" Fundamentalisms?, 94 REIIous EDUC.
75, 76 (1999) (explaining that "inclusion" is a core concept of "a multicultural approach
to education"). Of course, the claim for inclusion of lesbians and gay men depends on
the left multicultural focus on group-based subordination, which distinguishes it from
more centrist liberal priorities on the individual. See Kelman & Lester, supra note 29, at
136 (explaining that left multiculturalism limits its reach "to individuals falling within
cognizable groups, rather than extending it to individuals lacking such affiliation"). Note
also that the focus on inclusion in a left multicultural model contrasts with exemption or
autonomy rights characteristic of models of multiculturalism often invoked by cultural
and religious sub-groups. See Carlson, supra, at 1478 (pointing out the contested mean-
ing of multiculturalism by exploring the tension between a model that prioritizes "inclu-
sionary politics by the government" and one that values "autonomy from the state").
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ticultural demands. In its strong form, the left multicultural model stresses
the marginalization of lesbians and gay men in an effort to frame rights
claims that seek affirmative state recognition.3 Advocates ask the state to
cultivate respect for lesbians and gay men by educating citizens in such re-
spect.32 By insisting on respect (rather than merely defending inclusion),
this strong claim embraces a gay-affirmative component that neither allows
for state-sanctioned messages that disapprove of homosexuality nor accounts
for sincere religious objections. To make the strong left multicultural claim,
advocates rely on a First Amendment right to receive information, asking
courts to declare students' affirmative rights to gay-inclusive programming
and to prohibit opt-out rights. 3  Courts, though, have resisted this demand
and its homogenizing desire to ensure all children, especially those of relig-
ious objectors, receive gay-affirmative instruction.34
As the foregoing summary demonstrates, this Article's analysis operates
on three planes: strategy, theory, and doctrine. By situating doctrinal claims
within broader, normative theoretical frameworks, I attempt to show the way
in which cause lawyers' strategies cast movements and constituents in pow-
erful ways that make possible new doctrinal framings at the same time that
they render others more unthinkable. The comprehensive theoretical
frameworks lawyers use to construct and advocate for constituents change
the way decision makers, including courts, understand, contemplate, and ad-
judicate claims. While the two most powerful theoretical frameworks ad-
dressed in this Article-the inclusion and left multicultural models of
pluralism-yield tremendous success for their respective advocates, they
also have important limitations. My focus on the movement/countermove-
ment relationship between the Christian Right and gay rights movements
permits a deeper appreciation for lawyers' strategic choices at the same time
that it reveals the limitations of such strategies. Indeed, as both movements
deploy the language of pluralism to achieve comprehensive goals that move
beyond mere inclusion, both run head-on into the theoretical and doctrinal
31 This move is consistent with Kelman and Lester's description of learning disability
advocates' use of "the left multiculturalist rhetorical manipulation of the mainstream cen-
trist conception of antidiscrimination law to 'legalize' their claims .... " Kelman &
Lester, supra note 29, at 159. Advocates for the learning disabled demand that the state
intervene to end discrimination against this group. See id. at 161. They reframe ques-
tions of policy and resource allocation as questions of rights-based legal claims requiring
state intervention. See id.
32 As Amy Gutmann explains, in a multicultural model, "[flull public recognition as
equal citizens may require two forms of respect: (1) respect for the unique identities of
each individual ... and (2) respect for those activities, practices, and ways of viewing the
world that are particularly valued by, or associated with, members of disadvantaged
groups . . . ." Amy Gutmann, Introduction to MULTICULTURALISM 3, 8 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1994). Charles Taylor explains how "the demands of multiculturalism build on the
already established principles of the politics of equal respect." Charles Taylor, The Polit-
ics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM, supra at 25, 68.
13 See discussion of Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders ("GLAD") strategy in
Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008), infra Part V.A.
34 See discussion of Parker, 514 F.3d 87, infra Part V.A.
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limitations of their strategic choices. These are the pressure points among
strategy, theory, and doctrine that I seek to expose and explore.
This Article proceeds in five parts.3" In Part I, I set up the court-cen-
tered strategies of the Christian Right and gay rights movements, explicating
the way in which lawyers for both deploy a minoritizing rights discourse to
portray constituents as vulnerable minorities in a pluralistic society.
In Part II, I situate each movement in the debate over public school
curriculum, showing the way in which schools represent vital, highly con-
tested domains for both the Christian Right and gay rights movements and
allow for an appeal to a pluralist ethic in service of a broader normative
view.
In Part III, I stake out the Christian Right's doctrinal claims in the
school programming domain, map such claims onto inclusion and accommo-
dation models of pluralism, and point to the tensions between these claims
and their broader implications. First, I show how the free speech claim,
which taps into an inclusion model of pluralism, evidences doctrinal short-
comings and suggests a "balanced" curriculum in a way that may run
counter to the desired remedy. Next, I explain how parental rights and free
exercise claims, which tap into an accommodation model of pluralism, sug-
gest an exemption remedy that correlates with pluralist impulses at the same
time that they strive for a more far-reaching result: no mention of sexual
orientation.
In Part IV, I explore the normative strength of the Christian Right's
doctrinal claims in light of the pluralist notions to which they attach. Liberal
priorities on tolerance and autonomy present barriers to Christian Right law-
yers' effort to revert to a pluralistic vision that accommodates illiberal
desires. Christian Right lawyers' attempt to avoid this predicament by ap-
pealing to the sex in homosexuality largely has folded in the face of gay
rights lawyers' left multicultural framing of lesbians and gay men as a stable,
identity-based group.
Finally, in Part V, I show how gay rights advocates have stretched their
left multicultural model of pluralism, and corresponding doctrinal framings,
to seek state sponsorship of a gay-affirmative message, asking courts to de-
clare students' affirmative rights to gay-inclusive programming and to man-
date that programming for all students. But courts have resisted. Without
35 In terms of methodology, my analysis draws on court decisions, legal briefs, de-
mand letters, media accounts, public documents from community-based committees and
boards of education, and organization literature, including press releases and legal memo-
randa. I have also conducted interviews of many individuals working on these issues,
including individuals at the First Amendment Center, the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender ("LGBT") Project, GLAD, Lambda
Legal, and Alliance Defense Fund ("ADF"). I also spoke with individuals on the ground
in Montgomery County, Maryland, including lawyers, activists, and county government
employees. Other organizations and individuals were unwilling to be interviewed; my
requests for interviews with Christian Right law firms such as TMLC, ACL, and Liberty
Counsel went unanswered.
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court-ordered mandates, Christian Right advocates have seized on the poten-
tial chilling effect of litigation to gain a political route to programming that
correlates with Christian Right beliefs.
Before proceeding, it is helpful to briefly situate this Article in relevant
scholarship. First, I am drawing on legal scholarship and political theory on
law and religion. My close reading of Christian Right claims relies on the
work of legal scholars who have analyzed the way in which religious claims
operate within competing political and philosophical traditions. Indeed,
Nomi Stolzenberg's foundational work on the claims of fundamentalist
Christian parents informs my own analysis of religiously motivated claims
in the sexual orientation domain.36 At the same time, in order to associate
doctrinal claims with distinct brands of pluralism, I invoke the work of polit-
ical theorists, including William Galston, 7 Stephen Macedo,38 and Amy Gut-
mann.39 In offering competing visions of liberalism, these scholars consider
the political and moral grounds on which a society should accommodate
illiberal religious traditions. Similarly, I draw on the work of religious stud-
ies scholars, such as Diana Eck4° and James Davison Hunter,4' to position
Christian Right claims and gay rights responses within discussions of
pluralism.
In a related but distinct vein, I use the lens of multiculturalism to ap-
proach gay rights claims with the same political and ideological focus that I
use to explore Christian Right claims. I situate gay rights representational
strategies within the project of left multiculturalism: the gay rights appeal to
a stable lesbian and gay identity relies on the left multicultural focus on
coherent group-based difference in a pluralistic society. And the move from
inclusion and tolerance toward recognition and respect tracks the trajectory
of multicultural citizenship.42
Next, I am building on the expanding field of sexuality and sexual ori-
entation scholarship. Scholars addressing lesbian and gay youth have at-
tempted to articulate wholesale theories that support a right to gay-positive
36 See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out": Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993).
37 See GALSTON, supra note 11; GALSTON, supra note 4.
38 See Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism:
The Case of God v. John Rawls?, 105 ETHics 468 (1995).
39 See GutMANN, supra note 13; Amy Gutmann, Civic Education and Social Diver-
sity, 105 ETmcs 557 (1995).
40 See ECK, supra note 10.
41 See HUNTER, supra note 1.
42 See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CrriZENSHiP 6 (1995) ("A comprehensive
theory of justice in a multicultural state will include both universal rights, assigned to
individuals regardless of group membership, and certain group-differentiated rights or
'special status' for minority cultures."). Of course, I recognize the way in which mul-
ticulturalism may be deployed in favor of illiberal religious and cultural groups. See id.
at 163-70. Indeed, gay rights advocates must remain cognizant of the way in which
some multicultural aims may run counter to the interests of lesbians and gay men. See
generally Okin, supra note 29 (debating whether multicultural policies undermine the
status of women by granting group rights to patriarchal and sexist cultural groups).
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programming. Like the gay rights litigators discussed in this Article, these
scholars dismiss the claims of objecting parents by arguing from the per-
spectives of students' rights and the norm-generating function of public edu-
cation in a pluralistic society. 43 Rather than take an approach that sounds in
advocacy or that aims for prescription, I consider oppositional claims leveled
by the Christian Right to situate more carefully the issue of sexual orienta-
tion in schools. Beyond the issue of lesbian and gay youth and school pro-
gramming, this Article opens up avenues for future work relating to gay-
based representation (including a focus on movement/countermovement re-
lationships) and points to the way in which the conflicts between religiously
motivated claims and gay rights claims will continue to present some of the
most challenging issues for those interested in both religion and sexuality.
Finally, I am undertaking a project on cause lawyering. Legal scholars
are just beginning to pay attention to conservative cause lawyering as a loca-
tion for inquiry. 4 While some cause lawyering scholars have recognized the
43 See, e.g., Carlo A. Pedrioli, Lifting the Pall of Orthodoxy: The Need for Hearing a
Multitude of Tongues In and Beyond the Sexual Education Curricula at Public High
Schools, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 209, 211-12 (2005) ("[T]he Article will offer sugges-
tions on how public high schools can help sexual minority students deal with their sexual-
ities, namely by: forming support groups for sexual minority youth, discussing a wide
variety of sexual orientation perspectives when appropriate in classes, instituting diver-
sity training for teachers, and implementing non-discrimination policies that address sex-
ual orientation. In addition, this Article will demonstrate that the proposed approaches
are constitutional under the First Amendment because they do not violate speech rights of
public high schools or of students enrolled in such high schools. Finally, this Article will
demonstrate that the proposed approaches are also constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment because they do not violate the substantive due process liberty rights of the
parents of public high school students, regardless of the sexual orientations of the stu-
dents."); Ruthann Robson, Our Children: Kids of Queer Parents & Kids Who are Queer:
Looking at Sexual Minority Rights from a Different Perspective, 64 ALB. L. REV. 915,
945 (2001) ("[S]tudents should have a First Amendment right not to be subjected to
[anti-gay] viewpoints."); Patrick Henigan, Note, Is Parental Authority Absolute? Public
High Schools which Provide Gay and Lesbian Youth Services Do Not Violate the Consti-
tutional Childrearing Right of Parents, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1261, 1285-86, 1290 (1996)
("If a high school does not provide gay and lesbian support services to students because
it chooses to suppress the message of tolerance and self-acceptance that accompanies the
services, then the state is denying youth the right to receive accurate information.").
"Ann Southworth initiated the turn to conservative cause lawyering in legal scholar-
ship when she described the law-centered conservative movement, including its religious,
business, and libertarian strands. See Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the
Contest Over the Meaning of "Public Interest Law," 52 UCLA L. REv. 1223, 1245
(2005) [hereinafter Southworth, Conservative Lawyers]; see also John P. Heinz, Anthony
Paik, & Ann Southworth, Lawyers for Conservative Causes: Clients, Ideology, and So-
cial Distance, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 5, 6 (2003) ("Scholars have produced extensive
research on lawyers who serve causes associated with America's political left, but much
less empirical work has focused on the characteristics of lawyers who serve conservative
causes .... "); Anthony Paik, Ann Southworth, & John P. Heinz, Lawyers of the Right:
Networks and Organization, 32 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 883, 884 (2007) ("Conservative
lawyers have created scores of organizations devoted to their causes, but relatively little
scholarly attention has focused on the entrepreneurs who built these organizations or on
the particular contributions of lawyers."). Most recently, Southworth published a book
on the topic. ANN SoutHwoRTm, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CON-
SERVATIVE CoALMON (2008) [hereinafter SoUTHwoRTm, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT].
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way in which religious conservatives have turned to public interest law orga-
nizations modeled on those of the left, there is yet to be extensive analysis of
the actual doctrinal and representational moves deployed by such cause law-
yers.45 Furthermore, legal scholarship has yet to explore the way in which
the conservative religious movement coalesces with left/progressive move-
ments in terms of representational strategies. More specifically, sustained
attention to the court-centered movement/countermovement relationship be-
tween the gay rights and Christian Right movements is long overdue. In-
deed, my project demonstrates the way in which attention to movement/
countermovement dynamics helps us to better understand lawyers' strategic
choices and to account for the currency of particular strategies.
This Article also seeks to expand the reach of cause lawyering research
and methodology. Moving in a more theoretical direction by exploring the
way in which doctrinal claims become embedded in the terrain of ideologi-
cal conflict, this Article pushes beyond the sociological impulses of cause
lawyering scholarship. For instance, I show that as Christian Right cause
lawyers begin to face legitimate inclusion claims by minority interests, they
must contemplate the limitations of the inclusion model of pluralism and the
free speech claim.46 Advocates face tough choices between inclusion and
accommodation models of pluralism, and these choices involve not only
doctrinal considerations, but also normative and strategic decisions regard-
ing how to think about movement constituents. The connections I draw
among strategic choices, doctrinal claims, and broader theoretical
frameworks provide a richer account with which to analyze the currency of
claims in new contexts and the limitations of strategic framings.
Many traditional cause lawyering questions are subsidiary to this pro-
ject. That parents challenging school curriculum routinely lose their cases
and yet continue to litigate begs questions regarding the strategic use of law,
the mobilizing and fundraising potential of losing litigation, and the dynam-
ics between constituents and movement leaders in formulating and articulat-
ing movement priorities. While I touch on these topics throughout, I leave a
more comprehensive consideration of them for future work. In addition,
rather than delve into conflicts among cause lawyers in framing the disputes
45 While political science and sociology scholars, such as Kevin den Dulk, Hans
Hacker, and Steven Brown (all of whose work is discussed throughout this Article), have
explored the broad legal and political approaches of Christian Right advocates, there is
yet to be a detailed law-centered account of the doctrinal and representational moves of
the Christian Right.
46 There are contexts other than schools that implicate LGBT individuals in which
this phenomenon might occur, including state anti-discrimination laws that do not pro-
vide religious exemptions. See, e.g., N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Super.
Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 962-63 (Cal. 2008) (denying a free exercise exemption from an anti-
discrimination law for doctors who refused to provide a lesbian patient with infertility
treatments). Returning to the school context, this issue might also crop up when minority
religions make inclusion claims. For instance, Christian Right advocates attempt to block
Islam-inclusive school programming. See Eklund v. Byron Union Sch. Dist., No. 04-
15032, 2005 WL 3086580, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 2005).
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set out in this Article, my analysis in some ways treats cause lawyers work-
ing for each movement as a monolith, glossing over internal disagreement.
Instead of comprehensively addressing on-the-ground lawyer conflicts, I
stake out a more theoretical approach to understand the operation of doctri-
nal claims and ideological stakes for both movements in the school program-
ming context.
In explaining the importance of school issues to both the gay rights and
Christian Right movements, and attaching those issues to broader litigation
campaigns, this Article in some ways makes a positive claim about the sig-
nificance of court-centered strategies to social movements. This proposition
is controversial in an atmosphere in which many scholars have turned away
from court-centered models of social movements. Scholars from Critical
Legal Studies, 47 Feminist Legal Theory, 48 Critical Race Theory,49 Queer The-
ory,50 Cause Lawyering, 51 and New Governance 2 have offered pointed criti-
47 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in
LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRmQUIT, supra note 29, at 178, 178-79; Mark Tushnet, An Essay
on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1363, 1363-64 (1984).4
' See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State:
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 658 (1983) ("Abstract rights will authorize
the male experience of the world."); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique
of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. RaV. 387, 391-92 (1984) ("Often ... rights analysis is
indeterminate and assertions of women's rights do not achieve concrete advances in the
status of women. For this reason, some feminists have stopped relying on rights claims
and begun criticizing rights analysis.").
49 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L.
REv. 1467, 1468-69, 1518 (2000) (explaining how gay rights and black civil rights dis-
courses, and antidiscrimination law more generally, fail to account for the intersection of
race and sexual orientation); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989) (arguing that single-axis
antidiscrimination categories obscure intersections of race and sex).
0 See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 85 (1999) ("The campaign for marriage, never a broad-based
movement among gay and lesbian activists, depended for its success on the courts. It was
launched by a relatively small number of lawyers, not by a consensus among activists. It
remains a project of litigation, though now with the support of the major lesbian and gay
organizations. So far the campaign has come up dry.").
- See Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community Economic Develop-
ment in the Figueroa Corridor, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MovEMENTS, supra note
6, at 302 (explaining that cause lawyering scholarship "largely calls into question the
viability of legal rights strategies as a vehicle for social reform, emphasizing the demobil-
izing effect of law on political action"); Michael W. McCann, How Does Law Matter for
Social Movements?, in How DoEs LAW MATrER? 76, 77 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat
eds., 1998) (pointing out cause lawyering scholarship's focus on the limitations of law-
yers' attempts to litigate for social change). Within cause lawyering scholarship, I would
include work on critical lawyering, community lawyering, poverty lawyering, and client-
centered lawyering. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Faith in Community: Representing
"Colored Town," 95 CAL. L. REV. 1829, 1830 (2007) ("This Article calls [on] progres-
sive lawyers to step outside law and put their faith . . . in community."); William H.
Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholar-
ship in the Post-Modem, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 1099, 1102 (1994)
(articulating the goal of client empowerment and self-elaboration over lawyer control);
Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on
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ques of rights discourse. 3 Rather than sweeping the relatively recent gay
rights and Christian Right movements within the reach of such critiques, I
seek to understand the cause lawyering models used by both movements in
more contextual terms. This Article, however, should not be read as an un-
qualified endorsement of rights claims. Instead, my analysis reveals that the
implications of each movement's current strategies are a mixed bag. Rather
than make a normative claim about court-centered strategies, this Article
explores where law works and where it fails, while simultaneously noticing
where law functions as politics.
I. REPRESENTING CHRISTIAN RIGHT AND GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENTS
In significant ways, gay rights and Christian Right organizations both
use rights-claiming, court-centered impact litigation. Of course, lawyers for
both movements use non-litigation techniques, and both movements exert
influence on electoral politics. Yet advocates from each movement have in-
creasingly turned to litigation to frame their constituents, obtain material
benefits, influence the public and elites, and advance an agenda.
This Part sets up the cause lawyering model of each movement. I situ-
ate the court-centered projects of both the Christian Right and gay rights
movements, exploring their respective appeals to minoritizing rights claims
to position constituents as discrete minorities needing judicial protection
from majoritarian or elite decision making. This initial groundwork is nec-
essary to demonstrate that both movements have moved toward prioritizing
litigation-focused strategies. Only by exposing the underpinnings of such
court-centered strategies can we see the way in which rights claims feed into
an invocation of pluralism and diversity in American culture.
the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BunF. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1990) (arguing that legal institutions
and legal discourse impede meaningful participation by individuals from subordinated
groups).
52 New Governance scholars have turned toward flexible public-private partnerships,
locating lawyers as problem solvers rather than as traditional advocates. See Orly Lobel,
The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MiN. L. RaV. 342, 345-48 (2004). In a related project, I explore New
Governance interventions in the public school governance context, looking specifically at
the challenges faced when intervening in a domain characterized by identity-based social
movements where cause lawyers have prominent litigation roles and movement/
countermovement tensions run high. See Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance
Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
11 These criticisms range from theoretical critiques, pointing out the essentializing
and political nature of rights, to effectiveness critiques, contending that public interest
lawyers seduced by the "myth of rights" might hinder social movement mobilization and
place unreasonable faith in the power of courts to remedy inequalities. See Cummings,
supra note 51, at 307.
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A. The Gay Rights Movement
The gay rights movement largely centers itself around legal and legisla-
tive advocacy organizations. Some of the movement's most resource-rich
organizations are independent public interest law firms that have long
headed the movement, including Lambda Legal (founded in 1973), the Na-
tional Center for Lesbian Rights ("NCLR") (1977), and Gay & Lesbian Ad-
vocates & Defenders ("GLAD") (1978).14 These three groups, along with
the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and
Transgender ("LGBT") Project (1986), boast substantial budgets that dwarf
those of many other LGBT organizations. For instance, in 2007, these four
organizations enjoyed a combined budget of $22.5 million, and Lambda Le-
gal alone had a budget of $11.4 million." While Lambda Legal's budget is
smaller than those of the three most prominent AIDS service organizations,"
the L.A. Gay & Lesbian Center," and advocacy giant Human Rights Cam-
paign," it bests those of prominent organizations like the Task Force, Par-
ents, Families and Friends of Lesbians and Gays ("PFLAG"), the Gay,
Lesbian and Straight Education Network ("GLSEN"), Freedom to Marry,
and the Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation ("GLAAD"). 9 This is
particularly striking given that legal organizations use small numbers of at-
torneys to litigate significant cases rather than provide extensive legal ser-
vices or other direct services to movement members, such as those provided
by AIDS service organizations. While these law firms spend some portion
of their budgets on educational and lobbying activities, they concentrate on
litigation to yield far-reaching results and national publicity.
The gay rights movement hews closely to a traditional impact litigation
model, steeped in the civil rights paradigm and characteristic of what Wil-
liam Simon has termed "Legal Liberalism." 6 Advocates formulate interests
5 4 
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, 2007 STANDARD ANNUAL REPORTING: A Fi-
NANCIAL AND OPERATING OVERVIEW OF THE LGBT MOVEMENT AND ITS LEADING ORGANI-
ZATIONS 14 (2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2007 STANDARD ANNUAL
REPORTING]. The criminalization of sodomy partly explains why the gay rights move-
ment looked to legal activism early on in its history. GLAD, for instance, was founded to
defend gay men arrested in a Boston sex sting. See Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defend-
ers, GLAD is Founded in 1978 in Response to a Sting Operation at the Boston Public
Library, http://www.glad.org/30years/case-jan.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
55 2007 STANDARD ANNUAL REPORTING, supra note 54, at 36.
56 See id. at 20.
-7 See id. at 29.
"s See id. at 16.
19 See id. at 16, 32; see also Sandra R. Levitsky, To Lead with Law: Reassessing the
Influence of Legal Advocacy Organizations in Social Movements, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 6, at 145, 146 (explaining that LGBT legal organizations
possess a disproportionately large share of movement resources).
6o See William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist
Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 127, 130 (2004).
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as rights, which have a trump-like quality. 6t Courts become necessary to
define and enforce rights, and the judiciary is trusted to safeguard individual
interests. 62 In line with this conceptualization, gay rights legal organizations
construct a narrative that is court-centered, adversarial, and rights-based.
Lambda Legal, for instance, looks to litigation as a vehicle for securing and
safeguarding LGBT rights on a broad scale, explaining that it "select[s] the
cases and issues that will have the greatest impact in protecting and advanc-
ing the rights of LGBT people ..... 63 GLAD positions itself as a deter-
mined force in an adversarial regime, declaring, "Civil rights have never
been easy to win. Fighting for them takes passion, skill and an absolute
determination to prevail. That's what GLAD delivers every single day.",,
Rights are clearly the dominant discursive tool for articulating interests, evi-
denced by the ACLU's mission statement, which catalogs a list of rights
before stating, "If the rights of society's most vulnerable members are de-
nied, everybody's rights are imperiled. '65
Gay rights legal organizations have appropriated the models of previous
identity-based social movements. 66 They ask courts to declare rights
grounded in equality and liberty for LGBT individuals, relying on minoritiz-
ing rights claims paradigmatic in civil rights litigation. Lawyers depict con-
stituents as like other identity-based groups that have waged successful
rights campaigns.67 In this sense, they tap into a left multicultural discourse
that situates lesbians and gay men as merely another discrete group in an
6" See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xi-xii (1977) (discussing
rights as political trumps held by individuals).
62 See Simon, supra note 60, at 136 (explaining that we "find in Legal Liberalism a
commitment to formulating certain fundamental norms as rights, and to insisting on the
priority of these norms over other values"); id. at 137 (describing rights as "less suscepti-
ble to trade-offs and balancing" and pointing to "idealized portrayals of the judicial
role").
63 See Lambda Legal, About Us, http:/www.lambdalegal.org/about-us/ (last visited
Mar. 14, 2009).
6 See GLAD, Mission Statement, http://www.glad.org/about/mission (last visited
Mar. 20, 2009).
65 See ACLU, About Us, http://aclu.org/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
For instance, the rights-centered, impact litigation strategy of the gay rights move-
ment reflects the models developed by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
("LDF") and the ACLU. See Halley, supra note 2, at 40 (explaining that the gay rights
movement has "national organizations, including NAACP-like national legal reform of-
fices staffed with full-time lawyers"); Levitsky, supra note 59, at 145 ("The NAACP's
early successes with test case litigation created a model for using law as a social move-
ment strategy that has since been replicated by advocates for such wide-ranging interest
groups as consumers, environmentalists, gays and lesbians, economic libertarians, and the
poor."); see also Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Con-
sciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REv. 937, 946 (2007) ("In the
wake of the 1950s and 1960s, the energy of civil rights groups, particularly the [NAACP
and LDF], increasingly encouraged other movements-including the women's rights
movement, the gay rights movement, and the disability rights movement-to adopt a
legal reform strategy and to organize around similar patterns of identity rights and an-
tidiscrimination claims.")
67 See, e.g., Halley, supra note 2, at 40. It is important to note that it is a collective,
rather than an individual, identity to which advocates appeal. For a discussion of this
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increasingly diverse society.68 Lawyers invoke pluralist notions animating
multiculturalism to recognize and protect this new constituency. 69
The most significant recent example of this identity-based strategy de-
rives from the California marriage litigation. In striking down the state's
marriage restriction, the California Supreme Court became the first court of
last resort to apply strict scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orienta-
tion. The court made clear the connection between lesbians and gay men
and other identity-based minority groups, declaring that "sexual orientation,
like gender, race, or religion, is a characteristic that frequently has been the
basis for biased and improperly stereotypical treatment . . . -70 Indeed, the
court rejected the argument that the marriage restriction constituted sex dis-
crimination, instead staking out sexual orientation as a distinct identity
category.7
B. The Christian Right Movement
Unlike the gay rights movement, which was historically grounded in
law-based activism, the Christian Right made a highly orchestrated turn to-
ward litigation, partly attributable to limited progress on the explicitly politi-
cal front. In the mid-1990s, with criticism of evangelical Christian advances
running high, the president of Alliance Defense Fund ("ADF"), a Christian
legal organization, declared that "[w]hile we can bring about quick fixes in
the voting booth, it is in the courts that we will bring about the type of
change that transcends all generations."72 He argued to the Christian Right
membership that "national legal precedents we can achieve to protect relig-
ious freedom, the traditional family, and the sanctity of life are going to
touch our lives much longer than any political candidate or officeholder
can."73 Along with ADF, numerous other public interest law firms sprung
up to represent religious interests in the courts. In the past two decades, the
number of Christian Right legal organizations has multiplied, with at least
nine appearing in the 1990s alone.74
distinction, see K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival, in MuLTnCULTURAL-
ISM, supra note 32, at 149, 150-52.
68 See Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Brief in Support of Defendants-Appellees
by GLAD, Greater Boston PFLAG, GLSEN, HRC, & Women's Bar Ass'n at 5, Parker v.
Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1528) (defending gay-inclusive curriculum
by arguing that it "depicts a variety of family types to reflect the growing recognition that
families today come in many forms") [hereinafter Parker GLAD Amicus Brief].
69 See id. at 8 (arguing that in light of "demographic data" showing large numbers of
families headed by same-sex couples, "it would be most appropriate for any school dis-
trict-anywhere in the United States-to include information reflecting a broad variety
of family types in its curricula").
70 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 444 (Cal. 2008).
71 See id. at 438.
72 Brown, supra note 3, at 5 (quoting Alliance Defense Fund, Winning Precedent-
Setting Cases for You and Your Family, ADF BRrEFiNr, May 1996, at 4).
73 BROWN, supra note 3, at 5.74 See Southworth, Conservative Lawyers, supra note 44, at 1245.
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Many of the most prominent Christian Right legal organizations are
connected to larger Christian Right organizations, showing that the turn to
court-centered strategies is part of a broader movement strategy.75 The
American Center for Law and Justice ("ACLJ") emerged from Pat Robert-
son's Christian Broadcasting Network and has ties to Robertson's Regent
Law School. 76 Liberty Counsel is tied to Jerry Falwell's Liberty University,
including its law school.77 Prominent non-lawyer Christian Right leaders,
including James Dobson and Bill Bright, founded ADF to create a litigation-
focused national organization (at first a steering and funding organization
and now a litigation firm in its own right).7" While Christian public interest
law firms are important and at times central players in Christian Right advo-
cacy, I do not want to overemphasize their role. Their ties to larger cultural,
educational, religious, and media-based Christian Right conglomerates cer-
tainly suggest the vast institutional and monetary support to which some of
these law firms have access and attest to their heightened stature. Yet such
ties underscore their positions as parts of a broader political and cultural
movement.
The Christian Right movement has successfully translated religious
principles into legal action by constructing its own version of rights. Repli-
cating successful public interest law models of the progressive groups of the
1960s and 1970s, 79 the Christian Right has formed well-funded national or-
ganizations that use highly-trained lawyers to advance the cause of religious
constituents through rights-claiming advocacy.80 Indeed, the name ACLJ is
" See SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT, supra note 44, at 38 ("Lawyers' aggres-
sive building of law-related institutions has placed them in the center of the conservative
movement.").76 See HACKER, supra note 2, at 22.
" See id. at 62-64.
78 See BROWN, supra note 3, at 41; HACKER, supra note 2, at 188 n.42; Alliance
Defense Fund, History, http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/about/History/Default.aspx
(last visited Mar. 14, 2009). The ADF model evidences an attempt to coordinate strategy
among Christian Right lawyers. See SOUtmWORT, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT, supra note
44, at 127, 145, 165 (discussing informal and formal coordination among social con-
servative lawyers, often facilitated by ADF).79 See HACKER, supra note 2, at 14 (explaining how "New Christian Right litigators"
have used the impact litigation strategy developed by "[Iliberal groups, such as the
NAACP and ACLU"); ALLEN D. HERTZKE, REPRESENTING GOD IN WASHINGTON: THE
ROLE OF RELIGIOUS LOBBIES IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 195 (1988) (explaining the new-
found emphasis by the Christian Right on "framing the issues in the language of rights");
Kevin R. den Dulk, In Legal Culture, but Not of It: The Role of Cause Lawyers in Evan-
gelical Legal Mobilization, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 6, at
197, 197; Southworth, Conservative Lawyers, supra note 44, at 1251 ("By embracing the
organizational form, purpose, and rhetoric of the public interest movement, conservative
groups engaged in a form of 'legitimacy politics' with their liberal adversaries.").
' See Southworth, Conservative Lawyers, supra note 44, at 1258-59 (explaining
how a conservative public interest attorney "said that his organization's practice ... was
'patterned after the NAACP Legal Defense Fund very, very consciously"'). The evangel-
ical Christian movement has attempted to replicate the institutions upon which the liberal
lawyering profession depends. For instance, when Jerry Falwell announced the opening
of the law school at Liberty University, he declared that "we plan to turn out conservative
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meant to recall "ACLU."8' As Christian Right leaders found less power in
majoritarian politics and as courts disallowed favorable treatment of Chris-
tians based on Establishment Clause grounds, advocates rethought the way
Christians should be understood in society.8" Rather than argue from domi-
nant values and cast Christianity in majoritarian terms, Christian Right liti-
gators began to track the rights discourse of the progressive paradigm,
deploying classic minoritizing moves. While majoritarian claims may fit
better with legislative activity, minoritizing claims resonate within a court-
focused model.83 In this court-centered mode, Christian Right cause lawyers
shy away from explicitly invoking the normative status of their religion in
America. 4 Instead, they position Christian claims as equality claims by
casting Christians as a vulnerable group in an increasingly secular society,
urging courts not to allow the state to discriminate against them.8" As Ruth-
erford Institute founder John Whitehead wrote, "When ACLU attorneys
threaten or sue public school districts in the name of freedom to stop a child
from voluntarily praying, they are not standing for freedom. The ACLU is
repressing a whole segment of society-religious people-as if it were an
appendage of the secular state. '86 In the new Christian Right framework,
left/progressive organizations are married to the secular state, together con-
stituting the majoritarian forces from which Christians seek protection. Ac-
cordingly, Christian Right advocates counter gay minoritizing moves by
reconfiguring the operation of discrimination. The Family Research Coun-
lawyers the same way Harvard turns out liberals ...." Allen Pusey, Falwell has High
Hopes as Law School Opens, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 25, 2004, at A 11.8, See HACKER, supra note 2, at 29.
82 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987) (holding unconstitu-
tional a statute that required teaching creationism in public schools); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 60-61 (1985) (holding unconstitutional a "moment of silence" statute in-
tended to return prayer to schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606, 625 (1971)
(holding unconstitutional statutes authorizing state aid to church-related educational insti-
tutions); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a
statute criminalizing teaching of evolution in public schools); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (holding school prayer unconstitutional); HERTZKE, supra note 79,
at 166-67 (discussing defeat of legislative efforts to return school prayer to schools).
83 See, e.g., HERTZKE, supra note 79, at 161 (drawing a distinction between "the
'minoritarian politics' of the courts [and] the majoritarian or consensus-seeking politics
of the Congress").
Religious pluralism scholar Diana Eck notes that some in the Christian Right oper-
ate under an assumption that "Christians are the majority and should have their way in
setting the public spirit." See ECK, supra note 10, at 42.
8 See SouTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT, supra note 44, at 72 (explaining that, in
her survey work, "religious liberties advocates claimed that they were asserting the rights
of religious people to express their views in an oppressively secular and morally corrupt
public domain"); HACKER, supra note 2, at 9 (explaining how "conservative Christian
litigating firms ... have provided courts with arguments presenting Christians as a pro-
tected minority rather than a majority asserting its will"); see also Sarat & Scheingold,
What Cause Lawyers Do, supra note 6, at 7 ("Today it has become clear that the right has
taken its cues from the left-constructing its own cultures of victimization and resis-
tance" and "recruit[ing] their own cadres of cause lawyers, who have crafted conserva-
tive versions of the politics of rights.").86JOHN W. WHITEHEAD, THE STEALING OF AMERICA 126 (1983).
[Vol. 32
Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition
cil's Peter Sprigg explains: "[w]hile pro-homosexual activists are usually
the first to complain about alleged instances of 'discrimination,' the truth is
that in many cases, it is people who hold more traditional views about homo-
sexuality who become victims of discrimination.""7
In line with this minoritizing shift, the most successful claim for the
Christian Right has been one'based on free speech.s8 Significant Supreme
Court cases, discussed infra Part III.A., establish that the First Amendment
guarantee of free speech protects religious expression just as it does other
forms of speech. But, religious groups operate under a disability-the Es-
tablishment Clause. s9 The use of free speech claims to frame religious ex-
pression, as like secular forms of expression, attempts to skirt Establishment
Clause considerations. Since conflicting free exercise and establishment
principles are weighed against each other, free speech allows a way out of
that balancing act and toward a doctrine less pressed by non-secular
concerns.90
In this sense, the free speech strategy in some ways represents a delib-
erate turn toward more promising law. Former ACLJ executive director Ke-
vin Fournier explicitly invoked a strategy of "incremental pragmatism"
grounded in the turn toward free speech as a doctrinal basis for Christians'
religious liberty claims.9" But Christian Right litigators must remain alert to
the potential for pragmatic, strategic considerations to jeopardize long-term
doctrinal or ideological commitments. 92 While the free speech claim has
yielded great success,93 some Christian Right cause lawyers realize that it
7 PETER SPRIGG, HOMOSEXUALrrY IN YOUR CHILD'S SCHOOL 12 (2006).8 See BROWN, supra note 3, at 10.
Perhaps surprisingly, New Christian Right lawyers neither boldly renounce the
Supreme Court's establishment clause rulings of the past nor offer any new inter-
pretation of the free exercise clause to protect religious expression. Instead, they
turn to the free speech clause of the First Amendment . . . . [Ilt is just this ap-
proach which, after years of frustrating losses in the courts, has provided the
movement with a number of significant legal victories ....
Id.
89 See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1, 11 (2000) ("Not only must religion be 'unimpaired,' but it must also be unspon-
sored, uncontrolled, and unpromoted. As a result, religion may not 'flourish,' but rather,
wither away.").
90 See id. at 40 (explaining that when religious speech is at issue, principles of view-
point neutrality and equal access apply instead of free exercise and establishment
considerations).
91 See BROWN, supra note 3, at 46-47.
92 In this way, these Christian Right lawyers fit Stuart Scheingold's description of the
"innovative" lawyer-activist, who looks for pragmatic possibilities offered by rights dis-
course. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND POLITICAL CHANGE 181 (1974).
93 See BROWN, supra note 3, at 63 ("The significance of Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia lies not only in the Court's landmark decision in this
case but also in the manner in which the ruling highlighted the presence and legal argu-
ments of the New Christian Right. Rosenberger was but the latest in a remarkable string
of religion cases in which the Supreme Court subordinated concerns about the wall of
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taps into a discourse of pluralism not incompatible with that advanced by the
gay rights movement.
94
Even as the free speech framing tends to secularize Christian Right
claims, the movement maintains an overtly religious orientation. Indeed, the
"culture war" serves as an important symbol in the Christian Right's court-
centered discourse, painting a picture of embattled religious believers fend-
ing off powerful secular forces. 95 This symbol rallies constituents and justi-
fies legal action. The "culture war" image, with its invocation of battle and
highly important yet somewhat intangible stakes, ties neatly with an impact
litigation model that emphasizes winner-takes-all, zero-sum contests.96 For
example, ACLJ's Keith Fournier "see[s] the litigation efforts of groups like
the ACLJ as the sword. They help us fend off the social marauders, those
who are stripping away the remnants of civilization, suppressing people of
faith, and substituting a new culture in the United States."97 Similarly, the
Thomas More Law Center ("TMLC"), whose "ministry was inspired by the
recognition that the issues of the cultural war being waged across America
• ..are not being decided by elected legislatures, but by the courts," re-
sponds with an oppositional rights-claiming strategy, further entrenching the
role of courts. 9 TMLC positions itself in opposition to left legal rights orga-
nizations, explaining that the court decisions it seeks to contest "have been
inordinately influenced by legal advocacy groups such as the [ACLU]."99
The "culture war" symbol also constructs the identity of Christian
Right cause lawyers. Relying on ideas of symbolic politics pioneered by
Murray Edelman1 °° and translation of those ideas into the legal domain by
separation while affirming the free speech arguments made by New Christian Right attor-
neys."); HACKER, supra note 2, at xi (describing Christian Right lawyers' "remarkable set
of victories" relating to "the expressive and participatory rights of the religious"); id. at
18 ("The ACLJ's central victories in court have involved recasting public schools as
public forums for student expression of faith-based belief."); id. at 55 (describing "the
free expression defense" as "the most significant legal contribution of the new breed
[of] Christian litigators").
4 See, e.g., HACKER, supra note 2, at 56 (explaining that Liberty Counsel attorney
Matthew Staver's view of free expression in public schools includes gay-based
advocacy).
95 See Thomas More Law Center, About Us, supra note 3.
96 See Hunter, supra note 3, at 30 (explaining how elites at national organizations use
"culture war" symbolism "to frame issues in stark terms, to take uncompromising posi-
tions, and to delegitimate their opponents").
97 KEITH A. FOURNIER WITH WILLIAM D. WATKINS, A HOUSE UNITED? 101 (1994).
98 See Thomas More Law Center, About Us, supra note 3.
99 Id.; see also HACKER, supra note 2, at 22 (explaining that Pat Robertson viewed
ACLJ as a way "to create an organization that would counter the efforts of liberal public
law firms, specifically the ACLU").
1ot See generally MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964) (explor-
ing how elites use politics symbolically to pacify the mass public and legitimate existing
power relations despite vast inequalities); see also Patricia Ewick & Austin Sarat, Hidden
in Plain View: Murray Edelman in the Law and Society Tradition, 29 LAW & Soc. IN-
QUIRY 439, 440 (2004).
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scholars such as Stuart Scheingold, 1°1 Kevin den Dulk explores the symbolic
power that the "culture war" has in evangelical cause lawyers' construction
of their roles. 10 2 den Dulk shows that evangelical cause lawyers adopt a
"warrior" role that relies on and perpetuates the "culture war" discourse. 03
He suggests that evangelical lawyers are cast as warrior-heroes precisely
because they are venturing into enemy territory, using an otherwise suspect
and dangerous tool-the politics of rights-for counter-mobilization.1 4 The
warrior-hero is often cast as victor, but in other instances he is portrayed as
"the honorable, long-suffering loser (who will win in the end),"' 105 heroic
nonetheless for engaging the enemy on its own turf-the courts. 16
In sum, both gay rights and Christian Right cause lawyers deploy rights
claims to construct constituents as minority groups meriting judicial protec-
tion. As I show in the next Part, these rights claims have begun to clash in
tangible ways, and the public school system offers a particularly significant
location for such clashes.
II. TURNING TO SCHOOLS
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund's school desegrega-
tion campaign, which in many ways represents the origin of cause lawyering
thought, located schools as central not only to doctrinal, but also to ideologi-
cal claims. That two of the most prominent contemporary social movements
find themselves fighting on the same terrain is in many ways unsurprising.
This Part locates the Christian Right and gay rights movements in the public
education domain. Both movements position schools as vital parts of their
minoritizing, rights-claiming orientations, and in doing so, both locate
schools as symbols of pluralism in a diverse society. At the same time, both
movements acknowledge the universalizing potential of public education
and attempt to use school programming as a way to further a particular nor-
'01 SCHEINOLD, supra note 92, at 205-09 (relying on Edelman's work); see also
Ewick & Sarat, supra note 100, at 444 ("Scheingold observed that law-particularly
through the discourse of rights and legal procedures-furnishes politics with its most
potent symbols of legitimacy.").
102 See den Dulk, supra note 1, at 60-61. James Davison Hunter also discusses the
symbolic nature of the "culture war." See HUNTER, supra note 1, at 52-53.
103 See den Dulk, supra note 1, at 75.
" See id.
'05 See id. at 76.
" den Dulk explains that evangelical cause lawyers' description of their Supreme
Court appearances "leave[s] the impression of the lawyer heroically entering a lair of
secularism, which is a useful impression whether the lawyer wins ('I defeated the secular
dragon!') or loses ('We are up against a powerful enemy!')." den Dulk, supra note 1, at
76.
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mative agenda.10' In this sense, public schools represent a particularly fertile
terrain for "culture war" contests."' 8
Despite their general reluctance to involve themselves in local school
disputes, courts are continually confronted with school issues and have de-
veloped a large body of law governing public schools at the K- 12 level. The
amount of education-related litigation has increased over the last several de-
cades and continues to increase. 1 9 What might otherwise seem like minor
school disputes feature as part of nationwide controversies. 110 Not only do
localized issues gain national media attention and publicity, but national
non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") converge on a given town or
city, turning otherwise unknown school districts into battlegrounds for test
case litigation."' Supported both financially and rhetorically by national or-
ganizations, parents, students, and community organizations conceptualize
their disputes as part of a national battle." 2
107 See David W. Machacek, The Problem of Pluralism, 64 Soc. OF RELIGION 145,
154 (2003) ("Education, being compulsory, is more likely to feel the impact of pluralism,
and indeed is already the scene of heated debates over the normative values and beliefs
that are taught .... ").
10" For instance, situating itself as on the frontlines of a "culture war," ACLJ explains
that "[p]erhaps more than in any other arena, Christians find that their values and beliefs
are under continual attack in the nation's public schools." ACLJ, Education, http://www.
aclj.org/Issues/Issue.aspx?ID=2 (last visited Mar. 14, 2009). For an in-depth analysis of
ACLJ and its general counsel, Jay Sekulow, see HACKER, supra note 2, at 17-54. Nota-
bly, Hacker explains that ACLJ "has done battle with public schools." Id. at 18.
109 See, e.g., STUART BIEGEL, EDUCATION AND THE LAW 1 (2006) (noting the "ongoing
increase in education-related litigation").
1 James Davison Hunter notes the way in which a relatively minor local issue sur-
rounding "outcomes-based education" in Gaston County, North Carolina turned into a
heated "culture war" conflict as national organizations like Citizens for Excellence in
Education and People for the American Way become involved. See Hunter, supra note 3,
at 29; see also BIEGEL, supra note 109, at 2 (noting that controversies in education law
today tend to "be much broader in scope, embodying the range of 'front-burner' disputes
that are on the minds of many Americans on a day-to-day basis"). The nationalization of
public school disputes might also relate to the increasing federalization of education pol-
icy. In the past decade, especially with the "No Child Left Behind" Act, education law
and policy have become increasingly centralized and local educational agencies have
become increasingly subject to federal regulation. See BIEGEL, supra note 109, at 2; see
also James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely
Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANOE 183, 187 (2003) (noting "increased centralization, even national-
ization, of the public school system").
"I Ann Southworth explains that ACLJ general counsel Jay Sekulow finds cases
through call-ins to his radio and television programs. In response to callers, ACLJ sends
what Sekulow calls "SWAT teams" of lawyers to the relevant community. See South-
worth, Conservative Lawyers, supra note 44, at 1272. Hans Hacker's collection of data
shows that for ACLJ, the majority of its work constitutes a test case litigation strategy
with an eye toward setting national precedent. See HACKER, supra note 2, at 144.
112 See HACKER, supra note 2, at 40 (noting that when ACLJ sponsors a case, it serves
as attorney of record and bears the especially high costs of litigation given ACLJ's desire
to take cases up the appellate chain); Mayer N. Zald, The Future of Social Movements, in
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SocIErY 319, 332 (Mayer N. Zald & John D.
McCarthy eds., 1987) ("[S]ocial movements in the United States quickly learn how to
link local and national venues."); cf JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE
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Before the gay rights movement moved heavily into school-based advo-
cacy, the Christian Right had centered its strategy on schools."3 While con-
servative Christians exert authority on a local level and do so through
political channels, such as gaining election to local school boards, the most
comprehensive study of local influence by the Christian Right suggests that
this impact has been fairly limited. Melissa Deckman analyzed attempts by
the Christian Right in the 1990s to elect conservative Christians to school
boards and thereby turn "school districts into local battlefields."' 4 She
found, contrary to media commentary, that conservative Christians neither
won election more than non-Christians nor drastically influenced school pol-
icy once elected." 5
Deckman's findings that the Christian Right has not achieved its goals
in public schools through local political channels are consistent with cause
lawyering scholarship focusing on the Christian Right's turn toward litiga-
tion strategies in the public education domain. Well-funded Christian Right
organizations spend large amounts of time and money on cases intended to
influence school policy."6 For instance, between 1987 and 2004, more than
twenty percent of ACLJ's caseload dealt with religious issues in schools, and
LEGAL SYSTEM 17 (1978) (explaining that "McCarthy & Zald's funded social movements
are influential in getting programs on the national agenda and manipulating the media
and elites"). For instance, in Montgomery County, Citizens for a Responsible Curricu-
lum ("CRC") urged parents to opt their children out of the additional lessons on sexual
orientation, warning that "it won't stop with just this curriculum-there are examples
across the country of parental rights violations by the public school systems." Citizens
for a Responsible Curriculum, Can I Opt-Out? What About Alternate Classes?, http://
www.mcpscurriculum.com/opt-out.shtml (last visited Mar. 14, 2009). As CRC sees it,
each parent in Montgomery County is "in the middle of a national battle for the hearts
and minds of our children-and the culture of our society." Id.
"3 See DECKMAN, supra note 3, at 3 ("[Gjrassroots initiatives [of the 1960s and
1970s] alerted many conservative Christian leaders to problems in the public schools,
and education became a major focus for the New Christian Right, led by the Reverend
Jerry Falwell and others in the early 1980s.").
See id. at 167.
"5 Deckman's research first concludes that there "is little evidence to suggest that
Christian Right organizations are having a major impact on the school board candidacies
of conservative Christians." Id. at 110. Deckman next finds that conservative Christian
school board candidates are no more likely to win election than other candidates, mean-
ing that "[p]rogressive opponents and media critics of the Christian Right have it
wrong-the likelihood of a Christian Right takeover of local school boards does not seem
imminent." Id. at 132-33. Finally, Deckman concludes that conservative Christian
school board members have had only a limited influence on school policy. She argues
that once conservative Christians gain a place within official school governing bodies,
they often adopt more nuanced and moderate positions and make conventional priorities
like sex education and evolution less central to their agendas. See id. at 140, 145, 149. In
instances where conservative Christian board members maintain more "pure" ideological
positions, they tend to be minority members; they can slow down progressive agendas by
providing policy distractions but can rarely get their more conservative proposals passed.
See id. at 135-36, 157.
"
6 See BROWN, supra note 3, at 37, 42, 123 (noting that by 2000 ACLJ boasted a $9
million budget, 25 staff attorneys, and a network of 330 volunteer attorneys, and that by
1999 ADF's budget had grown from $400,000 to more than $9 million in just six years of
operation).
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almost thirty percent of its Supreme Court activity during this period in-
volved such cases." 7 Similarly, more than thirty percent of Liberty Coun-
sel's caseload between 1989 and 2004 consisted of school-based issues, and
almost half of its Supreme Court activity during this time addressed such
issues. 1 18
Through its partial reconfiguration as a law-based movement, the Chris-
tian Right turned a campaign to bring religion (and religious values) back to
public schools into a campaign to protect student rights through the courts
and legislatures. Indeed, the pragmatic abandonment of the school prayer
amendment and a turn instead toward the Equal Access Act ("EAA") exem-
plifies the Christian Right's shift.119 Some movement leaders justified the
school prayer amendment on majoitarian grounds, basing the campaign on
recognizing most students as religious and presumptively Christian. But at-
tempts at school prayer have been turned down by the Supreme Court and
were deemed politically unpopular in moderate legislatures. 120 On the other
hand, the EAA, which represented a movement victory after the failure of
the school prayer effort, turned toward claims that painted Christian students
as a minority group and called for the inclusion of religious student groups
on equal terms with non-religious groups. 121 The EAA effort appealed to
moderates by including all students and by placing religious expression on
an equal footing with secular expression. At the same time, EAA principles
derived from First Amendment free speech law and avoided Establishment
Clause problems.
As the EAA campaign demonstrates, schools offer a fruitful location
for framing Christian advocacy as a rights-based campaign in which politi-
cally powerless victims are at stake. Christian Right lawyers position chil-
dren as vulnerable to the coercive methods of educators and portray school
officials as secular elites attempting to indoctrinate children. 12  Constituents
see public schools as hostile to their religious and moral values, such that
advocates are necessary to protect against schools' overreaching. 23
"17 See HACKER, supra note 2, at 48, 50.
118 See id. at 84, 86.
19 For a discussion of this shift, see HERTZKE, supra note 79, at 161-98.
'
2
o See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963); HERTZKE, supra note 79, at
165-67.
121 See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (2006).
122 See DECKMAN, supra note 3, at 17 (explaining that some "conservative Christians
believe that their children are virtually 'abused' in the classroom"); id. ("Some Christian
Right leaders allege that there is a widespread conspiracy by leaders in the 'liberal' educa-
tion establishment to change the religious values of their children, through various curric-
ula, teaching methods, and behavior-modification programs.").
123 See id. at 43 ("[R]esearch shows that religiously conservative individuals are
most likely to think that public schools are hostile to their moral and spiritual values.").
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Children are particularly sensitive subjects, deemed either non-sexual
or presumptively heterosexual. 24 In this sense, the same sensitivity that aids
Christian Right advocates poses unique challenges for a movement centered
on homosexuality. 25 But as young people come out earlier, partly in re-
sponse to gay rights advances in other domains, gay rights organizations
have had to confront schools as important venues. In fact, LGBT youth are
now the beneficiaries of more grant funding than any other specific LGBT
population. 26 Lawyers position LGBT children as vulnerable minorities
whose safety is threatened and whose educational experience compro-
mised. 27 Advocates cite high rates of harassment and violence against
LGBT students and correlate such treatment with high drop-out rates as well
as other signs of emotional, psychological, and educational harm. 2 '
While legal action recognizes the need to protect LGBT students and to
remedy wrongs, it also yields opportunities to push proactively LGBT issues
in public education, translating the vulnerability of LGBT students into calls
for greater acceptance through diversity programming and comprehensive
sex education.'29 In fact, litigation that seeks to redress harms suffered by
LGBT students may result in school-wide diversity programming. 30 Such
programming draws on a depiction of schools as state entities that must rec-
ognize and further an important pluralist ethic. For instance, in defending a
gay-inclusive curriculum in Lexington, Massachusetts, GLAD appealed to
increasing school safety while simultaneously focusing "on the crucial role
of public schools in ... the transmission of values that prepare students for
participation in a pluralistic democracy .. .
24 See generally Teemu Ruskola, Minor Disregard: The Legal Construction of the
Fantasy that Gay and Lesbian Youth Do Not Exist, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 269 (1996)
(explaining how society desexualizes adolescents and erases the existence of gay youth).
125 See Kerry Robinson & Cristyn Davies, Docile Bodies and Heteronormative Moral
Subjects: Constructing the Child and Sexual Knowledge in Schooling, 12 SEXUALITY &
CULTURE 221, 223 (2008) ("The regulation of children's knowledge of sexuality becomes
even more restrictive and difficult when heteronormative boundaries of sexuality are
transgressed.").
26 See 2007 STANDARD ANNUAL REPORTING, supra note 54, at 10 (reporting that be-
tween 2004 and 2006, $19.7 million of the total $119 million in grant funds for LGBT
organizations went specifically to serve youth).
127 See, e.g., Parker GLAD Amicus Brief, supra note 68, at 28-29 ("Several leading
mental health organizations have identified [LGBT] students... as particularly vulnera-
ble targets for bullying.").
'28 See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006)
(citing studies and advocacy pieces), vacated on other grounds by 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
'29 See Parker GLAD Amicus Brief, supra note 68, at 28 (defending Lexington, Mas-
sachusetts's gay-inclusive curriculum, GLAD argues that "[elducational programs for
the youngest age groups that teach tolerance, respect for differences and effective prob-
lem-solving are widely regarded as key ingredients in a school's anti-bullying
curriculum").
130 That was the situation in the Boyd County litigation, discussed later in this Part
and infra Part HL.B.
' Parker GLAD Amicus Brief, supra note 68, at 1.
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GLAD's reasoning demonstrates the way in which advocates deploy
minoritizing moves to endorse school programming that embraces the partic-
ular group's normative view. That is, not only do Christian Right and gay
rights lawyers depict their constituents as vulnerable minorities in a pluralis-
tic society, but they also seek to harness the universalizing potential of
school policymaking. 32 Both groups of lawyers seek to affect children at an
early age, thereby influencing their worldviews. 13  As advocates from the
Christian Right put it, "[i]ndoctrinating impressionable school children is
an easier way of changing public attitudes toward homosexuality than per-
suading adults.1 34 Advocates on the left explain that "once students are
educated regarding diversity, they can be powerful agents of change for
transforming their school environment, and, ultimately, society." '35
In a relatively short period of time, gay-inclusive school programming
has become a key issue for both movements. In their study of sexual orien-
tation issues in public schools in the late 1990s, political scientists James
Button and Kenneth Wald, along with health education expert Barbara
Rienzo, found that sexual orientation was "either omitted or only briefly
132 See HUNTER, supra note 1, at 37 ("Because skills, values, and habits of life are
passed on to children in school, it was inevitable that the schools would be an arena of
cultural conflict ...."); see also Gutmann, supra note 32, at 11 ("Educational policy in
America, far from requiring neutrality, encourages local communities to shape schools
partly in their particular cultural image .... ); cf. GUTMANN, supra note 13, at 14 (ex-
plaining that a "democratic theory of education focuses on what might be called 'con-
scious social reproduction"'); Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv.
4, 61 (1983) ("The public curriculum is an embarrassment, for it stands the state at the
heart of the paideic enterprise and creates a statist basis for the meaning as well as for the
stipulations of law.").
133 See HUNTER, supra note 1, at 174.
Together, the curriculum, the textbook literature, and even the social activities of
the school convey powerful symbols about the meaning of American life-the
character of its past, the challenges of the present, and its future agenda. In this
way the institutions of mass education become decisive in socializing the young
into the nation's public culture. Public education is especially significant territory
in this regard, primarily because it reflects the will and power of the state vis-A-vis
the nation's public culture.
Id.
34 SPRIGG, supra note 87, at 1; see also id. at 22 ("What they seek to do is 'recruit
children'-100% of our children, 'gay' or straight-as soldiers in their war against truth,
common sense, and traditional moral values.").
135 Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae by Anti-Defamation League at 4,
Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1528) [hereinafter Parker Anti-
Defamation League Amicus Brief]; see id. at 9 ("Using public schools to promote toler-
ance and understanding allows the state to combat the harms of ... widespread prejudice
from the ground up, by seeking to improve the cultural and civic values of its youngest
citizens."); see also JAMES W. BURTON, BARBARA A. RIENZO, & KENNETH D. WALD, PRI-
VATE LivEs, PUBLIC CONFLICTS: BATTLES OVER GAY RIGHTS IN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES
167 (1997) ("Schools are the focus of contentious political battles over sexual orientation
issues. Proponents of including sexual orientation in the school agenda assert that educa-
tion is critical for social transformation and changes in attitudes toward lesbians and gay
men. They maintain that this education needs to begin early and that schools provide the
best environment for such activity because of their accessibility to youth.").
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addressed in the classroom."'' 16 Not only did students report that any such
instruction tended "to be negative in tone," but many teachers reported that
they omitted discussion of HIV/AIDS to avoid "attitudes and beliefs about
homosexuality."'31 The few schools that included sexual orientation pro-
gramming almost always recognized the concerns of religious parents by
giving them the right to opt-out, even though such rights were rarely used.'
But this picture from the 1990s looks quite unlike the current one. In
the last decade, more attention has been paid to LGBT youth, the gay rights
movement has claimed significant victories, and religious organizations have
increasingly turned their attention to issues of sexual orientation. Accord-
ingly, school controversies at the intersection of sexuality and religion have
become much more common. While issues relating to gay-straight alliances
and student rights (from speech to non-harassment and non-discrimination)
are among the most common, curricular issues are beginning to crop up
more frequently.
Given the relatively recent emergence of this issue and the lack of con-
sensus among parents, students, and school officials, curricular issues relat-
ing to sexuality are highly contested. While states like Massachusetts
promulgate regulatory guidance encouraging schools to implement inclusive
curriculum in line with the state's pro-gay legal norms, other states maintain
statutes either mandating instruction that discusses homosexuality in a nega-
tive light or prohibiting instruction that mentions homosexuality in a positive
way. 3 9 Most states, though, provide no explicit guidance and leave pro-
gramming to local school decision makers such that sexuality and sexual
orientation are treated in vastly different ways as one moves from one school
district to the next. National advocacy groups, unsurprisingly, devote sub-
stantial resources to this area, which they see as both essential and up-for-
136See BUTTON, RIENzo, & WALD, supra note 135, at 141.
137 Id.
'
38 See id. at 159.
39 Compare MASS. DEP'T OF EDUC., MASS. COMPREHENSIVE HEALTh CURRICULUM
FRAMEWORK 12, 31 (1999) (including a "guiding principle" that students learn to accept
"the dignity and worth of all individuals regardless of ... sexual orientation" and encour-
aging instruction such that by the end of fifth grade students can "define sexual orienta-
tion using the correct terminology") with ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2(c)(8) (2008) (requiring
sex education course materials to emphasize "in a factual manner and from a public
health perspective, that homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the general public
and that homosexual conduct is a criminal offense under the laws of the state."), ARiZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-716(c)(1) to (3) (2008) (prohibiting any course of study that (1)
"[p]romotes a homosexual life-style," (2) "[p]ortrays homosexuality as a positive alter-
native life-style," or (3) "[s]uggests that some methods of sex are safe methods of ho-
mosexual sex"), S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-32-30(A)(5) (2008) (prohibiting health education
programs from discussing "alternate sexual lifestyles from heterosexual relationships"
except for purposes of instruction on sexually transmitted disease), and TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 85.007 (Vernon 2008) (requiring educational programs for those
eighteen and younger to state "that homosexual conduct is not an acceptable lifestyle and
is a criminal offense").
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grabs. A turn to law correlates with each movement's struggle for a superior
position in influencing schools' norm-generating functions.14°
It is useful to note the relationship to litigation that each movement
demonstrates in the school programming domain-relationships that might
seem unexpected. The gay rights movement, which has relied quite exten-
sively on courtroom advocacy, uses more privatized policymaking, through
NGOs like PFLAG and HRC, to convince schools to implement gay-inclu-
sive curriculum. 14' The turn to litigation most often occurs when the curricu-
lum is challenged. The Christian Right, on the other hand, generally uses
court-centered activism to challenge school programming that emerges from
school decision-making channels. 142 Rather than rely on insider status to
achieve political gains, in this context Christian Right advocates use legal
claims to publicize and challenge school decisions.
Two recent examples, which are central to this Article's analysis, pro-
vide illustrations. In Maryland, the Montgomery County School Board initi-
ated a plan to add three lessons to its health and sex education curriculum for
eighth and tenth graders. Eighth graders would consider how people re-
spond to differences in sexual orientation and gender identity. Tenth graders
would learn about laws their schools must follow to prevent harassment and
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and would
receive a lesson on condom use and sexually transmitted disease. 43 Citizens
for a Responsible Curriculum ("CRC") and Parents and Friends of Ex-Gays
and Gays ("PFOX"), two groups representing Christian Right interests,
challenged the curricular changes and sought to block their implementation.
CRC urged parents to exempt their children, warning: "[i]f you are
morally opposed to this curriculum and let your child participate anyway,
. . . you are doing a disservice not only to your child, but to parents and
children across the nation."' 44 At the same time, Teach the Facts, an organi-
zation supporting the school district's curriculum, proclaimed, "[a]cross the
140 Scholars studying social movement lawyering have explained the power of legal
reform even as they recognize the limitations of law-centered projects. See, e.g., Sarat &
Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do, supra note 6; HANDLER, supra note 112, at 22-25.
Those studying the gay rights movement have noted law's ability to establish norms and
shape behavior. See BUTTON, RIENZO, & WALD, supra note 135, at 10 ("[L]aw changes
the values of society.").
The new "Welcoming Schools" curriculum being piloted in select communities
across the country represents an effort by PFLAG and HRC, and both groups have been
careful not to publicize the locations for the pilot programs. See Dana Rudolph, Boston
Leads the Way to Welcoming Schools, BAY WI Nows, Nov. 14, 2007, at 8, available at
http://www.baywindows.com/index.php?ch=columnists&sc=mombian&sc3=&id=523
68.
142 See, e.g., Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Pub.
Sch., No. AW-05-1194, 2005 WL 1075634 (D. Md. May 5, 2005); Hansen v. Ann Arbor
Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
143 Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., No.
07-30 at 2 (Md. State Bd. of Educ. June 27, 2007).
'4 Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum, supra note 112.
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nation and in our own back yard, religious extremists are attempting to im-
pose their beliefs on all of our children."' 145
The curricular challenge played out in two separate rounds of litigation:
CRC and PFOX challenged the initial curriculum in federal court and a re-
vised curriculum in the state administrative system and state court. 146 TMLC
and Liberty Counsel, both Christian public interest law firms, represented
CRC and PFOX. Lambda Legal represented PFLAG, which intervened in
the litigation in support of the school district.
While Christian Right lawyers asserted parental rights and religious
free exercise claims, they quickly made the free speech claim central. Advo-
cates argued that the programming included only one perspective-a gay-
positive one-to the exclusion of other legitimate perspectives, and included
variations in sexual orientation-gay, lesbian, and bisexual-without in-
cluding ex-gays. 47 This framing plays into an inclusion model of pluralism
that values a proliferation of voices and states neutrality with regard to com-
peting truth claims. Such a framing deemphasizes the religious nature of
Christian beliefs vis-A-vis the state, instead treating Christian perspectives
like secular belief systems.
Meanwhile, in Lexington, Massachusetts, the public school district im-
plemented a gay-inclusive curriculum at the elementary school level. Start-
ing in kindergarten, students are exposed to books introducing families
headed by same-sex couples. When parent David Parker learned that his
son's class would read Who's in a Family?, he requested the opportunity to
exempt his son from the reading. School officials denied his request, and
Parker refused to leave the school until his demands were met. Eventually,
he was arrested for trespassing and taken away in handcuffs. 48 While Parker
hired a private Boston law firm to sue the school district, Christian Right
organizations used the case as a centerpiece of their campaign and reportedly
advised the lawyers overseeing the litigation. 49 On the left, GLAD, the
ACLU, and the Anti-Defamation League ("ADL") all filed briefs in the case
145 Teach the Facts, Stand Up for What's Right, http://www.teachthefacts.org/index2.
html (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
146 See Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum, 2005 WL 1075634; Citizens for a
Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., No. 284980 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan.
31, 2008); Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum (Md. State Bd. of Educ. June 27, 2007).
141 See, e.g., Petitioners' Memorandum at 15, Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum
(Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008). PFOX defines ex-gays as "men and women with unwanted
same-sex attractions [who] make the personal decision to leave a gay identity via secular
therapy [or] faith based ministries ..... PFOX, About Us, http://pfox.org/about-us.
html (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).48 See Maria Cramer & Ralph Ranalli, Arrested Father Had Point to Make, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 29, 2005, at B 1.
'49 See, e.g., SPRIOG, supra note 87, at 13-14.
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in support of the school. 15 0 The Parker v. Hurley litigation resulted in pub-
lished decisions from both the federal district court and the First Circuit. 5 '
Unlike in the Montgomery County litigation, in Parker, lawyers repre-
senting the religious parents made parental rights and religious free exercise
claims the centerpiece of their challenge, arguing that the school's curricu-
lum impinged on the parents' right to raise their children as they see fit and
to control the religious upbringing of those children.' In doing so, lawyers
appealed to an accommodation model of pluralism, framing the objecting
parents as a minority group in need of judicially declared accommodation.
The right to withdraw based on religious beliefs would serve pluralist ends
by allowing distinctive religious cultures to survive rather than sacrificing
such diversity to a homogenizing, assimilative state effort.
Gay rights advocates, and the school district itself, responded to the
parents' claims by appealing to the virtues of tolerance, exposure to diver-
sity, and critical deliberation, all priorities of a liberal, pluralistic society.'53
When pressed by the claim that children's "mere exposure" to sex and sexu-
ality is harmful in itself, even within a liberal society, gay rights advocates
asserted a left multicultural vision of pluralism that cast lesbians and gay
men not as sex actors but as an identity-based minority group meriting rec-
ognition in a diverse society.154
While the lawsuits emerging from Montgomery County and Lexington
provide the most comprehensive examples of school programming litigation,
a brief survey of additional cases further demonstrates the high level of in-
volvement by both gay rights and Christian Right legal organizations in the
fight over schools' value-inculcation function. Before its Parker work,
GLAD represented the Chelmsford, Massachusetts school district against a
parental challenge to an AIDS education program that included material on
homosexuality, masturbation, and condom use. 55 In addition to its role in
the Parker litigation, the ACLU represented a group of students in Boyd
County, Kentucky, challenging the school district's refusal to allow a gay-
straight alliance. 56 When that litigation ended with the school district agree-
ing to provide mandatory anti-harassment training to students, ADF sued the
11o See Parker GLAD Amicus Brief, supra note 68; Brief of Amici Curiae American
Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Lexington
Community Action for Responsible Education and Safety, Lexington Education Ass'n,
Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, and Respecting Differences, Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87
(1st Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1528); Parker Anti-Defamation League Amicus Brief, supra note
135.
'5' Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008); Parker v. Hurley, 474 F. Supp. 2d
261 (D. Mass. 2007).
152See Parker, 514 F.3d at 90.
'53 See Parker GLAD Amicus Brief, supra note 68; Brief of Defendant-Appellees at
8, Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1528).
'5 See Parker GLAD Amicus Brief, supra note 68, at 8.
' Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 528-29 (1st Cir. 1995).
156 Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d
667, 669 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
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school district on behalf of parents and students, and the ACLU intervened
in this second round of litigation.'57 These gay rights groups do not see
themselves as merely defending school districts involved in local skirmishes
with some local parents. Rather, they acknowledge how both sides in local
conflicts tend to be supported financially and rhetorically by larger national
movements. As one GLAD attorney put it to a local reporter, "these parents
groups ... are really fueled by a larger right-wing establishment."'' 8
Progressive groups, it must be noted, are also willing to represent par-
ents challenging a school district's controversial curricular decisions. For
instance, the ACLU represented a group of parents challenging a Bible
course in the Ector County, Texas public schools as well as parents challeng-
ing intelligent design policies in Dover, Pennsylvania, and Cobb County,
Georgia. 159
Christian Right legal organizations have initiated numerous court chal-
lenges to sex- and sexual orientation-related school programming. In addi-
tion to its Montgomery County work, TMLC represented a parent and
student challenging gay-positive programming in an Ann Arbor, Michigan
school. 60 Liberty Counsel not only represented CRC and PFOX in Mont-
gomery County, but the firm also became lead counsel for parents in
Palmdale, California, petitioning the Ninth Circuit to rehear en banc a case
regarding a sex-related survey given to students without parental notifica-
tion.' 6' ACLJ represented a parent challenging the health curriculum in Fair-
field, Connecticut. 62 In addition to its challenge to the Boyd County anti-
harassment programming, ADF is currently working to stop implementation
of a gay-inclusive curriculum at the elementary school level in Minneapo-
lis. 63 ADF also represented PFOX in Montgomery County, urging the
school district to end its alleged viewpoint discrimination with regard to
'5 Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F.3d 602, 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2008).
158 Ethan Jacobs, GLAD Atty: Lexington Lawsuit Has Had Chilling Effect on Schools,
BAY WINDOWS, Sept. 27, 2007, at 28, available at http://www.baywindows.com/index.
php?ch=news&sc=glbt&sc3=&id=48743.
'19 Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal of Action Without Prejudice, Moreno v. Ector
County Indep. Sch. Dist., No. MO-07-CV-039 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2008) [hereinafter
Moreno Dismissal]; see also Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 449 F.3d 1320, 1321
(1Ith Cir. 2006); Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D.
Pa. 2005); ACLU, ACLU Successfully Helps Parents Challenge Bible Classes in Texas
Public Schools, http://www.aclu.org/religion/schools/bibleinpublicschools.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2009).
160 Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
6 Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005); 447 F.3d 1187, 1188
(9th Cir. 2006) (denying petition for rehearing en banc).
162 Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 135 (2d Cir. 2003).
163 See Memorandum from Brian W. Raum & Austin R. Nimocks, Senior Legal
Counsel, Alliance Defense Fund, to Dr. William D. Green, Superintendent, Minneapolis
Public Schools, Lydia Lee, Chair, Minneapolis Board of Education, Dorothy Washington,
Principal, Park View Montessori Elementary School, Ray Aponte, Principal, Jefferson
Community School, & Robert Z. Brancale, Principal, Hale Elementary School (Apr. 24,
2008), available at http://www.telladf.org/UserDocs/MNPubSchoolsMemo.pdf.
2009]
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender
PFOX on school campuses. 164 Just as a GLAD attorney recognized the use
of parents in local communities to advance a "right-wing" agenda, Richard
Thompson, TMLC's President and Chief Counsel, commented that the
Montgomery County case is "another example of our public school system
being used as an indoctrination arm of homosexual advocacy groups.' 1 65
Christian Right legal groups not only represent parents challenging
school districts, but also school districts themselves. For instance, TMLC
represented the Dover school district in its intelligent design dispute, 66 ADF
came to the defense of the Cobb County public schools' evolution policy, 67
and, most recently, the Liberty Legal Institute, an ADF "ally" organization,
represented the Ector County school district against the ACLU's challenge to
a Bible course. 16
As this Part has made clear, both gay rights and Christian Right lawyers
view schools as central sites in the "culture war." Both see curriculum as a
way to produce citizens who will take for granted the movement's
worldview. Both, therefore, devote substantial resources to litigation ad-
dressing the place of sexual orientation in school programming.
III. SITUATING DOCTRINAL CLAIMS WITHIN MODELS OF PLURALISM
School curriculum represents one of the most influential-and hence
most contested-influences on a child's development. As gay rights groups
convince more schools to include sexual orientation programming, Christian
Right organizations respond, often with litigation. This Part explores how
Christian Right lawyers challenge school programming.
First, I set out the free speech claim, which maps onto an inclusion
model of pluralism. I explain the free speech claim's problematic doctrinal
application in this domain and the "balanced" curriculum remedy it sug-
gests. Nonetheless, some courts credit the free speech claim in a way that
evidences the power of the Christian Right's inclusion model of pluralism.
I then proceed to the Christian Right's parental rights and free exercise
claims, which work with an accommodation model of pluralism. These
claims also attempt to capture a pluralist ethic, yet do so in a way that sug-
'6 See Letter from Jeremy D. Tedesco, Legal Counsel, Alliance Defense Fund, to
Nancy Navarro, President, Montgomery County Board of Education (July 16, 2007),
available at http://www.telladf.org/UserDocs/MontgomeryCountyLetter.pdf.
16- Thomas More Law Center, Lessons on Homosexuals Being "Born That Way" and
Erotic Sex Taught to 8th and 10th Graders Challenged by the Thomas More Law Center
(Jan. 23, 2009), http://familyactionorganization.wordpress.com12008/01/2311essons-on-
homosexuals-being-%e2%80%98born-that-way%e2%80%99-and-erotic-sex-taught-to-
8th-and- 10th-graders-challenged-by-the-thomas-more-law-center/.
'66 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 730, 753-54 (M.D. Pa.
2005).
167 Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 449 F.3d 1320, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006).
'r See Moreno Dismissal, supra note 159, at 2; Alliance Defense Fund, Legal Orga-
nizations, http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/about/Allies/Legal.aspx (last visited Mar.
15, 2009).
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gests exemption, or a curriculum silent on sexual orientation, as the appro-
priate remedy. Courts have been uniformly unreceptive to these claims and
the theoretical framework within which they operate.
Throughout this Part, I pay attention to Christian Right cause lawyers'
focus on the Supreme Court, which has been more welcoming of their rights
claims than lower courts. I contend that this Supreme Court focus helps to
explain the Christian Right's aggressive litigation in the school programming
context despite unfavorable law.,
A. Inclusion Based on Free Speech
In asking for inclusion on equal terms, the free speech claim for relig-
ious liberty exemplifies the "place at the table" approach adopted by promi-
nent Christian Right cause lawyers. 169 Sounding in a participatory pluralism,
the free speech claim stresses the societal value of allowing all groups to
have their voices heard."'7 Christians are seeking to engage with difference,
maintaining a distinctive identity while also acknowledging the legitimate
place of competing identities, both secular and religious. This Christian
Right position constructs pluralism as an "engagement with, not abdication
of, differences and particularities."'' 71 As pluralism scholar David Machacek
puts it, pluralism becomes "meaningful diversity." 172
By definition, the free speech strategy legitimizes, at least in part, the
inclusion claims of other minority groups. 73 Michael McConnell, who was
influential in formulating the free speech claim for religious liberty, argues
169 See, e.g., HACKER, supra note 2, at 36-37, 45 (using the term "place at the table"
to describe the Christian Right strategy based on equal access for all worldviews and
forms of speech, regardless of religious content). Pluralism scholars often appeal to the
"common table" as the location for engagement in a pluralistic society. See ECK, supra
note 10, at 71 (discussing the work of John Courtney Murray, who "described America's
civic pluralism as the vigorous engagement of people of different religious beliefs around
the 'common table' of discussion and debate").
171 See Roof, supra note 10, at 8; see also ECK, supra note 10, at 69 ("The language
of pluralism is the language not just of difference but of engagement, involvement, and
participation."). This brand of pluralism also resonates with the cultural pluralism that
Diana Eck describes. Eck builds on the work of sociologist Horace Kallen, who pio-
neered the idea of pluralism by characterizing America's diversity as like a symphony, in
which distinctive tones blend in harmony. See id. at 57. Eschewing the symphony image
for one of jazz, Eck argues that this captures a society in which collaboration and inven-
tion are required as we "hear the musical lines of our neighbors." Id. at 58.
' ECK, supra note 10, at 71.
172 Machacek, supra note 107, at 155; see also Marty, supra note 8, at 16 ("Speak of
'pluralism' and you venture to a terrain in which people have thought about what to do
about diversity.").
17 Jay Sekulow has commented that he is "not concerned about competing
worldviews" since "[t]he danger is in keeping any of them out of the forum." HACKER,
supra note 2, at 37. Indeed, some Christian Right lawyers have embraced an even-
handed approach to the EAA such that it allows gay-straight alliances. See SoutHwoRTH,
supra note 44, at 164-65 (relating a Christian Right lawyer's story of how he convinced
his colleagues to adopt a balanced, doctrinally faithful approach to the EAA). Nonethe-
less, regardless of settled EAA principles, some Christian Right organizations oppose the
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in the domain of public schools that "[tihe best we can do ... is to foster
pluralism and diversity-to encourage as wide a range of views to be
presented and expounded as is practical, and to avoid when possible an au-
thoritative position on issues known to be controversial." '74 If the Christian
voice is given a place not because of its dominance but because of its mere
presence in a pluralistic society, the LGBT voice must also be included.
Indeed, Liberty Counsel's general counsel, Matthew Staver, has conceded as
much.175 Moreover, as an approach that simultaneously recognizes religious
and secular/progressive interests, this framing has at times been embraced by
progressive organizations like the ACLU.'76
In 1981, when the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Christian Right's
strategy in Widmar v. Vincent, Christian Right litigators began to establish
First Amendment free speech protection as the strongest guarantee of relig-
ious liberty in the public education context. 77 In Widmar, the Court held
that the University of Missouri at Kansas City policy prohibiting religious
student groups from using university facilities while permitting non-relig-
ious groups to use them violated the students' free speech rights, specifically
finding that "religious worship and discussion... are forms of speech and
association protected by the First Amendment."' 178
When the Widmar Court used language distinguishing the higher educa-
tion context from the secondary education context, Christian Right organiza-
tions lobbied Congress to pass the EAA, which translated Widmar's First
Amendment principles into statutory principles governing secondary
schools. 179 The Supreme Court later upheld the EAA against an Establish-
ment Clause challenge and, in so doing, vindicated the rights of students to
form a Christian club at a public high school. 80 Jay Sekulow, now head of
ACLJ, represented the students before the Court.'
After successfully securing religious freedom rights under free speech
principles for university and high school students, the Christian Right argued
rights of students to form gay-straight alliances. See, e.g., SPRIGG, supra note 87, at
16-17 (instructing parents on "Opposing 'Gay-Straight Alliances'").
174 Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L.
REv. 146, 165 (1986).
M In his case study of Liberty Counsel, Hans Hacker explains that Matthew Staver
"has argued for free expression within public schools, including student advocacy of
atheism, secular humanism, and gay marriage, as well as Christianity." HACKER, supra
note 2, at 56. Similarly, Hacker documents the "place at the table" approach advocated
by ACLJ's Jay Sekulow-an approach that "has led others to endorse attitudes more
tolerant of diverse ideas and speech." Id. at 36.
176 See, e.g., Brief of ACLU of San Diego & Imperial Counties as Amicus Curiae at
1-2, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 04-
CV- 1103) [hereinafter Harper ACLU Amicus Brief]; see also HACKER, supra note 2, at
56.
177454 U.S. 263 (1981).
'7 Id. at 269, 277.
179 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (2006). For a discussion of the lobbying efforts of the
Christian Right in support of the EAA, see HERTZKE, supra note 79, at 162-72.
180 See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990).
s ' See id. at 230.
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for the inclusion of non-student groups in the public school forum. In
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, Sekulow
represented a church that sought to use a school's facilities to screen a film
series that dealt with family values and childrearing from a religious per-
spective.182 He successfully argued that a school's policy to prohibit use of
its facilities by religious groups violated the First Amendment's free speech
guarantee, and the Court held that allowing the church access to the school
would not violate the Establishment Clause.'83
Finally, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Vir-
ginia, the Court again extended its free speech jurisprudence in the religious
freedom domain, holding that the University of Virginia engaged in uncon-
stitutional viewpoint discrimination by denying funds for printing costs to a
religious student publication.1' 4 With numerous victories based on the free
speech claim, the adaptation of free speech to religious freedom represents a
significant innovation of Christian Right lawyers that has changed the face
of litigation involving religious liberty.18 5
Significantly, these religious free speech principles emerged from Su-
preme Court decisions. Indeed, in Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel, the
Christian Right lost at both the district and appellate court levels. 86 The
increasingly conservative Supreme Court has been particularly receptive to
the Christian Right's claims in a way that lower federal courts have not,
accommodating such claims within notions of liberal pluralism embodied by
both public education and free speech doctrine.
Because the free speech approach is limited in significant ways to the
public education domain, 87 it is unsurprising to see Christian Right lawyers
attempt to extract additional gains from this strategy by situating school-
based claims that are not amenable to free speech arguments within free
speech doctrine. For instance, in Berger v. Rensselaer Central School Cor-
poration, Sekulow defended a school's policy allowing religious organiza-
182 508 U.S. 384, 385, 387-89 (1993).
3 See id. at 394-95.
' 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995).
1s5 BROWN, supra note 3, at 73 ("The coupling of the free speech clause with relig-
ious expression, a jurisprudential concept successfully invoked with regularity after
Widmar, has been the major contribution of the New Christian Right in the Supreme
Court.").
11
6 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 827-28
(1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 389-90
(1993).
187 See BROWN, supra note 3, at 142.
New Christian Right public interest law firms have seen the free speech rationale
stretched to include high school Bible clubs, religious literature distribution in
elementary and junior high schools, student activity fees in college, and public
access to school facilities. Outside the educational setting, however, the free
speech argument has yielded little substantive success.
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tions to distribute religious literature, including Bibles, in classrooms.'88
Rather than argue directly against Establishment Clause concerns, he as-
serted a free speech interest, namely the right of religious groups "to freely
express themselves by handing out Bibles to schoolchildren."'' 89 In striking
down the school policy under the Establishment Clause, the Seventh Circuit
criticized Sekulow for misapplying free speech principles, accusing him of
"[a]ttempting a definitional coup."' 9 Nonetheless, Christian Right liti-
gators demonstrated their willingness to make free speech claims in the pub-
lic school domain, even when the doctrinal arguments are quite strained.
Christian Right lawyers eventually identified issues in the sexual orien-
tation context conducive to free speech claims. They have aggressively liti-
gated First Amendment claims on behalf of students expressing religious
views critical of homosexuality. These claims present difficult issues, pit-
ting the free speech rights of students against the rights of lesbian and gay
students to be free from harassment. They incorporate an inclusion model of
pluralism, positioning Christian speech as one voice among many, and posi-
tioning school officials (and gay rights advocates) as attempting to silence
that voice in service of a singular, pro-gay normative vision. In fact, the
Christian Right's liberal, pluralistic free speech claims in these cases have
prompted the ACLU to file briefs on the side of ADF.' 9' Such issues have
produced a circuit split ripe for Supreme Court review. Whereas the Ninth
Circuit affirmed a school's ability to limit a student's speech condemning
homosexuality, the Seventh Circuit recently overturned a school's decision
to restrict such speech. 92
For the Christian Right movement, these student speech cases link to
school programming issues. First, some programming cases explicitly fea-
ture facts that include student speech claims. In Morrison v. Board of Edu-
cation, not only did parents and students challenge anti-harassment training,
but they also challenged an anti-harassment policy that allegedly prohibited
student speech critical of homosexuality. 93
More importantly, some cases present a blurry area between student
and government speech. In Hansen v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, a student
and her parent, represented by TMLC, successfully challenged a school's
refusal to allow her to speak, from a Catholic perspective, on the "Homosex-
uality and Religion" panel organized by the gay-straight alliance during the
'
88 See 982 F.2d 1160, 1161-62 (7th Cir. 1993).
119 Id. at 1165.
190 See id. (explaining that the free speech claim "distorts the facts and misconstrues
the law").
M9' See, e.g., Harper ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 176, at 1-2.
192 Compare Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), with
Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008). In both cases,
ADF represented the students. See Harper, 445 F.3d at 1170; Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 669.
193 521 F.3d 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2008).
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school's diversity week. 194 Although the district court rejected the free exer-
cise and parental rights claims, it found viable Establishment Clause, equal
protection, and free speech claims. Adopting a "place at the table" ap-
proach, the court observed that the case presented "the ironic, and unfortu-
nate, paradox of a public high school celebrating 'diversity' by refusing to
permit the presentation to students of an 'unwelcomed' viewpoint on the
topic of homosexuality and religion, while actively promoting the competing
view."' 195 The court, then, rejected the gay rights multicultural brand of plu-
ralism, which calls for respect for lesbians and gay men, in favor of the
Christian Right's brand of pluralism, which includes and gives voice to relig-
ious objections to homosexuality. Furthermore, the court's emphasis on cap-
turing a range of perspectives relates to calls for "balance" in curricula
relating to sexual orientation. 196 In this way, Hansen positions exclusively
pro-gay views-when part of school-sponsored programming-as constitu-
tionally suspect.
This view comports with the Christian Right free speech claim in Citi-
zens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Public Schools. 197
Stretching the free speech principle from student-run panels into the class-
room, the federal court in the first round of the Montgomery County litiga-
tion adopted Liberty Counsel's free speech position, in addition to its
Establishment Clause argument. Granting a preliminary injunction against
the gay-inclusive curriculum, the court found viewpoint discrimination
likely since the school district "open[ed] up the classroom to the subject of
homosexuality, and specifically, the moral rightness of the homosexual lifes-
tyle," but "present[ed] only one view on the subject-that homosexuality is
a natural and morally correct lifestyle-to the exclusion of other perspec-
tives." 98 In this sense, a pluralism based on the inclusion of both positive
and negative portrayals of homosexuality trumped a left multicultural one
based on lesbian and gay equality and respect.
The court's treatment of viewpoint discrimination in the classroom set-
ting, where government rather than student speech is implicated, is an out-
lier. 199 Curriculum is not subject to the "place at the table" approach that
19 293 F. Supp. 2d 780, 782, 803, 806-807, 809 (E.D. Mich. 2003). Hansen also
featured an organization-versus-organization dynamic. The gay-straight alliance had
contacted the ACLU for legal advice, and the ACLU advised that Hansen (and the Pio-
neers for Christ student club) could be denied representation on the panel. See id. at 790
n.13.
195 Id. at 782-83.
96id.
197 AW-05-1194, 2005 WL 1075634, at *11-12 (D. Md. May 5, 2005). See supra
Part II.
198 Id. at *12.
199 Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Board of Education, Island Trees Union
Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), might give some hope to
Christian Right advocates who seek to impose limits on the discretion schools may exer-
cise in fashioning programming. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a school board
may not remove books from its library based on the mere disapproval of ideas and the
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has increasingly governed non-governmental secular and religious speech,
and free speech principles do not generally compel particular government
speech.200 At most, courts have applied a deferential reasonableness stan-
dard when faced with programming by a school (rather than a student). For
instance, in evaluating the anti-harassment training for students in Morrison,
the district court rejected the free speech challenge, reasoning that "the stu-
dent training is speech by the school and, as such, need not be neutral so
long as the viewpoint or content is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogi-
cal concerns. z20'
More starkly, the state Board of Education explicitly rejected the free
speech claim in the second round of the Montgomery County litigation
based on the inapplicability of viewpoint discrimination principles to curric-
ulum. In assessing whether the revised lesson plans violated the plaintiffs'
free speech rights by expressing "only one viewpoint on homosexuality,"
desire to impose a particular political or religious view. See id. at 872. Significantly,
however, the plurality distinguished the school library from the classroom, carefully not-
ing that its decision "does not intrude into the classroom, or into the compulsory courses
taught there." Id. at 862. Indeed, the dissenting justices explained that the Court had
reached too far into local school board discretion, finding untenable the second-guessing
of school officials in both the library and the classroom. See id. at 893 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, neither the Hansen court nor the federal court in Citizens for a
Responsible Curriculum cited Pico for its First Amendment holding. Instead, both relied
on viewpoint discrimination principles, citing Rosenberger. See Citizens for a Responsi-
ble Curriculum, 2005 WL 1075634, at *12; Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 799. Interest-
ingly, as explained infra Part V, some gay rights lawyers have attempted to stretch the
Pico holding into the classroom when arguing for rights to gay-inclusive instruction.
20o See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998)
("Much like ... a public school prescribing its curriculum, a broadcaster by its nature
will facilitate the expression of some viewpoints instead of others."). Christian Right
advocates advance similar free speech claims in the evolution/intelligent design context.
Relying on the Supreme Court's adoption of the liberal free speech approach, some argue
that "if public schools or other governmental agencies bar teachers from teaching about
[intelligent] design theory but allow teachers to teach [evolution], they will undermine
free speech and foster viewpoint discrimination." David K. DeWolf, Stephen C. Meyer,
& Mark Edward DeForrest, Teaching the Origins Controversy: Science, or Religion, or
Speech?, 2000 UTAH L. REv. 39, 106 (2000). The claim, of course, suffers doctrinal
deficiencies similar to those observed in the gay-inclusive curriculum context.
201 Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. Supp. 2d 937, 942 (E.D. Ken. 2006), aff'd on
other grounds, 521 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2008). This standard derives from the Supreme
Court's decision in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), in
which the Court held that with regard to school-sponsored speech, or student speech that
would reasonably be perceived to bear the school's imprimatur, "educators do not offend
the First Amendment . . .so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns." Id. at 273. In this sense, the Morrison court applied precedent
that focused on student speech and was therefore inapposite. After citing Rosenberger
for the proposition that "government speech-speech by the school itself.., is given a
certain amount of latitude in that it need not be neutral, so long as the speech does not run
afoul the Establishment Clause or the Equal Protection Clause," the court also appealed
to the Hazelwood standard governing student speech sponsored by the school. Morrison,
419 F. Supp. 2d at 941. Perhaps the court felt compelled to do so because the case also
featured anti-harassment policies that implicated student speech. Or perhaps the court
found Hazelwood relevant in order to explicitly and unequivocally distinguish Hansen,
which applied the Hazelwood standard. See id. at 941-43.
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the Board, unlike the federal court in the 2005 challenge, characterized Su-
preme Court precedent so as to place public school curriculum outside the
bounds of viewpoint discrimination considerations. 02 Perhaps especially
bothered by PFOX, which advocated for a curriculum that included "ex-
gay" as a sexual orientation, the Board compared the situation to teaching
the Holocaust without including the views of Holocaust deniers. The Board
reasoned that a "viewpoint-neutrality requirement would force the County
Board into a Hobson's choice: either abandon any lessons on the Holocaust
or else address the horrors of that event, but be forced to turn around and tell
students that perhaps the Holocaust never happened."2 3 The Board con-
cluded that "[w]hile the First Amendment prohibits the government from
silencing individuals who argue that the Holocaust never happened, it does
not give those same individuals a right to insist that the government convey
their views when fashioning a school curriculum. ' '204 Here, then, the Board
used a more restrained doctrinal position to stake out a left multicultural
brand of pluralism-one that validates lesbian and gay inclusion in an exclu-
sively affirmative way. 205
Nonetheless, that both the Hansen and Citizens for a Responsible Cur-
riculum courts credited the free speech claim, while dismissing parental
rights and free exercise claims, suggests the currency of the inclusion model
of pluralism elaborated by Christian Right lawyers. The emphasis on inclu-
sion of diverse viewpoints in a pluralistic society so thoroughly pervades
school-based advocacy that the boundaries between the classroom (and gov-
ernment speech) and spaces outside the classroom (and student speech) have
loosened.
In addition to its doctrinal limitations in the curriculum context, the free
speech claim poses remedial complications. The free speech claim lends
itself to a call for "balanced" curriculum, rather than a curriculum without
any reference to sexual orientation.2°6 Christian Right lawyers deployed the
free speech claim this way in the Montgomery County litigation, using the
ex-gay perspective of PFOX to suggest the need to include an additional
category of sexual orientation. Indeed, focusing on resort to the free speech
202 Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., No.
07-30, at 6 (Md. State Bd. of Educ. June 27, 2007). The Board's decision was affirmed
by a state circuit court. See Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery
County Pub. Sch., No. 284980 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008).
203 Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum, at 6-7 (Md. State Bd. of Educ. June 27,
2007).204 Id. at 7.
205 Of course, this affirmative position tends to masquerade as neutral, presenting
objective information on sexual orientation while implicitly discrediting religious objec-
tions to homosexuality.
206 The "balanced" curriculum agenda links rhetorically to other Christian Right pro-
gramming priorities, most notably the treatment of creationism or intelligent design
within a science curriculum. See, e.g., Gu-rrAt, supra note 13, at 101-07 (exploring
the turn away from advocacy with no mention of evolution toward advocacy centered
around "balanced treatment of creationism along with evolution").
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claim in the programming context reveals how the controversial position
represented by the ex-gay movement is vital to the claims of the more main-
stream Christian Right.
The "balanced" curriculum position, which fits best with the inclusion
model of pluralism embraced by the Christian Right, may undermine the
remedy desired by many constituents. Unlike in other contexts where the
free speech claim tracks the desired remedy-inclusion at the proverbial ta-
ble on equal terms-the remedial disconnect in the school programming
context underscores the uneasy fit of the free speech framing. Christian par-
ents objecting to gay-inclusive curriculum likely prefer that the curriculum
not delve into such purportedly controversial territory.2°7 In the event that it
does, they would prefer that their children be exempted from it.2°8
The organized parent group in Montgomery County provides an illus-
tration. While Christian Right lawyers argued for the inclusion of a variety
of viewpoints based on a free speech claim (and prevailed on such grounds
in the first round of litigation), the client, CRC, was not committed to this
model of inclusion. Instead, parents in CRC wanted their children to avoid
the discussion of sexual orientation altogether, regardless of how many
viewpoints were included, and wanted the children of other parents to avoid
the discussion as well. CRC deployed the exemption option offered by the
school as a way to pressure school officials into a curriculum that adhered to
their religious beliefs.2°9 Urging parents to exempt their children from the
new lesson plans, CRC explained that "[i]f enough children opt-out, and
enough parents complain (loudly and frequently), [the school district] may
be forced into establishing a parallel curriculum .... ,,210 In other words, as
CRC's advocates were pressing free speech claims so that the curriculum
included the objectors' perspective on sexual orientation and sexuality, CRC
itself attempted to orchestrate a large-scale opt-out as a way to influence the
school district to change the curriculum entirely, omitting all views on ho-
207 In a poll conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation, Harvard University's Ken-
nedy School of Government, and National Public Radio, only about fifty percent of par-
ents thought it was appropriate to teach about homosexuality in middle school. Only four
percent thought such instruction should teach "that homosexuality is acceptable." See
Diana Jean Schemo, Lessons on Homosexuality Move into the Classroom, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2007, at B6.
208 Requests for exemptions are common in curricular challenges. See, e.g., Parker v.
Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Two sets of parents, whose religious beliefs are
offended by gay marriage and homosexuality . . . assert that they must be given prior
notice by the school and the opportunity to exempt their young children from exposure to
books they find religiously repugnant.").
209 The parents were given an opt-in mechanism. See Citizens for a Responsible Cur-
riculum, supra note 112. As opposed to an opt-out mechanism, which requires parents to
explicitly exempt their children from class, an opt-in mechanism requires parents to spe-
cifically give their children permission to attend. An opt-in mechanism, then, represents
a stronger parental protection than an opt-out mechanism.
210 Id.
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mosexuality.2 11 Indeed, CRC members were not satisfied with the exemp-
tion mechanism offered by the school, clearly wanting to reach beyond their
own children to influence the instruction all children received.
In sum, not only is the free speech claim of suspect application in the
curriculum context, but it suggests a limited remedy-"balanced" program-
ming-that may miss the point for many Christian parents, who may not
want their children (or any children) exposed to materials on sexual orienta-
tion and sexuality. It is to the alternative parental rights and free exercise
claims that I now turn.
B. Accommodation Based on Parental Rights and Free Exercise
Lawyers representing parents challenging school programming with
which they disagree on religious grounds most often claim both free exercise
and parental rights violations. 2 2 These claims depart from the inclusion
model of pluralism underpinning the free speech claim for religious free-
dom. Instead, the parental rights and free exercise claims hew to an accom-
modation model of pluralism that allows distinctive religious cultures to
survive, even if such survival depends on shielding adherents from compet-
ing perspectives. That is, religious diversity in a pluralistic society comes to
depend on the preservation of distinctive, even if illiberal, belief systems.
Accordingly, this brand of pluralism stresses legitimate group difference
over a civic education that inculcates liberal values, including tolerance, au-
tonomy, and critical deliberation.213
21 As CRC explained, "if 10 students per school OPT-OUT of the program, [the
school district] is forced to assign a teacher and a classroom to the alternative lessons."Id.
2 2 Here, I am dealing specifically with challenges to school-wide programming or
curricular choices in the domain of sexuality. This analysis, however, would apply to
attempts by schools to include other potentially controversial topics in the curriculum.
For instance, litigation ensued when the Byron, California school system included in-
struction about Islam in order to increase student sensitivity after September 11 th. See
Eklund v. Byron Union Sch. Dist., No. 04-15032, 2005 WL 3086580, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov.
17, 2005). The issues of evolution/intelligent design and Bible instruction, however, pose
somewhat different questions, implicating the Establishment Clause in a central way.
Courts have been much more likely in this context to reject school decisions. See, e.g.,
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
109 (1968); Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 766 (M.D. Pa.
2005).
23 This new invocation resonates with a strand of multiculturalism that, unlike the
left multiculturalism embraced by gay rights lawyers, preserves the distinctive (perhaps
illiberal) traditions of religious minorities. While religiously grounded multiculturalism
generally focuses on marginalized, non-Western religions, Christian Right lawyers hint at
this position to the extent that it stresses accommodation and facilitates a framing of
religious adherents as minorities in an increasingly hostile (secular) society. See Ayelet
Shachar, Two Critiques of Multiculturalism, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 253, 261, 265-266
(2002). But see KYMLICKA, supra note 42, at 177 (distinguishing the demand for with-
drawal by religious groups from the late-twentieth-century move toward multicultural-
ism, which focuses on inclusion of non-white and non-Christian minorities).
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Despite overtures to this alternative iteration of pluralism, courts have
repeatedly declared that parents' rights do not allow them to dictate a
school's curriculum and that general school programming does not impinge
on religious freedom. In rejecting parental challenges, courts have explicitly
rejected opt-out requests.
In one of the most prominent cases, Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Pro-
ductions, the First Circuit rejected parental challenges to a mandatory AIDS
education program for high school students. The court explained that "the
rights of parents . . . do not encompass a broad-based right to restrict the
flow of information in the public schools. 2 14 The court also determined that
free exercise rights are not infringed by "a neutral requirement that ap-
plie[s] generally to all students." '215 In rejecting a parental challenge to
mandatory middle school health classes in Leebaert v. Harrington, the Sec-
ond Circuit relied on Brown, concluding that approaching curricular objec-
tions with heightened scrutiny "would make it difficult or impossible for any
public school authority to administer school curricula responsive to the over-
all educational needs of the community and its children." ' 6 In Fields v.
Palmdale School District, the Ninth Circuit relied on Brown to reject a pa-
rental challenge to a survey administered to students touching on issues of
sex, holding that while parents enjoy the "right to inform their children
when and as they wish on the subject of sex," they do not possess a "consti-
tutional right.., to prevent a public school from providing its students with
whatever information it wishes to provide, sexual or otherwise, when and as
the school determines that it is appropriate to do so." '217
More recent cases on gay-inclusive programming rely on these earlier
decisions. In Parker v. Hurley, the district court rejected the parental chal-
lenge to gay-inclusive curriculum, finding that these parents "have chosen to
send their children to the Lexington public schools with its current curricu-
lum," and "[t]he Constitution does not permit them to prescribe what those
children will be taught." ''1 The First Circuit affirmed, finding "well recog-
nized" the proposition that parents "do not have a constitutional right to
'direct how a public school teaches their child.'" 2 9 Furthermore, the court
rejected the free exercise claim, holding that the "mere fact that a child is
exposed on occasion in public school to a concept offensive to a parent's
religious belief does not inhibit the parent from instructing the child
differently."220
214 68 F.3d 525, 534 (1st Cir. 1995).
215 Id. at 539.
216 332 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2003).
217 427 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005).
218 474 F. Supp. 2d 261, 264 (D. Mass. 2007).
2 19 Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Blau v. Fort Thomas
Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395 (6th Cir. 2005)).220 1d. at 105.
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Likewise, in Morrison v. Board of Education, the district court rejected
a challenge to diversity programming that consisted of mandatory, school-
wide training sessions for middle and high school students aimed at reducing
anti-gay harassment. In rejecting the parental rights claim, the court con-
cluded that the parents "do not have the right to impede the Board's reasona-
ble pedagogical prerogative, nor do they have the right to opt-out of the
same.""22 In rejecting the free exercise claim, the court stressed a disclaimer
read at the end of each training session, stating that students' religious views
"'are very sacred and they should only be influenced by you, your parents
and your family."' 22
From Brown to more recent cases in Massachusetts, Kentucky, and Ma-
ryland, it is clear that parental rights and free exercise challenges to sex-
related or gay-inclusive programming routinely fail. Yet Christian Right
cause lawyers continue to threaten school districts with litigation and to
bring claims on behalf of aggrieved parents. Doctrinal gaps left open by the
increasingly conservative Supreme Court help explain this trend.
As the history of the free speech claim for religious liberty demon-
strates, Christian Right cause lawyers center their strategy on a Supreme
Court populated by conservative justices backed by the movement.223 The
most important goal for some advocates is to have a case heard by the
Court.224 As ACLJ general counsel Jay Sekulow explains, his firm "look[s]
at cases that are going to set a national precedent. '225 Indeed, Sekulow ad-
221 419 F. Supp. 2d 937, 946 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
222 Id. at 944-45.
223 See HUNTER, supra note 1, at 252-53 (explaining how both sides of the "culture
war" want the Supreme Court to reflect their ideologies). ACLJ, for instance, enthusias-
tically supported the most recent Supreme Court appointees, Justice Alito and Chief Jus-
tice Roberts. See American Center for Law & Justice, President Nominates Sam Alito to
Supreme Court, http://www.aclj.orgffialNotebook/Read.aspx?id=272 (last visited Mar.
15, 2009); American Center for Law & Justice, Petition to Support John G. Roberts, Jr.,
https://www.aclj.org/Petition/default.aspx?SC=3034&AC=l (last visited Mar. 15,
2009). Of the forty-two conservative and libertarian public interest law firms that Ann
Southworth documents in her study of conservative cause lawyering, the firms filed
briefs in 144 Supreme Court cases between 2000 and 2004. Six organizations, including
ACLJ, filed over a dozen briefs during that period. See Southworth, Conservative Law-
yers, supra note 44, at 1268. In her most recent study, Southworth quotes a religious
liberties lawyer: "We always have half of our eye on the Supreme Court." SoUTH-
WORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT, supra note 44, at 73.
224 See HACKER, supra note 2, at 26 (noting evangelical Christian law firms' "ultimate
goal of 'arguing cases up to the Supreme Court"'). Within a traditional model of cause
lawyering, Supreme Court pronouncements provide the ultimate resolution, offering a
way for a declaration of rights to affect behavior on the ground on a national scale, and
Supreme Court participation signals to supporters and to critics that the involved organi-
zations are "'players' in the most important judicial arena of all." See BROWN, supra
note 3, at 78; SCHEINGOLD, supra note 92, at 173 ("The ultimate goal is a definitive
decision by the United States Supreme Court itself. Traditional activists invest in leading
case tactics because they believe that authoritative pronouncements by the Supreme
Court will alter patterns of behavior in the real world.").
225 HACKER, supra note 2, at 27; see also id. at 23 (quoting ACLJ general counsel Jay
Sekulow as stating that "the only books we wanted to write were books that ended up in
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mitted when discussing a school voucher case, "[wle took the case knowing
we would lose in the lower courts with the idea we would go to the Supreme
Court."22 6
Advocates might attempt to recreate the success of the free speech
claim, which was grounded in Supreme Court decisions, in the school pro-
gramming context. Most cases relating to curricular challenges, including
gay- and sexuality-specific disputes, come from federal district and appellate
courts. It is not unreasonable for lawyers to believe that the Court would
take issue with, for instance, decisions from the First and Ninth Circuits in
this domain.227
To that end, Christian Right cause lawyers have seized on two impor-
tant doctrinal ambiguities left open by the Supreme Court in the parental
rights and free exercise domains in an attempt to gain Supreme Court review
and garner heightened scrutiny. These lawyers present the parental right as
universally fundamental and argue for strict scrutiny for a conjoined parental
rights/free exercise, or "hybrid," claim, all the while appealing to an image
of Christian parents as a vulnerable minority in a pluralistic society.
1. Parental Rights Claims
Parental rights have particular appeal in a pluralist paradigm.28 Al-
lowing parents to control the upbringing of their children acknowledges the
interest in preserving diversity: parents are allowed to impart values, regard-
less of majoritarian preferences, on their children, who are likely to carry
them on. In this way, religious diversity in America is intimately linked
with parental rights. In the school context, parental rights have the most
resonance when asserted against state-mandated public education; private
those [book]cases right there [pointing to shelves holding the Supreme Court
Reporter]").
226 Id. at 27. ACLJ "cultivat[es] cases in various issue areas with unique fact pat-
terns in the hope that some will find their way up for review by the high court." Id. at 35.
Hacker documents that a significant percentage of ACLJ's cases between 1987 and 2004
were part of an effort to take the case up the appellate chain. See id. at 44. ACLJ's
website describes the group's litigation based primarily on its Supreme Court work.
While noting that ACLJ "litigates at all levels in state and federal courts across the na-
tion," the website explains that "[m]any of the issues that we are involved with at the
ACLJ end up at the Supreme Court of the United States" and "Chief Counsel Jay
Sekulow has appeared before the high court on numerous occasions-conducting oral
arguments on some of the most important issues of the day." See ACLJ, Cases, http://
www.aclj.org/Cases/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
227 Although talk of the Ninth Circuit's record reversal rates is overstated, during the
2004-O5 term, the First and Ninth Circuits were among the top four circuits for reversal
rates, with rates of one hundred percent and eighty-four percent respectively. See Media
Matters for America, O'Reilly Echoed Right-Wing Falsehood that Supreme Court Over-
turns 9th Circuit at a "Record Rate", http://mediamatters.org/items/200512150016 (last
visited Mar. 15, 2009).
228 See HUNTER, supra note 1, at 207 (for conservatives, "genuine pluralism in educa-
tion can only be based upon the concept of parents' rights"); see also GALSTON, supra
note 11, at 108.
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parochial schools represent recognition of parental authority and the parental
prerogative to educate one's children exclusively in one's religious tradi-
tion.229 More recently, parental rights, and the corresponding insistence on
pluralism and diversity, have been applied to the school voucher movement:
parental rights signal choice in service of diversity. 230 In the domain of sexu-
ality, parental rights have added resonance since sex is thought of as an
especially private, personal, family-centered issue.23 ' By preserving parental
authority and religious diversity, it is an accommodation model of pluralism,
rather than an inclusion model, to which parental rights attach. This accom-
modation model of pluralism permits religious individuals to wall them-
selves off from a more secular society.
232
Two Supreme Court cases from the first half of the twentieth century,
Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names,
form the foundation of parental rights doctrine.233 In Meyer, the Supreme
Court struck down Nebraska's statutory ban on foreign language instruction
in schools, concluding that the legislation interferes "with the power of par-
ents to control the education of their own. ' 234 In Pierce, the Court again
struck down a sweeping law-Oregon's Compulsory Education Act, which
prohibited parents from sending their children to parochial or private schools
and thus mandated public school attendance.2 35
For decades, parental rights doctrine sat relatively untouched, but the
Supreme Court has returned to it in more recent years. In Troxel v. Gran-
229 See Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(holding that law requiring public school attendance and thereby prohibiting parochial
school attendance unconstitutionally burdened parental rights).
230 See GUTMANN, supra note 13, at 65; Gutmann, supra note 39, at 572 ("Proponents
of unregulated voucher systems ... invoke support for social diversity ....").
23! Cf. GUTMANN, supra note 13, at 109 ("The strongest case for banning courses on
sex education from public schools (regardless of democratic will) rests on an appreciation
of the intimacy of the subject matter.").
232 See HUNTER, supra note 1, at 208 ("[A] government monopoly [on education]
cannot respond to the rights of parents to educate their children in the moral universe of
their particular choice. It is the logic of parents' rights and the pluralism that parents'
rights implies that necessitates, for the conservatives, the breakup of the public school
monopoly.").
213 Pierce, 268 U.S. 510; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
234 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
235 Notably, Pierce also posed the intersection of parental rights and free exercise. In
striking down the Act, the Court relied on its holding just two years earlier: "Under the
doctrine of Meyer .... we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control." 268 U.S. at 534-35. Two decades later, the Court had
the opportunity to articulate limitations on the parental rights articulated in Meyer and
Pierce. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944), the Court rejected a paren-
tal control claim, which again intersected with issues of religious free exercise. The
child's aunt and legal guardian, a Jehovah's Witness, had allowed her niece to sell relig-
ious literature in violation of the state's child labor law. The Court reasoned that
"[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae
may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting
the child's labor, and in many other ways." Id. at 166.
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ville, the Court struck down a Washington statute allowing for third-party
visitation rights against a parent's wishes, whenever such visitation was
deemed in the child's best interests.236 In her plurality opinion, Justice
O'Connor, citing Meyer and Pierce, appealed to the liberty interests pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause and characterized the right at stake as
fundamental.2 37 Other Justices did the same, providing a clear majority of
the Court specifying the fundamental nature of the parental right.23 But, as
Justice Thomas pointed out, the Troxel plurality did not apply strict scrutiny
even though a fundamental right was at stake.2 39 Nonetheless, Christian
Right litigators use Troxel to argue that parental rights should, as a general
matter, be considered fundamental and thus merit strict scrutiny.
Courts, however, have routinely rejected the framing of parental rights
as fundamental in the curriculum context. They conceptualize parental
rights as traditionally negative rights, protecting parents from state interfer-
ence with regard to their children. 4 Although the distinction between posi-
236 530 U.S. 57, 61-63 (2000).
237 Id. at 65 ("The liberty interest at issue in this case-the interest of parents in the
care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court.").
238 Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, joined Justice
O'Connor's opinion. See id. at 60. Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, and Justice Ste-
vens, in his dissent, also specified the fundamental nature of the parental right. See id. at
80 (Thomas, J., concurring) (recognizing the "fundamental right of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children"); id. at 87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Our cases leave no
doubt that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in caring for and guiding their
children."); David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy after Troxel and Car-
hart, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1125, 1135-55 (2001) (providing a thorough breakdown of the
opinions in Troxel).
239 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Our decision in [Pierce] holds that parents have a fundamental constitutional
right to rear their children, including the right to determine who shall educate and
socialize them. The opinions of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter
recognize such a right, but curiously none of them articulates the appropriate stan-
dard of review. I would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental
rights.
Id. As Adam Winkler has argued, despite common wisdom to the contrary, courts often
apply something other than strict scrutiny when fundamental rights are implicated. See
Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT.
227, 227-28 (2006). Scholars have voiced concern over what exactly Troxel means for
parental rights doctrine. For instance, David Meyer discerns a more middle-ground bal-
ancing test applied by the Court in such cases, seeing Troxel as a ratcheting down of the
otherwise strict level of scrutiny. See Meyer, supra note 238, at 1162-63.240 See James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371, 1374-75 (1994) (distinguishing "par-
ents' negative claim-rights against state interference in their child-rearing practices and
decision-making" from "a 'positive claim-right' against the State when the State is under
a duty owed to the parent to provide some form of assistance to the parent"); see also
Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REv. 857, 864 (2001) ("The
distinction between positive and negative rights is an intuitive one. One category is a
right to be free from government, while the other is a right to command government
action.").
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tive and negative rights is theoretically problematic, 241 it helps to explain
courts' reluctance to find parental rights violations in the classroom setting.
Courts have no problem prohibiting the state from telling parents they must
send their children to public school (negative rights), but courts do not want
to tell the state that schools must instruct children in a way that meets par-
ents' expectations or demands (positive rights).242
This distinction appeared to animate the Second Circuit's post-Troxel
decision in Leebaert v. Harrington, a case brought by ACLJ.2 43 While
Leebaert claimed that his constitutional right to direct the upbringing and
education of his child required the Fairfield, Connecticut school district to
excuse his son from attending health education classes, the court, rejecting
the father's challenge, found "nothing in Troxel that would lead us to con-
clude.., that parents have a fundamental right to the upbringing and educa-
tion of the child that includes the right to tell public schools what to teach or
what not to teach him or her."2"
Nonetheless, lawyers for the Christian Right consistently assert, partic-
ularly trying to exploit the strong language from Troxel, that the parental
right is more generally fundamental and subject to strict scrutiny. For in-
stance, in its position statement on parental rights, ACLJ advises its constitu-
ents that the fundamental liberty interest of parents articulated in Troxel
supports parental opt-out rights with regard to classroom instruction. 245 Sim-
ilarly, the parents in Parker relied on Troxel as "recognizing a substantive
due process right of parents 'to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
241 Scholars have offered pointed critiques of the positive/negative rights distinction,
arguing that all rights depend on government action for their enforcement. See, e.g.,
Cross, supra note 240, at 864-65.
242 Some courts treat parental rights in the family law context differently than paren-
tal rights in other contexts, such as education. The Ninth Circuit in Fields v. Palmdale
School District went so far as to suggest that "the Meyer-Pierce right does not extend
beyond the threshold of the school door." 427 F.3d 1187, 1207 (9th Cir. 2005). The
court later issued an amended opinion, deleting this controversial statement and replacing
it with the following: "In sum, we affirm that the Meyer-Pierce due process right of
parents to make decisions regarding their children's education does not entitle individual
parents to enjoin school boards from providing information the boards determine to be
appropriate in connection with the performance of their educational functions .... "
Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 447 F.3d 1187, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 2006).
243 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268
F.3d 275, 291 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Troxel does not change the [analysis] in the context of
parental rights concerning public education. While Parents may have a fundamental right
in the upbringing and education of their children, this right does not cover the Parents'
objection to a public school Uniform Policy.").
24 Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 135, 142 (emphasis in original).
245 See ACLJ Memorandum of Law, The Parental Right to Opt Children Out of Ob-
jectionable School Curricula (Nov. 20, 2001), http://www.aclj.org/Issues/Resources/
Document.aspx?ID= 15. ACLJ also appeals to Troxel in its demand letter arguing that
Portland, Maine's contraception program violates parental rights. See Letter from Jay
Alan Sekulow, Chief Counsel, American Center for Law and Justice, & Stephen Whiting,
Maine Director, American Center for Law and Justice, N.E., to John Coyne, Chairperson,
Portland School Committee 7 (Nov. 2, 2007), available at http://www.aclj.org/media/pdf/
ParentalRights-atKingMiddleSchool_1 1022007.pdf.
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and control of their children,'" while at the same time disclaiming any intent
to control the curriculum. 246 Unsurprisingly, the First Circuit found Troxel
"not so broad as plaintiffs assert. 2 41
2. "Hybrid" Parental Rights/Free Exercise Claims
Unsuccessful in garnering heightened scrutiny for parental rights stand-
ing alone, Christian Right lawyers have paired the parental right with a free
exercise right in an attempt to gain heightened scrutiny. Free exercise
claims strike a chord with pluralistic notions of religious diversity. Some
scholars have argued that the religion clauses of the First Amendment form
"a charter for democratic and civil-religious pluralism. 2 48 Going further,
Ted Jelen contends that the free exercise clause is so significant to religious
pluralism because "the more diverse the local or national religious land-
scape, the more distinctive (and therefore valuable) adherence to one's own
religious tradition might seem. 249 In other words, the free exercise clause
ensures the value of one's own religion in part because it facilitates the prac-
tice of multiple religions.
Litigants are quick to work within these pluralist notions. For instance,
the Parker parents asserted that "[t]he whole purpose of civil rights litiga-
tion is to protect minorities from... government overreaching" and charac-
terized themselves as "a tiny minority comprised of people who harbor deep
and abiding religious beliefs consistent with the 'Defense of Marriage
Act.' "250 Indeed, the language from the Parker pleadings evidences the shift
away from majoritarian rhetoric: Christians are now "a tiny minority." The
parents' claims make religious beliefs special, positioning them as different
in kind from other expressive activity. While these claims still work with
ideas of diversity and pluralism, they nonetheless do so within a religious
framework-it is religious diversity to which they attach. 25' As will become
clear in the next Part, while the free speech claim tracks an inclusion model
of pluralism that is in many ways grounded in secular liberalism, the paren-
tal rights and free exercise claims hew to a religiously-focused pluralism that
seeks to accommodate illiberal impulses against subjectivity and tolerance.
The coupling of parental rights and free exercise claims, a coupling that
the Supreme Court has labeled "hybrid" claims, springs from the significant
ratcheting down of the level of scrutiny afforded free exercise claims stand-
216 Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 101, 102 (1st Cir. 2008).
247 Id. at 101.
248 Marty, supra note 8, at 22.
249 Jelen, supra note 18, at 30.
2
-o Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Parker v. Hurley, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008) (No. 07-
1368)) [hereinafter Parker Cert. Petition].
251 Id. at 23 ("The interesting dynamic in this case is that the petitioners, a small
minority in Lexington, Massachusetts, wish to remain part of the fabric of the public
school. They ask only that they, as a family unit, not be placed at risk of losing their
religion .... ).
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ing alone. In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court rejected a free exer-
cise claim based on a neutral law of general application, departing from its
more stringent Sherbert test, which required that "governmental actions that
substantially burden a religious practice ...be justified by a compelling
governmental interest." ' Notably, however, Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority in Smith, stated that:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amend-
ment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to re-
ligiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections, such as... the right of parents...
to direct the education of their children.253
In turning down the claim at issue, the Court noted that the case "does not
present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with
any communicative activity or parental right. '25 4 Since the Court's decision
in Smith appeared to lower the standard to which neutral, generally applica-
ble government regulations (like curriculum) are subjected under free exer-
cise analysis, the existence of a "hybrid" claim that garners heightened
scrutiny becomes crucially important to litigants with free exercise
complaints.2 15
The 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, which Justice Scalia cited in
Smith for the "hybrid" rights concept, has come to signify the paradigmatic
"hybrid" rights case.25 6 In Yoder, Amish parents challenged Wisconsin's
compulsory education law, arguing that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments prevent the state from forcing them, after their children finished the
eighth grade, to send their children to formal school until age sixteen. In the
name of parental rights and free exercise, the Court sided with the Amish
parents. Approaching the conjoined claim with a heightened level of scru-
tiny, the Court explained that "when the interests of parenthood are com-
bined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more
than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of
252494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03
(1963)); see also Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46
UCLA L. Rav. 1465, 1467 (1999) (explaining that before Smith, courts determined
whether a law that "substantially burdened" a religious objector could nonetheless be
applied to such objector by applying "strict scrutiny," assessing whether the law served a
"compelling government interest" and did so "in the least restrictive way possible").
253494 U.S. at 881.
254 Id. at 882.
25' See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 95 (1st Cir. 2008) ("What is clear from
Smith is that not all free exercise challenges will survive motions to dismiss and not all
will receive strict scrutiny review.").256 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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the State' is required to sustain the validity of the State's argument under the
First Amendment. '257
In the name of religious difference and a state commitment to diversity,
the court allowed the Amish to wall themselves off from society.25 An ac-
commodation model of pluralism prevailed. Some courts and scholars view
Yoder merely as an outlier due to the exceptional situation of the Amish, a
group that functions peacefully apart from practically all segments of main-
stream American society. 259 But the idea of diversity embodied by Yoder is
crucial to the Christian Right project. Advocates must rely on the logic of
Yoder at the same time that they stress Christians' otherwise full participation
in society.
Unlike the free speech claim, which calls for a "balanced" curriculum,
with parental rights and free exercise claims, parents ask that the curriculum
not include material on sexual orientation, or, if it does, that they receive
exemption rights. It is a difficult balancing act to rely on Yoder, in which the
petitioners were disengaging from society, for a claim in which petitioners
demand continued inclusion but on their own terms. In fact, the Christian
Right's free speech strategy, which has further entrenched a focus on inclu-
sion, might have unwittingly made these claims more unthinkable and si-
multaneously bolstered the claims of gay rights lawyers seeking to justify
gay-inclusive programming and judicial deference to such programming.
The dicta in Smith coupled with the holding in Yoder have yielded con-
fusion for lower federal courts, as well as commentators, as to whether and
to what extent a different mode of analysis informs a parental rights claim
when religious concerns are present, and who exactly can claim exemptions
in order to preserve a distinctive religious culture. 260 Some courts have re-
257 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.
258 Ayelet Shachar situates the accommodation offered in Yoder within a multicul-
turalist discourse that accounts for minority (even illiberal) cultures. See Shachar, supra
note 213, at 254.
259 See Duro v. Dist. Attorney, 712 F.2d 96, 98 (4th Cir. 1983) (in rejecting Pentecos-
talist parent's objection to state compulsory education law, the court found Yoder distin-
guishable "because it arose in an entirely different factual context"); Dwyer, supra note
240, at 1389 (in arguing for limits on parental rights doctrine, Dwyer notes that in Yoder
the Supreme Court "placed great weight on the unique characteristics of the Amish com-
munity"); Gutmann, supra note 39, at 568.
11°See, e.g., Parker, 514 F.3d at 97 ("What the Court meant by its discussion of
'hybrid situations' in Smith has led to a great deal of discussion and disagreement. Ob-
servers debate whether Smith created a new hybrid rights doctrine, or whether in discuss-
ing 'hybrid situations' the Court was merely noting in descriptive terms that it was not
overruling certain cases such as Pierce and Yoder." (internal citation omitted)); Hicks v.
Halifax County Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 660-61 (E.D.N.C. 1999) ("It is true
that it is a difficult task to make sense of Smith's hybrid-rights language within the larger
context of the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence. Yet the language of Smith
remains, [and] ... it is the responsibility of this court, until the Supreme Court changes
its interpretation, to give meaning to the seemingly impenetrable hybrid-rights exception
by applying the law to the facts of cases before it."); see also Steven H. Aden and Lee J.
Strang, When a "Rule" Doesn't Rule: The Failure of the Oregon Employment Division v.
Smith "Hybrid Rights Exception," 108 PNN ST. L. REv. 573, 602 (2003) (explaining that
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fused to apply the "hybrid" rights concept. For instance, the Sixth Circuit
declared the concept of hybrid claims "completely illogical," '261 and the Sec-
ond Circuit dismissed it as dicta.262 Others have applied it with such a rigor-
ous standard that the concept does no independent work. For example, the
Tenth Circuit explained that a hybrid claim "at least requires a colorable
showing of infringement of recognized and specific constitutional rights,
rather than the mere invocation of a general right such as the right to control
the education of one's child. 263 Still others have attempted to make the
hybrid rights concept somewhat meaningful, with one federal district court
commenting that "the mere presence of the [parental rights] interest, as a
genuine claim, supported by evidence in the record, . . . triggers the height-
ened scrutiny of the free exercise claim."2 64 Clearly, the lower federal courts
are in disarray over what the hybrid rights concept means, if anything. 265
Lawyers challenging public school programming continue to press the
hybrid rights concept. In Parker, the parents' appellate brief devoted more
space to this argument than to any other claim, contending that the "viola-
tions must be addressed synergistically" and subjected to strict scrutiny.266
The First Circuit, though, passed on the invitation to clarify the concept,
explaining that it need not "enter[ ] the fray over the meaning and applica-
tion of Smith's 'hybrid situations' language. ' 267 Here, then, is a perfect ex-
ample of an issue for which the Christian Right movement would like
Supreme Court review.
In seeking certiorari from the Supreme Court, the Parker parents
pushed to garner heightened scrutiny by urging the Court to resolve the two
ambiguities discussed above, presenting the issue of fundamental parental
rights and "hybrid" rights as in need of Supreme Court review. First, they
presented a circuit split based on the interpretation of parental rights in the
school context, arguing that the Court should resolve the question of
whether, in the Ninth Circuit's words, parents "leave their [fundamental]
courts have struggled in trying to accommodate "hybrid" claims based partly on "the
difficulty in determining the proper burdens and procedures [required] to assert a hybrid
claim").
261 Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
262 Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2003).
263 Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998); see
also Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that to assert a "hy-
brid" claim, the plaintiff alleging a free exercise violation must make out a "colorable
claim" of another constitutional right, meaning that she must show "a 'fair probability' or
a 'likelihood'" of "success on the merits").
264 Hicks, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 662.
265 Their confusion is only exacerbated by Justice Souter's dismissive language in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah. See 508 U.S. 520, 566-67 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring in part) (describing Smith's "hybrid" rights distinction as "ulti-
mately untenable").
266 See Brief of Appellant at 35-44, Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008)
(No. 07-1528).
267 Parker, 514 F.3d at 98.
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'Meyer/Pierce' rights at the school house door.' '261 They contended that "if
the fundamental parental right has any true meaning, it is to preclude a pub-
lic school from egregiously usurping the parental role in religious and moral
matters of the utmost importance. 2 69 After also arguing that the Court
should determine whether indoctrination constitutes a free exercise burden,
the petitioners focused on their "hybrid" rights claim.2 70 They argued that
"[b]ecause the parameters of [hybrid rights] claims have generated enor-
mous controversy, certiorari should be granted to provide guidance to the
lower courts concerning the manner and means of construing them.1
271
While the Supreme Court rejected the Parkers' petition for certiorari, lawyers
for the Christian Right will likely continue to press the issue of "hybrid"
parental rights and free exercise claims and urge the Court to take up the call
for accommodation. 272
This Part's analysis of the Christian Right's doctrinal claims reveals that
its lawyers invoke a commitment to pluralism, yet they rely on different
visions of pluralism that evidence significant tensions. Christian Right law-
yers assert doctrinally and remedially problematic free speech claims to de-
mand inclusion of their perspective in gay-inclusive curriculum. Such
claims rely on a model of pluralism that values inclusion of multiple view-
points and engagement with difference. At the same time, lawyers for the
Christian Right assert parental rights and free exercise claims to shield chil-
268 Parker Cert. Petition, supra note 250, at 7.
269 Id. at 13.
270 See id. at 15.
271 Id. at 25. In discussing the Christian Right's Supreme Court focus, it is important
to note that almost all of the parental challenges to school programming play out in
federal court and make federal constitutional claims the centerpieces of the suits. This is
the case even though many states have constitutional and statutory provisions that may
provide greater protection for religious freedom. After the Supreme Court, in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), struck down application to the states of the fed-
eral Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") (42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1993)), itself a
response to the Court's ratcheting down of free exercise scrutiny in Smith and an attempt
to return to the Court's Sherbert regime, some states passed their own RFRAs in an
attempt to provide greater protection for religious freedom under state law. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493 (2008); FL. STAT. § 761 (2008); 775 ILL. COMp. STAT.
35 (2008). In addition, some state courts have interpreted their own free exercise clauses
as embodying a more Sherbert-like standard. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636
N.E.2d 233, 235-36 (Mass. 1994) (interpreting the Massachusetts Constitution to provide
greater free exercise protection than the federal Constitution). Even though state law
provisions might offer an innovative way to attack school programming under religious
freedom principles, litigants have largely focused on federal claims and federal litigation.
The First Circuit asked for supplemental briefing in Parker regarding whether it should
abstain from deciding the federal constitutional claims pending resolution of the state law
claims, including a state free exercise claim, or, alternatively, whether it should certify
questions of state law to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, but neither side en-
dorsed the proposed courses of action. See Supplemental Brief for Defendant-Appellees
at 1, Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1528). The plaintiffs them-
selves neither filed their state law claims in state court nor sought resolution of those
claims. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 94 n.3.
272 See Parker Cert. Petition, supra note 250, at 25-28.
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dren from gay-inclusive instruction. Such claims draw on a model of plural-
ism that values withdrawal based on religious beliefs and accommodation of
orthodox religious value systems.
In discussing religious conservatism and secular humanism, James
Davison Hunter argues that "[flor the orthodox, genuine pluralism only ex-
ists when there is respect for the integrity of diverse even if exclusive relig-
ious and moral commitment. '273 On the other hand, Hunter observes that
"[f]or progressivists, pluralism can only exist when there is an acceptance
of all religious and moral commitments as equally valid and legitimate; as
simply different but equally authentic ways of articulating truth. ' 274 Al-
though Hunter's dichotomy is excessively stark to the extent that it empha-
sizes a progressive relativism, this Part has shown how a similar distinction
plays out in the sexual orientation context. The pluralism put forward by
Christian Right lawyers through parental rights and free exercise claims re-
quires accommodation of parents' orthodox beliefs by shielding children
from gay-inclusive state messages. On the other hand, the inclusion model
of pluralism evidences some of the tendencies Hunter ascribes to progres-
sives. Indeed, the gay rights model of pluralism that I construct in Parts IV
and V stresses inclusion and diversity in a way that actually resonates with
aspects of the Christian Right's inclusion model. Christian Right lawyers,
then, are caught between competing models of pluralism: is the movement
taking a place at the proverbial table, or instead seeking to leave its seat
vacant in the name of pure religious commitment?
IV. IDEOLOGICAL STAKES AND IMPLICATIONS
This Part assesses the normative purchase of Christian Right claims and
gay rights responses by teasing out the ideological stakes in the school pro-
gramming context. I first show that the accommodation model of pluralism
advanced by parental rights and free exercise claims prioritizes exclusive
religious commitments and recognizes exposure as harmful in a way that
cannot function in an inclusion model of pluralism premised on the potential
validity of competing belief systems. It is here that the appeal to religious
diversity becomes incapable of success in a more secular tradition of subjec-
tivity, critical deliberation, and tolerance. The exact ethos that has credited
the inclusion model of pluralism (and the corresponding free speech claim)
marginalizes the accommodation model of pluralism (and the corresponding
parental rights and free exercise claims).
I then explain how, faced with this tension, Christian Right lawyers
appeal to the special status of sex in an attempt to counter the left multicul-
tural identity-based framing of the gay rights movement. But while Chris-
273 Hur R, supra note 1, at 211.
274 Id.
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tian Right advocates position gay-inclusive programming as about sex,
courts tend to accept the gay rights movement's framing of such program-
ming as about diversity in a multicultural society. As gay rights lawyers
continue to cement sexual orientation as a stable identity category (regard-
less of its descriptive accuracy), the characterization of homosexuality as
merely a sex-based attribute becomes increasingly unconvincing.
A. "Mere Exposure" and Liberal Pluralism
As an initial matter, when faced with controversial programming and
curricular decisions by school officials and administrators, parents often
claim that the school is indoctrinating their children, attempting to instill in
students a particular normative position. Parents, for example, may feel that
a comprehensive sex education curriculum intends to convince students that
sex before and outside of marriage is acceptable. Similarly, the Parker par-
ents objected to a book, King & King, depicting a wedding between two
princes because it "celebrates a gay marriage" and thereby attempts to "sys-
tematically indoctrinat[e]" their children.275 The First Circuit itself noted
that the "book affirmatively endorses homosexuality and gay marriage," and
further commented that "lilt is a fair inference that the reading . . . was
precisely intended to influence the listening children toward tolerance of gay
marriage." 76 While turning down the legal legitimacy of the claim of indoc-
trination, the court nonetheless noted the exact school agenda about which
the parents complained. Given courts' emphasis on coercion in parental
rights and free exercise analysis, parents' appeal to indoctrination makes
some sense from a doctrinal perspective.277 The claim also has rhetorical
appeal within a liberal, pluralistic lens that emphasizes state neutrality.2
78
And it recognizes that the left multiculturalism pushed by gay rights advo-
cates serves a far-reaching normative agenda.
Parents, though, also sincerely experience harm in situations that do not
approach indoctrination. They may suffer injury when schools present mate-
rial as part of a broader agenda of tolerance and diversity rather than an
affirmatively pro-gay or pro-sex position. For example, the Parker parents
objected to other books that presented same-sex couples without the more
275 Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
276 Id. at 106.
277 See ACLJ Memorandum of Law, supra note 245 (advising parents that, as op-
posed to "mere exposure," "the higher the degree of coercion on students to participate
in, or otherwise endorse the classroom activity, the stronger the constitutional argument
in favor of a parental opt-out right"). Indeed, the indoctrination claim was one of the
three bases on which the Parker plaintiffs sought certiorari from the Supreme Court. See
Parker Cert. Petition, supra note 250, at 15.
271 See Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a
Hobby, 1987 DuKE L.J. 977, 985 (explaining in the context of school programming that
" '[n]eutrality' has become a political and constitutional buzzword").
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affirmative views embodied by King & King."9 Moreover, parents might
object to material on sexual orientation even if religious or moral objections
to homosexuality are included in a "balanced" presentation. Or they may
experience harm when schools are actually expressing approval of the par-
ents' beliefs; for instance, parents complain about comprehensive sex educa-
tion even when such programming positions abstinence as the best option for
young people, as it does in Montgomery County.8 0 The exposure of their
children to certain programming itself causes injury. In this sense, parental
rights and free exercise claims, in their more inclusive mode, focus on expo-
sure, rather than indoctrination.
Claims based on exposure, however, present a challenge to the liberal
notions of pluralism and diversity embodied by the Christian Right's inclu-
sion model of pluralism. The idea of harm from exposure, which sounds in
an accommodation model of pluralism that calls for withdrawal, is in tension
with an inclusion model of pluralism that values participation and engage-
ment with difference.
The concept of "mere exposure" finds its roots in the famous case of
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, in which fundamentalist
Christian parents objected to the school district's use of a basic reader se-
ries.2 ' The parents in Mozert asserted that, according to their religious be-
liefs, "they must not allow their children to be exposed to the content of the
[reader] series." 22 In what ended a lengthy course of litigation, featuring
multiple opinions from both the district and appellate courts, the Sixth Cir-
cuit rejected the parents' claims, holding that the public school curriculum
did not unconstitutionally burden the parents' and children's free exercise
rights. The Mozert plaintiffs asserted that their sincerely held religious be-
liefs were:
[c]ontrary to the values taught or inculcated by the reading text-
books and that it is a violation of the religious beliefs and convic-
tions of the plaintiff students to be required to read the books and a
279 See Parker, 514 F.3d at 92-93.
280 See Respondents' Memorandum in Response to the Petition for Review at 16,
Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch. (Md. Cir. Ct.
2007) (No. 284980).
281 827 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1987).
282 Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Sch., 647 F. Supp. 1194, 1197, 1198 (E.D. Tenn.
1986), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). The parents objected to texts dealing with
"futuristic supernaturalism," "occult practice," "telepathy," "evolution," and "role re-
versal or role elimination, particularly biographical material about women who have been
recognized for achievements outside their homes," and to texts that "expose[d] their
children to other forms of religion and to the feelings, attitudes and values of other stu-
dents that contradict the plaintiffs' religious views without a statement that the other
views are incorrect and that the plaintiffs' views are the correct ones." Mozert, 827 F.2d
at 1062.
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violation of the religious beliefs of the plaintiff parents to permit
their children to read the books.283
The children were deemed to have the same religious views as their parents
and as such asserted their own free exercise claims.284 Yet at the same time,
the parents' claims were based on their fears of exposing their children to
contrary views, evidencing a fear that the children would have different
views and revealing a recognition that their children's religious views were
not (fully) formed.185
Following the lead of the school district and, to a certain extent, the
parents, the Sixth Circuit framed the question in terms of "exposure" rather
than endorsement or indoctrination, asking whether "a governmental re-
quirement that a person be exposed to ideas he or she finds objectionable on
religious grounds" constitutes a free exercise violation. 86 The court con-
cluded that the fact that reading the materials might lead the students to
come to conclusions contrary to the teachings of their (parents') religion was
insufficient to establish an unconstitutional burden.287
Significantly, the court presented the issue of the curriculum's balance
before dismissing the question as largely irrelevant given the purported in-
jury. The court expressed doubt as to whether a more balanced presentation
would even satisfy the parents' religious views, since it was "clear that to the
plaintiffs there is but one acceptable view-the Biblical view, as they inter-
pret the Bible. '2 88 In fact, one parent testified that "evolution, false super-
naturalism, feminism, telepathy and magic ... could not be presented in any
way without offending her beliefs." '89
As Nomi Stolzenberg convincingly pointed out after Mozert, the court
misapprehended the basis and nature of the parents' objection.29g It is exactly
the neutrality, subjectivity, and tolerance furthered by the curriculum to
which the parents objected.2 91 In this way, the fact that their children were
merely exposed to the texts does not relieve the problem; instead, such expo-
sure is the exact injury. Recognizing that children may in fact arrive at con-
clusions contrary to those of their parents, the court conceptualized the
potential harm, yet failed to understand it as such. As Stolzenberg explains,
283 Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060.
21 Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1197 ("[P]laintiffs assert the free exercise rights of both
the students and the parents, who assert that their religion compels them not to allow their
children to be exposed to the Holt series.").
285 See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1069 ("Mrs. Frost did testify that she did not want her
children to make critical judgments and exercise choices in areas where the Bible pro-
vides the answer.").
286 Id. at 1063.287 id. at 1070.288 Id. at 1064.
289 Id.
290 Stolzenberg, supra note 36, at 588-98.
291 Id. at 591. It is important to note that liberalism is not neutral. As K. Anthony
Appiah notes, "liberalism must, in the end, be ready to be a fighting creed." See Appiah,
supra note 67, at 159.
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"the objective, tolerant institution of exposure is itself a form of indoctrina-
tion.' '292 The children were being taught to approach ideas and beliefs with
rationality and to understand ideas as subjective. Such values, fostered
through "mere exposure," were directly at odds with the fundamentalist
Christian parents' beliefs in the totalizing and unquestionable truth of their
religion. 293 As the parents contended, the books in the reader series taught
"that certain values, held to be absolute by [them], are relative depending
upon the situation. ' 294 Pluralism and tolerance, viewed as neutral by the
court, are values in themselves, and such values seriously threatened the
fundamentalist Christian parents' ability "to transmit the truth (as they see it)
to their children. 295
Pointing to the type of injury which Stolzenberg identifies, and which
the Mozert court dismissed, Stephen Gilles explains the way in which an
injury to parents may exist even if children adhere to their parents' beliefs
after being exposed to competing belief systems.296 As Gilles explains, posi-
tioning parental beliefs as unaffected by adherence post-exposure "unjustifi-
ably privileges critical reason" and neglects the fact that people "make
commitments and adhere to unprovable, deeply felt beliefs. '297 In this sense,
it is not necessarily unreasonable for adherents of a particular religious faith
to oppose exposure of their children to competing ideas and also not to advo-
cate that their children arrive at their own belief system-even if that belief
system matches the parents'-through critical reasoning. 29 Richard Garnett
makes the complementary point, warning that "we should resist the tempta-
tion to treat as harmful the transmission of unpopular or illiberal religious
beliefs." 299 In addition, as the Mozert example makes clear, the exposure of
children to competing values and beliefs not only risks displacing parents'
belief systems in children's minds, but also may taint the child in the parents'
eyes. James Dwyer points out that religious parents fear that they might
"become alienated from their children, viewing their children as different or
separate from them, or as morally tainted or impure, as a result of the state
292 Stolzenberg, supra note 36, at 611.
293 Id. at 612-13.
294 Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Sch., 765 F.2d 75, 76 (6th Cir. 1985).
295 Stolzenberg, supra note 36, at 627; cf Brief of Appellant, supra note 266, at 7
(describing the school's purpose as "dissemination of the ideology of 'diversity"').
296 Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 937, 976-79 (1996).
297 Id. at 976.
298 School districts argue from a presumption of subjectivity, viewing children's
minds as properly up for grabs and positioning their parents' belief systems as contesta-
ble. For instance, the Lexington school district in Parker argued to the First Circuit that
the district court "was not sanctioning efforts to 'change' the minds of children regarding
marriage and procreation; instead, it was registering approval of the use of reading mater-
ials that expose children to different ideas before their minds are made up." Brief of
Defendant-Appellees, supra note 153, at 46-47.
299 Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education,
and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 143 (2000).
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ordering ... education of the children in ways antithetical to the parents'
religious world view and self-conception."3 °°0
These scholars' assessments reveal the way in which the claims of ob-
jecting parents may be simply incompatible with entrenched notions of
American education, which are based on ideals of tolerance, subjectivity,
and pluralism. As Stolzenberg demonstrates, whether one's view of public
education is grounded in liberalism or civic republicanism, neither view can
accommodate the parental complaints of "mere exposure." Both ideologies,
which play out in education policy and in judicial opinions passing on the
constitutionality of such policy, are "based on the critical-objective faculties
of thought." 30' As Stolzenberg explains, civic republicanism "professes the
necessity of value-inculcation, yet among the values whose inculcation it
requires-the 'civic virtues' of a republican society-are the very principles
that define a liberal society dedicated to the toleration of diverse values and
the necessity of a free choice among them ....
The Mozert court itself grounded its rationale in liberal and civic repub-
lican understandings of public education, explaining that "public schools
serve the purpose of teaching fundamental values 'essential to a democratic
society[,]' . . . 'includ[ing] tolerance of divergent political and religious
views' while taking into account 'consideration of the sensibilities of
others.' ' ' 303 The court stated that the "tolerance of divergent . . . religious
views" advocated by the Supreme Court "is a civil tolerance, not a religious
one. It does not require a person to accept any other religion as the equal of
the one to which that person adheres. It merely requires recognition that in a
pluralistic society we must 'live and let live.' ,04 Indeed, it should now be
clear that this is the exact ethic against which the parents challenging the
reader series sought to guard their children. Pluralism and tolerance, now
3 00 JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 141 (1998); see also
James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and
Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74
N.C. L. REv. 1321 (1996). Charles Russo, a conservative Catholic commentator, con-
tends "that including material on [same-sex marriage] may tear at the fabric of society
by causing inter-generational rifts as children are indoctrinated on points-of-view that are
not consonant with the values of their parents." Charles J. Russo, Same-Sex Marriage
and Public School Curricula: Preserving Parental Rights to Direct the Education of
Their Children, 32 U. DAYTON L. REv. 361, 375 (2007).
301 Stolzenberg, supra note 36, at 655.
3o Id. William Galston, on the other hand, argues that "liberal freedom entails the
right to live unexamined as well as examined lives-a right the effective exercise of
which may require parental bulwarks against the corrosive influence of modernist skepti-
cism." GALSTON, supra note 4, at 254.
303 Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Sch., 827 F.2d 1058, 1068 (6th Cir. 1987) (quot-
ing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)); cf Jtirgen Habermas,
Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, in MULTICULTURALISM,
supra note 32, at 107, 133 ("[F]undamentalist worldviews are dogmatic in that they
leave no room for reflection on their relationship with the other worldviews with which
they share the same universe of discourse and against whose competing validity claims
they can advance their positions only on the basis of reasons.").
304Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1069.
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staples of Christian Right advocacy, were unabashedly the values the funda-
mentalist Christian parents in Mozert were protesting.
B. Mozert Redux
The dispute over a gay-inclusive curriculum sounds at times like
Mozert all over again. Parents argue that exposure of their children to sexual
orientation undermines the parents' ability to guard their children from sex
and to impart their opposition to homosexuality. While the children may
still subscribe to their parents' religious views on homosexuality, they have
learned that such a view is subjective. As the Parker parents argued, the
school district's position that such parents may still instruct their children on
issues of sexuality does nothing to alleviate the harm to religious parents.305
Tracking the injury claimed in Mozert, the Parker parents argued that the
school district's position "neglects to address the fact that the [parents]
firmly believe that the moral instruction of their children is their sacred
duty."31  Since "[t]he exercise of parental authority to direct their children
in their faith is one of the most basic tenets of the [parents'] religion," the
school district's instruction, "without notifying the [parents], is clearly bur-
densome in the extreme."30 7 Although the parents repeatedly asserted that
the school district was "indoctrinating" their children, they ultimately struck
at the heart of their claim, contending that "[t]he very exposure of children
to [contrary] beliefs ... burdens the parents' ability to instruct their children
in accord with their religion."30
Christian Right advocates, however, depart from Mozert-style argumen-
tation by reconfiguring notions of pluralism to accommodate parental rights
and free exercise claims, as discussed in Part III.B. Through claims that call
for the shielding of children from materials that run counter to orthodox,
unflinching beliefs, lawyers invoke an accommodation model of pluralism
profoundly different than the inclusion model of pluralism that stresses en-
gagement and dialogue. 3°9
Can a liberal pluralism, like that celebrated by the Mozert court, accom-
modate these religious impulses? Some liberal theorists believe so. Schol-
ars embracing a political liberalism that values diversity over autonomy and
that resists a strong normative view of civic education urge society, and the
education system, to accommodate diversity quite extensively.310





309 Marty, supra note 8, at 17-18 ("When citizens act in the name of a transcendent
force or person-usually their God-they change the rules of the pluralist games and rule
out those who do not share witness or obedience to that God.").
310 Political liberalism, as set out by John Rawls, assumes that "a plurality of reasona-
ble yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of
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William Galston endorses a liberalism that prioritizes diversity by af-
fording maximum "space for the enactment of individual and group differ-
ences.""31  To Galston, "[1]iberty unleashes diversity."31 2 He argues that
liberal pluralism "does not warrant the conclusion that the state must (or
may) structure public education to foster in children skeptical reflection on
ways of life inherited from parents or local communities." '313 That is, a pub-
lic education grounded in liberal pluralism (and a corresponding focus on
expressive liberty) may account for the religiously motivated parental desire
to pass on beliefs to one's children without consideration of conflicting be-
liefs or values.31 4 Although Galston does not address legal doctrine, his de-
fense of rights to accommodation links to the turn toward ninority-based
rights claims as he distinguishes between offensive public claims (e.g., argu-
ing for a "Christian nation") and defensive public claims (e.g., exemption
requests from policies acceptable to the majority).315 His analysis provides a
roadmap for Christian Right lawyers who articulate parental rights and free
exercise claims within an accommodation model of pluralism.
Similarly, Jeff Spinner-Halev argues that liberal principles may accom-
modate parents who seek an education that will help their children carry on
their parents' religious beliefs.3 16 In more general terms, he contends that
"[i]f liberalism is going to take the ideas of liberty and toleration seriously,
it must be prepared to tolerate non-liberal religions."3 7 Otherwise, Spinner-
Halev asserts, liberalism's celebration of tolerance rings "hollow."3 8 The
liberal priority on diversity and religious pluralism, then, might require ac-
commodation of distinctive (even if illiberal) traditions. As Menachem
Mautner argues, those who identify diversity as the central liberal value en-
dorse "the multicultural condition" by resisting the urge to evaluate illiberal
traditions by liberal standards.3 19
human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic
regime." RAWLS, supra note 12, at xvi. In this sense, political liberalism contrasts itself
with comprehensive liberalism, in which the state stakes out a general normative vision
for its citizens. See id. at xviii, xxix, 195-96.
31' GALSTON, supra note 11, at 23.
312 Id. at 61. Galston's theory of liberal pluralism includes within it Berlinian value
pluralism (referencing Isaiah Berlin), which embraces a diversity of conceptions of the
good life. See id. at 4-6.
313 GALSTON, supra note 4, at 253; see also Jason A. Scorza, Facing Up to Civic
Pluralism: A Friendly Critique of Galston, 4 THEORY & RES. EDUC. 291, 294 (2006)
(explaining that Galston's liberal pluralism would not "coerce the Amish into fulfilling
all standard educational requirements").
314 See GALSTON, supra note 11, at 102.315 See id. at 116-17.
316 Jeff Spinner-Halev, Liberalism and Religion: Against Congruence, 9 THEORETICAL
INQuiRIEs L. 553, 556 (2008).
317 Id. at 564.
318 See id.319 Menachem Mautner, From "Honor" to "Dignity": How Should a Liberal State
Treat Non-Liberal Cultural Groups?, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 609, 612 (2008).
Mautner's point demonstrates how one can reconfigure multiculturalism, which I have
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Nonetheless, the parental impulse here is incompatible with popular
and deeply entrenched liberal notions of pluralism in significant ways. The-
orists who situate themselves in political liberalism but take a capacious,
more normative view of civic education resist the parental claim against ex-
posure to diversity. Stephen Macedo, for instance, argues in the context of
Mozert that "'exposure to diversity' is a necessary means for teaching a
basic civic virtue," which is within the state's authority.3 20 Macedo contends
that parents do not have a right to opt-out of education that instills basic
liberal values, and therefore they have no "right to shield their children from
the fact of reasonable pluralism. '32' Significantly, while Macedo rejects a
claim to accommodation, he sympathizes with a claim that the curriculum
should be more "balance[d]. '"322 That is, Macedo's political liberalism re-
jects exemption rights at the same time that it rejects programming that
might comprehensively embrace secularist values and (impliedly) denigrate
religious worldviews.3 23 In this sense, he dismisses an accommodation
model of pluralism in favor of an inclusion model.
Scholars who endorse a comprehensive liberalism that prioritizes indi-
vidual choice and autonomy express a normative view of civic education
that rejects the accommodation of illiberal tendencies.3 24 Amy Gutmann, in
her theory of democratic education, dismisses "a right of parents to insulate
their children from exposure to ways of life or thinking that conflict with
their own. 325 Gutmann criticizes the accommodation model of pluralism as
"superficial. 3 26 Arguing that the pluralism identified with parental rights
does not correlate with the political value of pluralism in a democratic soci-
ety, Gutmann contends that "[t]o reap the benefits of social diversity, chil-
dren must be exposed to ways of life different from their parents and-in the
course of their exposure-must embrace certain values, such as mutual re-
spect among persons, that make social diversity both possible and desira-
positioned as a left/progressive project vis-A-vis gay rights advocacy, to serve the inter-
ests of conservative religious groups seeking to disengage partially from society.
320 Macedo, supra note 38, at 485.
321 Id.
322 Id. at 487.
323 See id. at 485, 487.
324 See Gutmann, supra note 39, at 565 ("Political liberals with a demanding under-
standing of civic education often ally with comprehensive liberals against their fellow
political liberals who defend a less demanding notion of what civic education entails.");
see also GALSTON, supra note 11, at 20-21 (distinguishing between autonomy and diver-
sity liberals).
325 GUTMANN, supra note 13, at 29; see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Radical Evil in
Liberal Democracies: The Neglect of the Political Emotions, in DEMOCRACY AND TrE
NEw RELIGIOUS PLURALISM, supra note 17, at 171, 184 (arguing that within a liberal
model of public education, one should "support education at all levels aimed at convey-
ing understanding of and respect for different religious and secular comprehensive doc-
trines and different ethnic and national traditions").
326 See GUTMANN, supra note 13, at 33.
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ble. ' '3 27 She believes that resting control exclusively in parents does not
ensure, and at times undermines, this liberal objective.328
The engagement Macedo and Gutmann value is consistent with the plu-
ralist vision projected by Christian Right lawyers in their free speech claims
for religious liberty and adopted by courts assessing these Christian Right
claims of inclusion. Because gay rights lawyers urge courts to view ob-
jecting parents as illiberal, schools as rooted in liberal tolerance, and gay
rights as the latest installment of identity politics in a discourse of left mul-
ticulturalism, the Christian Right's own adoption of a liberal, pluralistic lens
that stresses participation and inclusion hinders its ability to rebut these char-
acterizations. Accordingly, courts turn down the claims of religious parents
by adhering to a liberal, pluralist vision that calls for exposure to difference
and to a normative view of education that prioritizes critical, rational delib-
eration when faced with competing conceptions of the good life. 329 There-
fore, Christian Right lawyers find that the normative strength of parental
rights and free exercise claims is increasingly weak in light of judicial (and
societal) presumptions regarding diversity and civic education-presump-
tions Christian Right lawyers have made staples of their own advocacy.
In Parker, the First Circuit captured the parents' claim as one based on
"exposure."330 Pointing to the work of Nomi Stolzenberg, the court ac-
knowledged the notion that teaching tolerance can itself constitute harm. In-
deed, the court declared that "t]o the extent that Yoder embodies judicial
protection for social and religious 'sub-groups from the public cultivation of
liberal tolerance,' plaintiffs are correct to rely on it." '' But the court quickly
fell back on the factual specificity of Yoder to distinguish it, pointing out that
the holding in Yoder was "essentially sui generis. 332 Exemption became an
all-or-nothing proposition: if the parents wanted otherwise to participate
fully in society, they could not selectively withdraw based on religious
objections.
Moreover, even after acknowledging the potential harm of "mere expo-
sure" and the corresponding commitment to "liberal tolerance" that such
exposure facilitates, the court pulled back, stating that "[e]xposure to the
materials in dispute here will not automatically and irreversibly prevent the
parents from raising [their children] in the religious belief that gay marriage
is immoral." '333 The parents' claim failed once again because of their ability
3 2 7 Id.
328 See id.
329 Gutmann argues that "it would be an illegitimate pretension to educational author-
ity on anyone's part to deprive any child of the capacities necessary for choice among
good lives." See id. at 40.
330 Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2008) ("They assert that they must be
given prior notice by the school and the opportunity to exempt their young children from
exposure to books they find religiously repugnant.").
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to present competing views to their children. This, indeed, is Mozert-style
subjectivity. The children were given the benefits of critical deliberation and
independent judgment, celebrated values in a liberal, pluralistic society.334
Christian Right lawyers were not allowed to have it both ways: they could
not demand inclusion in a diverse society and then withdraw selectively
when confronted with the inclusion claims of other minority voices.
C. Identity Politics and Sex(ual Orientation)
Given that courts reject the contention that a truly pluralistic society
would accommodate parents' unflinching religious beliefs, Christian Right
lawyers attempt to escape the liberal priority on subjectivity by exploiting
the special status accorded sex. Advocates thereby attempt to counter gay
rights lawyers' minoritizing, identity-based moves with a powerful weapon
in the public school domain.
Gay rights lawyers position homosexuality and sexual orientation as
"like race" and "like gender" in a left multicultural discourse. 35 Springing
from pluralism's recognition of diversity, left multiculturalism seeks recog-
nition for minority groups by stressing coherent group-based identity.336
Lawyers construct an identifiable lesbian and gay population with common
characteristics and goals. In this sense, they conceptualize the fight for gay
rights as part of an identity-based project, and as like previous identity-based
campaigns. Gay rights lawyers exercise constitutive power in this regard.
Given that equal protection analysis at least implicitly compares forms of
discrimination and includes considerations of immutability, they have strate-
gic reasons to portray constituents in this way, regardless of its descriptive
134 Gutmann's theory of democratic education is based on the principle of
"nonrepression," which "secures freedom from interference only to the extent that it
forbids using education to restrict rational deliberation or consideration of different ways
of life." GUTMANN, supra note 13, at 44. This principle would restrict the Amish in a
way rejected by the Yoder Court. See id.
335 See, e.g., Halley, supra note 2, at 40.
336 See Roof, supra note 10, at 8. I am using an admittedly oversimplified version of
multiculturalism, which is a contested term subject to numerous interpretations. While I
am locating this left multiculturalism within liberal notions of pluralism, there are impor-
tant ways in which it departs from and moves beyond liberal ideals. While multicultural-
ism's emphasis on recognition for subordinated groups might be necessary to secure the
place in society required for involvement in a participatory pluralism, it might also con-
flict with liberal pluralism's goal of inter-group commonality and rising above group-
based difference. Multiculturalism's impulse to prioritize the group contrasts with a clas-
sic liberal impulse to prioritize the individual. See id. at 9; see also BROWN, supra note 4,
at 21 ("[L]iberalism's unit of analysis, the individual, and its primary project, maximiz-
ing individual freedom .... together stand antithetically to culture's provision of the
coherence and continuity of groups .... "). Nonetheless, some scholars have explicitly
set out to situate the multiculturalist aim for group-differentiated rights within liberal
theory. See, e.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 42, at 75-106 (arguing that group-based minor-
ity rights actually promote the individual freedom and autonomy valued by liberalism).
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accuracy. 3 7 Nonetheless, most lesbians and gay men understand themselves
as part of a movement that involves more than just the gender of their sex
partners and have accepted the identity-focused, left multicultural overtures
of movement leaders. 338
The gay rights movement's identity-based project has particular
resonance in the school domain. Advocates frame gay-inclusive curriculum
in terms of diversity, not sex.339 For instance, in considering appropriation of
the Massachusetts sex education opt-out statute by parents in Lexington, a
GLAD attorney explained that such parents are attempting to "take very,
very narrow opt-out and parental notification rules that exist . . . for sex
education ... and they are trying to take that ... [to] where kids are not
talking about sex."' 34 ° To gay rights advocates, the Lexington curriculum is
not about sex; it is about "who's in a family." 34
Yet at the same time, as scholars writing from a queer theoretical orien-
tation point out, notions of sex and sexual shame are constitutive (and liber-
ating).342 Sexual acts (whether same-sex sex or, more generally, non-
normative sex) contribute to a status (lesbians and gay men, or, more gener-
ally, queers). 343 In this sense, a gay rights project materially differs from
identity-based projects based on race or gender, a feature acknowledged by
even the most centrist gay rights advocates. 344 This distinctive feature of the
gay rights movement helps to better understand religious parents' objections
to injecting homosexuality into classroom instruction.
337 See Halley, supra note 2, at 46, 52 (pointing to the power of analogy in adjudica-
tion and noting how arguments from biology are intended to analogize to race); cf.
WARNER, supra note 50, at 46, 76-77, 88-89 (contrasting the politics and ideals of queer
culture with those of the mainstream gay rights movement).
338 See SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 83 ("[S]ubstantial groups of women and men
under this representational regime have found that the nominative category 'homosexual,'
or its more recent near-synonyms, does have a real power to organize and describe their
experience of their own sexuality and identity.").
331 Cf. WARNER, supra note 50, at 31 (explaining how "the official gay movement...
has chosen to articulate the politics of identity rather than to become a broader movement
targeting the politics of sexual shame").
- 0 Jacobs, supra note 158, at 1.
341 Id.
142 See WARNER, supra note 50, at 47-48 ("Gay political groups owe their very being
to the fact that sex draws people together and that in doing so it suggests alternative
possibilities of life. How ironic, then, that so often the first act of gay political groups is
to repudiate sex.").
'43 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALrrY 43 (Robert Hurley trans., Ran-
dom House 1978) (explaining how the "practice of sodomy" ultimately yielded the ho-
mosexual); see also LEO BERSANI, HoMos 34 (1995) ("The invention of the homosexual
may have been the precondition of sexual liberation in that the homosexual essence par-
tially desexualizes . . . the very acts that presumably called the essence into being.");
WARNER, supra note 50, at 29 ("The concept of perversion, as distinct from perverse acts,
led to the concept of sexual identity (or its close kin, sexual orientation).").
'" See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2181 (2002).
Here, I am not arguing that sexual orientation is socially constructed in a way that race
and gender are not. Rather, I am merely pointing out sexual orientation's unique conduct-
status phenomenon, in which sexual acts become constitutive of identity.
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Just as discourse in left queer circles points to the sex in homosexuality
and distinguishes gay-based projects from other identity-based movements,
conservative religious discourse evidences a similar, though normatively
conflicting, impulse. When addressing homosexuality, religious leaders and
commentators often focus on homosexual "conduct," "behavior," and "ac-
tivity. 3 45 In this sense, religious thought approaches the concept of homo-
sexuality and the existence of lesbians and gay men through the lens of
same-sex sex. Once sexual orientation is understood as being about non-
procreative, non-normative sex in conservative religious discourse, it is un-
surprising that it is controversial and operates differently than race and gen-
der. That sex is a contentious religious issue is obvious.346 It is no wonder,
then, that many major religious organizations openly characterize homosex-
uality as incompatible with religious doctrine and refuse to bless same-sex
relationships. 47
In this conservative religious discourse, when presumptively non-sex-
ual or heterosexual children are exposed to issues touching on sexual orien-
tation, they too are pushed into the sexual. As Charles Russo, a conservative
Catholic commentator, argues, if same-sex marriage is covered in school,
children will be "involuntarily subjected to concepts about. . . human sexu-
ality at the hands of public school officials." 8 Same-sex parenting also
implicates sexuality, as Russo contends that young children are "most sus-
ceptible to confusion" when "exposed to materials that discuss as intimate,
and possibly medically complicated, a topic as artificial insemination, let
alone sexual intercourse .. ..",49 This is a crucial move: not only is instruc-
tion about homosexuality about sex, but instruction that touches on same-sex
relationships and parenting is also about sex. Parents have expressed this
belief in litigation. For instance, the parents in Parker asserted that "they
are devout Judeo-Christians and that a core belief of their religion is that
homosexual behavior and gay marriage are immoral and violate God's
law. '350 The Parker parents' religious beliefs focused on "behavior" and
linked same-sex marriage to such "behavior."
341 See, e.g., Letter from Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger to the Bishops of the Catholic
Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons (Oct. 1, 1986), www.vatican.va/
roman-curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc-con_cfaith_doc_198610 1-homosexual-
persons-en.htmi (referring to "homosexual acts," "homosexual behaviour," and "homo-
sexual activity") [hereinafter Letter from Ratzinger to Bishops].31 See, e.g., id. (summarizing Catholic position on homosexuality and citing numer-
ous Biblical passages in support of the Catholic view).
34' See, e.g., Jonathan Wynne-Jones, Carey and Tutu Wade into Conflict over Gays,
THE TELEGRAPH, Nov. 18, 2007, at 6. (former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey,
describing homosexuality as a "deeply theological" issue and urging the Anglican
Church to "stand very firmly" with Biblical views that homosexuality is wrong and un-
dermines marriage); Letter from Ratzinger to Bishops, supra note 345.
348 See Russo, supra note 300, at 370.
349 Id. at 376.3 5
' Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2008).
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At the same time that parents like those in Parker track claims raised in
Mozert, they do so in a context where the danger of "mere exposure" seems
more reasonable. The domain of sex and sexuality is one in which decision
makers have located the harm of "mere exposure," and they have done so
specifically within schools. Many states provide notice and exemption
rights to parents in the sex-education context. 31 Such statutes recognize the
experience of parental harm from children's exposure to sex and sexuality.
In fact, the Parker parents relied on the Massachusetts statute allowing an
opt-out for curriculum that "primarily involves human sexual education or
human sexuality issues. ' 352 Accordingly, the legal system recognizes the
potential harm in "mere exposure" to sex. In the school context, lawmakers
recognize the harm to flow merely from information, not sexual imagery or
conduct.
If we understand religious parents' objections to gay-inclusive curricu-
lum as rooted in objections to sex-related curriculum, the harm of "mere
exposure" becomes more resonant. Moreover, the harm of "mere expo-
sure" in the sexuality domain does not necessarily stem from the presenta-
tion of information that depicts parental religious beliefs as contestable, but
instead may be rooted in the sexual as something private and from which
parents have a legitimate (state-approved) interest in shielding their chil-
dren.353 Accordingly, from the perspective of conservative religious parents,
it is not unreasonable to think that the legal system, even when relying on
liberal notions of pluralism and diversity, might recognize the harm deriving
from programming that touches on sexual orientation.
Nonetheless, the Christian Right move to characterize lesbians and gay
men as inherently "about sex" increasingly fails to counter left multicul-
turalism in the minds of decision makers. Sexual orientation is increasingly
understood as a stable (often innate) identity. This identity-based characteri-
zation facilitates analogies to race- and gender-based rights both in popular
culture and in legal discourse. As courts ratify this move by gay rights law-
yers-as they did most recently in the California and Connecticut marriage
lawsuits-Christian Right lawyers find it increasingly difficult to present a
351 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51240 (West 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 35-4.7
(West 2008); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3204(5) (McKinney 2009).
352 Parker v. Hurley, 474 F. Supp. 2d 261, 263 (D. Mass. 2007) (quoting MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 71, § 32A (2008)). Similarly, courts have recognized that "mere exposure" to
sex or sexual images may constitute a burden on an individual's religion. For instance, in
Lambert v. Condor Mfg., 768 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Mich. 1991), a federal district court
allowed a former employee to pursue his religious discrimination claim based on his
religious belief against working in a space where employees posted nude photographs of
women. See id. at 601. His claim based on mere exposure was enough to survive sum-
mary judgment. See id. at 602.
133 See GurMANN, supra note 13, at 5-6 (explaining the belief that "the government's
legitimate educational role does not extend to what might be called 'moral education,"'
since such education "cannot possibly be neutral with regard to morality, and . . .is
properly a private, not a public, concern"); see also id. at 108 (discussing the legitimate
notion that sex education should be a private, family matter).
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conduct-based conceptualization of homosexuality.3 4 Accordingly, the
Christian Right claim in this context is increasingly less convincing. Indeed,
as sexual orientation becomes more deeply ingrained as innate in the popular
imagination, the harm of "mere exposure," which often ties to fears of influ-
ence over children's sexual orientation, appears even more attenuated.
The Parker district court affirmed the gay centrist position of sexual
orientation as a stable, seemingly innate, identity category-like race and
gender-in an increasingly diverse society. First, it rested the rationale for
the gay-inclusive curriculum on liberal notions of education and pluralism,
reasoning that "[s]tudents today must be prepared for citizenship in a di-
verse society," and "one dimension of our nation's diversity is differences in
sexual orientation. '" 355 The court noted that the curriculum in Lexington ac-
corded with Massachusetts law recognizing same-sex marriage and with
Massachusetts Department of Education guidance encouraging instruction
on "different types of families," which was issued in light of Massachusetts
law prohibiting discrimination in public schools based on sex or sexual ori-
entation.356 The court linked the gay-inclusive curriculum to legal rights of
lesbians and gay men that rely on an identity-based, rather than a sex-based,
notion of sexual orientation.
Next, the district court's treatment of the opt-out request shored up the
identity politics of gay rights cause lawyers. Although the court dismissed
the state law opt-out claim without prejudice after deciding the federal con-
stitutional issues, it suggested the opt-out statute was inapplicable given that
issues of sexual orientation were raised in books that constituted part of the
school's diversity curriculum. The court noted that an opt-out would under-
mine the point of the gay-inclusive lesson plans to the detriment of all stu-
dents. It explained that "[a]n exodus from class when issues of
homosexuality or same-sex marriage are to be discussed could send the mes-
sage that gays, lesbians, and the children of same-sex parents are inferior
and, therefore, have a damaging effect on those students," and "[i]t might
also undermine the [school's] efforts to educate the remaining other students
to understand and respect differences in sexual orientation. '35 7 In doing so,
the court privileged a harm to lesbian and gay students (and children of
354See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438-39 (Conn. 2008)
("[G]ay persons, because they are characterized by a 'central, defining [trait] of per-
sonhood, which may be altered [if at all] only at the expense of significant damage to the
individual's sense of self' are no less entitled to consideration as a suspect or quasi-sus-
pect class than any other group that has been deemed to exhibit an immutable characteris-
tic.") (internal citation omitted); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 444 (Cal. 2008)
("There is no persuasive basis for applying to statutes that classify persons on the basis of
the suspect classification of sexual orientation a standard less rigorous than that applied
to statutes that classify on the basis of the suspect classifications of gender, race, or
religion.").
"I Parker, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
356 See id. at 274-75 (citing 603 MASS. CODE REGS. § 26.06(1)).
3 Id. at 265.
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lesbian and gay parents) over a harm to religious students (or, more pre-
cisely, religious parents). The court essentially rejected the belief that dis-
cussions of lesbians and gay men per se constitute discussions of sex. The
distinction between identity and act animated the court's decision in favor of
the gay-inclusive curriculum and the supporting gay rights organizations.
The court embraced the gay rights brand of pluralism-left multicultural-
ism-and included sexual orientation within notions of diversity.
V. THE LIMrrs OF MULTICULTURALISM
In this Part, I point to the limits of the gay rights model of left multicul-
tural pluralism in the school context and note how Christian Right advocates
seize on such limitations for political gain. First, I explain how some gay
rights advocates invoke left multicultural principles to assert doctrinally
problematic claims that ask courts to mandate a curriculum that embraces
the gay rights movement's normative vision and to compel all students (es-
pecially children of religious objectors) to receive that vision through pro-
gramming. That is, advocates move from a left multiculturalism that merely
defends lesbian and gay inclusion toward one that demands affirmative state
recognition. Because courts do not declare such affirmative rights, I then
show how Christian Right lawyers exploit this result politically.
A. Affirmative Rights
Both gay rights and Christian Right lawyers understand the secondary,
political effects of law and litigation.358 Gay rights advocates use courts'
ratification of their brand of pluralism in school programming litigation to
convince other schools to implement their own gay-inclusive curriculum.
Indeed, the Lambda Legal attorney who handled the Montgomery County
litigation noted just after that battle ended that the Washington, D.C. Board
of Education approved a comprehensive sex education program after hearing
"Lambda Legal's analysis about its right to pass curricular standards."359
Christian Right lawyers acknowledge the political usefulness of winning liti-
gation for the gay rights movement. As TMLC chief counsel Richard
Thompson explains, the Maryland state court decision upholding the revised
358 In exploring the political uses and implications of rights discourse, Stuart Sche-
ingold analyzes the law as a "political instrument" and explores litigation as a "pressure
group activity." See SCHEINGOLD, supra note 92, at 95-96.
3'9 See Hayley Gorenberg, Intersection of Law and Policy: Curriculum Accuracy-
What's in a Word?, OF COUNSEL, Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-work/
publications/general/law-and-policy-oc-march-08.html.
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Montgomery County curriculum "gives a green light to homosexual groups
throughout Maryland to pressure school boards to adopt similar policies."36°
Nonetheless, gay rights cause lawyers would prefer that litigation yield
a directive governing schools, rather than merely school-specific results
based on judicial deference to local control. The default, these lawyers
know, is likely a curriculum that excludes lesbian and gay issues and implic-
itly affirms the Christian Right ideal of family and sexuality. Seeking to
move beyond merely favorable results and toward affirmative mandates,
some gay rights lawyers, particularly at GLAD, take an aggressive rights-
claiming position to demand gay-positive content. 36' They attempt to marry
liberal priorities on pluralism, diversity, and critical deliberation to more
normative notions of left multiculturalism. In its strongest form, the left
multicultural pluralism endorsed by some gay rights lawyers requires affirm-
ative state recognition; the state must cultivate respect for lesbians and gay
men?.62 This claim moves beyond inclusion and tolerance and toward a more
normative objective.3 63 And it does so with a weak doctrinal basis.
Rather than simply defend the school district's decision in Parker based
on the principles of local control and deference to curricular decisions,
GLAD frames the materials at issue as tied up with a student's right to re-
ceive information under the First Amendment. First, GLAD points to a
"deeply-rooted constitutional 'right to receive information and ideas,"' but
fails to acknowledge the shaky jurisprudential ground upon which the right,
articulated in Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District
No. 26 v. Pico, rests. 64 The fracturing of the Court in Pico, such that only a
plurality endorsed the right to receive information, is compounded by the
fact that Pico involved the removal of existing materials rather than the addi-
tion of new materials.3 65 Moreover, the Court explicitly limited its holding
to library books, carefully distinguishing classroom instruction and curricu-
16°Bob Unruh, Judge Blesses Teaching Students Homosexuality Is Innate,
WORLDNETDAILY.COM, Feb. 5, 2008, http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&
pageld=55666.
361 Compare GLAD's aggressive position in Parker with Lambda Legal's more re-
strained position in Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum. GLAD argued that
"[s]tudents in Lexington, and elsewhere, have a right to learn that includes the right to
receive accurate information about families, including same-sex parent families." Parker
GLAD Amicus Brief, supra note 68, at 19. Lambda Legal, on the other hand, simply
argued that courts should defer to local school board decisions because "Maryland law
entrusts ... county boards with the discretion and authority to promulgate a health curric-
ulum." Respondent PFLAG's Statement in Lieu of Memorandum at 2, Citizens for a
Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., No. 284980 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan.
31, 2008).
362 The multicultural emphasis on respect is connected to the liberal priority on
choice. See GUTMANN, supra note 13, at 32 ("Teaching mutual respect is instrumental to
assuring all children the freedom to choose in the future.").
363 See Gutmann, supra note 32, at 22 ("Toleration extends to the widest range of
views .... Respect is far more discriminating.").
31 Parker GLAD Amicus Brief, supra note 68, at 19-20 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67, 870-71 (1982) (plurality opinion)).
363 See Pico, 457 U.S. at 862 (plurality opinion).
2009]
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender
luM. 3" Nonetheless, linking the right to liberal ideas about education,
GLAD argues that "'access to ideas ... prepares students for active and
effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society, in which
they will soon be adult members."' 367
Next, GLAD links the right to receive information to gay identity is-
sues. It argues that "[w]hen learning about family structure, or about socie-
tal diversity, students have a right to learn about lesbian and gay people and
same-sex parent families. '36 GLAD contends that "[i]f a public school
chooses to teach a unit about families, students in that school have a right to
relevant and accurate information about what constitutes a family in
America today. '369 The right has shifted from the already tenuous right to
receive information to a right to learn particular information that correlates
with notions of gay identity in a diverse society.
While a pluralist paradigm might account for religious objections by
allowing parental opt-outs, this gay rights model of pluralism does not. In-
deed, an accommodation model of pluralism would undermine the broader
normative agenda furthered by the gay rights movement's push for the cur-
riculum in the first place. Gay rights lawyers are interested in values incul-
cation, and, in this sense, they especially want the children of religious
objectors to receive gay-inclusive instruction. Arguing against opt-out rights
for parents, GLAD points to "the right of all students 'to receive a broad
range of information so that they can freely form their own thoughts." 370
The curriculum cannot be restricted (through an opt-out) or eliminated alto-
gether, GLAD contends, because such acts would "impermissibly inter-
fere[ ] with the students' right to receive accurate, topical information and to
learn." 371
As a GLAD attorney put it, the organization submitted the arguments it
did "so [schools] can have some language coming from our briefs that we
hope will make it into this case so they can offensively say, you know what,
it's not just that we're permitted to teach this material; it's that we are man-
dated to teach this material. ' 372 But gay rights organizations have not se-
cured any affirmative right to curricular content, and the First Circuit did not
366 See id. at 862, 869.
367 Parker GLAD Amicus Brief, supra note 68, at 20 (quoting Pico, 457 U.S. at 868).
361 Id. at 23.
369 Id.
370 Id. at 22 (quoting Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1027
n.5 (9th Cir. 1998)).
371 Id. at 27. Contrary to GLAD's argument, the deference normally given to school
districts suggests that courts would not go so far as to invalidate a school's decision to
allow parents to opt their children out of instruction touching on the topic of sexual
orientation. Indeed, the Parker district court itself suggested the viability of a parental
accommodation. Parker v. Hurley, 474 F. Supp. 2d 261, 264 (D. Mass. 2007) (noting
that the Constitution "does not prohibit the defendants from voluntarily accommodating
the parents' concerns if there is a reasonable way to do so").
3172 Jacobs, supra note 158.
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adopt GLAD's position.373 Instead, the court merely found that the school
district could persist with its curriculum. By facilitating local variation,
school district discretion serves a pluralist ethic in itself, against which
courts are reluctant to rule. Local school discretion ties to a democratic con-
ceptualization of public education by allowing curriculum to reflect commu-
nity values and consensus.374 In the end, school districts may fashion a gay-
inclusive curriculum or they may not.3 75
B. Law as a Political Tool
The lack of affirmative rights and duties secured by gay rights organi-
zations opens up possibilities for chilling effects on schools, yielding impor-
tant points of leverage for Christian Right lawyers. Even if school districts
are vindicated by litigation, the mere possibility of litigation may serve as a
deterrent. Litigation is extremely resource-intensive, using public funds that
can be better spent in other ways and placing demands on the time of busy
officials, administrators, and teachers. 376
Legal actors move toward litigation avoidance techniques to provide
certainty when faced with legal ambiguity and to steer clear of litigation
costs. a77 The fact that the law regarding parental challenges to school pro-
gramming is relatively well-settled in favor of curricular freedom makes
173 See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 107 (1st Cir. 2008) (rather than finding any
affirmative rights to content, simply concluding that the curriculum did not offend the
United States Constitution and that parents could seek to change programming through
"the normal political processes").
374 See GUTMANN, supra note 13, at 74 ("Preserving a realm of local democratic
control over schools not only makes control more effective but permits the content of
education to vary, as it should, with local circumstances and local democratic
preferences.").
175 Similarly, courts have not declared an affirmative right to comprehensive sex edu-
cation. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Speaking Truth to Power: Challenging "The
Power of Parents to Control the Education of their Own," 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
481, 491 (2002) (noting that she is "yet to find a case upholding the child's affirmative
right to access to sex education and holding that the school has a duty to make sex
education or condoms accessible to all students, despite the parents' objections").376 For instance, a Montgomery County school board member urged TMLC to "get
out of town" and "quit costing Montgomery County taxpayers money for litigation."
Leah Fabel, Montgomery County Wins Long Battle on Sex Ed, THE EXAMINER, Feb. 2,
2008, http://www.examiner.com/a- 1196553-Montgomery-County-wins-long-battle-on
_sexed.html.3 Scholars in a variety of fields have documented the impulse toward litigation
avoidance experienced by various actors. For instance, in considering the role of custom
in intellectual property law, Jennifer Rothman recently noted that "[l]itigation-avoidance
customs are motivated by IP players' (both owners and users) interests in providing
greater certainty in the face of unpredictable legal outcomes and in reaction to skyrocket-
ing litigation costs." Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellec-
tual Property, 93 VA. L. REv. 1899, 1909 (2007). As cause lawyering scholar Michael
McCann has explained, social movement lawyers rely on the costs and uncertainty of
litigation to force concessions from organizations and institutions. See Michael McCann,
Law and Social Movements, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SocI-rY 506,
514 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004).
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schools' litigation avoidance techniques appear surprising. But a central in-
gredient in the conventional litigation avoidance picture is increasingly miss-
ing in the public school context, or, more precisely, is present for only one of
the actors. Parents find heavily funded public interest law firms willing (and
eager) to fund litigation relating to public school decision-making. 378 More
often than not, schools must defend lawsuits using taxpayer resources. After
the Montgomery County school system's most recent state court win, a
school spokesperson estimated that the litigation cost the district more than
$500,000 and pointed out that opponents received free representation from
TMLC.379 Without the specter of high litigation costs needing to be ab-
sorbed by financially strapped parents, key players in the public school con-
text no longer have a vital incentive to avoid litigation, but schools still have
a strong incentive to avoid costly litigation. In this sense, there is a rela-
tional quality to the litigation avoidance strategies of schools and the litiga-
tion-seeking strategies of cause lawyers. The eagerness of legal
organizations to commence litigation springing from school district disputes
makes schools especially vigilant in avoiding potentially controversial
topics. 380
As an initial matter, this chilling effect can lead schools to adopt the
accommodation model of pluralism endorsed by the Christian Right and a
sex-based conceptualization of lesbians and gay men. Schools that have
controversial programming may more quickly bow to pressure from parents
by offering opt-out rights, which recognize exposure as injurious. They may
do so in contexts outside of sex education, thereby positioning sexual orien-
tation as invariably about sex. For instance, anecdotal evidence suggests that
in the wake of the Parker litigation some Massachusetts schools have con-
ceded to the objections of religious parents, notifying parents of any discus-
sion of LGBT people or families and allowing parents to exempt their
children from the instruction.3 8'
More importantly, the chilling effect allows Christian Right advocates
to achieve a more comprehensive goal: having sexual orientation excluded
from school programming. Such exclusion, rather than mere opt-out rights
in an otherwise gay-inclusive curriculum, seizes on the homogenizing poten-
tial of school programming to maintain traditional (Christian) notions of
family life and sexuality for all students. Even though the Lexington school
district prevailed at both the district and appellate court levels, the Parker
litigation may have a chilling effect on other schools. Schools may decide
37' Christian Right law firms are some of the most well-funded public interest legal
organizations in the United States. For instance, ACLJ has a yearly budget that exceeds
$30 million and, as of 2005, employed forty-four full-time attorneys and one hundred
support staff. See HACKER, supra note 2, at 28.
379 See Fabel, supra note 376.
380 It is important to note that this incentive structure is not entirely one-sided.
Schools may shy away from curricular changes when faced with parental challenges and
litigation threats backed by progressive groups like the ACLU.
381 See Jacobs, supra note 158.
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not to provide gay-inclusive programming at all, concluding, as a GLAD
attorney explained, "We just don't want to be sued like Lexington. 382 A
historical look at the Montgomery County litigation only underscores the
way in which schools can avoid controversy through silence. In 2002, the
Montgomery County school system moved from an explicit policy not to
discuss homosexuality in health education classes to a new policy that
sought to address "sexual variation." '383 The school district shifted from a
policy of silence to a policy of engagement, the latter yielding years of
litigation. 384
Some Christian Right lawyers, aware of litigation's chilling effect, at-
tempt to exploit it. They use litigation as a political tool to pressure school
districts into decisions favorable to the Christian Right movement. For in-
stance, in the Equal Access Act ("EAA") context, Liberty Counsel takes an
aggressive position to pressure other schools into complying with its posi-
tion. When Liberty Counsel sued a Florida public school district under the
EAA for refusing to allow a Christian student group to meet on campus,
general counsel Matthew Stayer, the same attorney who represented CRC
and PFOX in the Montgomery County federal court case, called a press con-
ference to condemn the school district in the suit and, more importantly, to
put other school districts on notice of Liberty Counsel's aggressive litigation
campaign.385 As Staver declared, "[t]his is the first in a series of lawsuits
that we'll be doing around the state of Florida."38 6 Later, Staver issued a
382 Id.
383 Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., No.
AW-05-1194, 2005 WL 1075634 at *1 (D. Md. May 5, 2005).
18 As Button, Rienzo, and Wald explain, in 1992, the New York City school system's
Children of the Rainbow multicultural education curriculum included two references, out
of 443 pages of materials, to lesbians and gay men. Critics reacted by accusing the
school district of promoting homosexuality. See BUTroN, RIENZO, & WALD, supra note
135, at 148; see also Steven Lee Myers, Values in Conflict: Schools Diversify the Golden
Rule, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1992, at BI. The school system's chancellor lost his job, ac-
cused by the school board of "concentrat[ing] his energies on a controversial social
agenda." Sam Dillon, Board Removes Fernandez as New York Schools Chief After
Stormy 3-Year Term, N.Y. TimES, Feb. 11, 1993, at Al; see also BtTrroN, RIENzo, &
WALD, supra note 135, at 148. Button and his co-authors suggest that the "ordeal in New
York City seemed to be heeded by school officials nationwide." BUTroN, RIENZO, &
WALD, supra note 135, at 149. As Arthur Lipkin explained, "during the New York battle,
the curriculum recommendations of the [Massachusetts] Governor's Commission on Gay
and Lesbian Youth were quietly dropped from its report ..... Id. Similarly, a Cincin-
nati school official reported that his district had become "more cautious." Id. at 150. As
Button and his co-authors found, "[i]nformants in every community we visited referred
to the New York episode as having a chilling effect on their community's efforts to ad-
dress sexual orientation issues and youth." Id. at 149. While this analysis discusses the
effects of political controversy, the publicity and controversy surrounding litigation,
along with its high costs, suggest that the chilling effects flowing from litigation might be
even greater. Moreover, while the New York City example represented a relatively iso-
lated incident in the 1990s, conflicts over gay-inclusive curriculum have proliferated in
recent years, only magnifying the chilling effects.
385 See HACKER, supra note 2, at 70.
386 Id.; see also Julie Hauserman, School Singled Out Christian Group, Girl's Lawsuit
Says, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 16, 1999, at 4B.
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press release entitled "Florida High School, School Board and Principal
Sued for Discrimination against Christian Student Club; Liberty Counsel
states, 'All Schools Are On Notice,"' which warned:
For years, when we were contacted about Equal Access issues we
would contact school personnel, give them the benefit of the
doubt, and offer to resolve the situation short of litigation. Those
days are gone . ..we will no longer hesitate to file suit when
violations arise. This suit marks the beginning of a national cam-
paign by Liberty Counsel to ensure public schools abide by the
Equal Access Act.3s7
Of course, the EAA domain, as an example of the successful inclusion
model of pluralism, presents a substantive area in which the law favors
Christian Right lawyers (as well as gay rights lawyers) vis-t-vis school dis-
tricts."' The issue of school programming and curriculum presents a situa-
tion less compelling under existing legal doctrine. Nonetheless, the political
leverage provided by litigation in some ways exists independent of actual
litigation results and well-settled doctrinal principles. The prospect of ag-
gressive, costly litigation by a perceived adversary may compel schools to
bow to Christian Right demands.38 9 In fact, religious conservative groups
involved in public school disputes note with approval the chilling effect that
losing litigation can have in the school programming domain. Even though
the Lexington school district was vindicated by both the district court and
the First Circuit, a social conservative advocacy group, MassResistance,
boasts that "[s]chools are apparently figuring out that if they push perver-
sion to children, they could face a tough lawsuit."390
37 HACKER, supra note 2, at 70-71.
388 Numerous decisions support the rights of Christian students to form religion-fo-
cused clubs and the rights of LGBT students to form gay-straight alliances. See, e.g., Bd.
of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 232-34 (1990) (upholding students' rights under the
EAA to form a Christian club at a public high school); Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch.
Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 847-48, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding students' rights
under the EAA to form a Bible Club at a public high school, though limiting the extent to
which the club could use a religious test for certain leadership positions); Boyd Co. High
Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d 667, 693 (E.D. Ky. 2003)
(upholding students' rights under the EAA to form a gay-straight alliance at a public high
school); Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(same).
389 See BROWN, supra note 3, at 131 (explaining that after ADF's John Price contacted
a school on behalf of an aggrieved student, arguing based on constitutional principles but
also mentioning legal costs the school might incur, the school, according to Price, exper-
ienced "a marvelous change of heart").
390 MassResistance, David Parker Lawsuit Having a "Chilling" Effect on Schools'
Homosexual Programs, Says Homosexual Legal Advocacy Group (Jan. 31, 2007), http://
www.massresistance.org/docs/gen/08a/pflag_092407/parkersuit.html (relying on com-
plaints about the chilling effects on school districts that a GLAD attorney aired to the gay
press).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has outlined three models of pluralism elaborated by Chris-
tian Right and gay rights lawyers-an inclusion model, an accommodation
model, and a left multicultural model. These models of pluralism give
meaning and resonance to different doctrinal claims. At the same time,
these models turn back on their own advocates, providing significant limita-
tions. The Christian Right's tremendously successful free speech claim,
which relies on an inclusion model of pluralism, runs up against doctrinal
and remedial problems as it ventures into school programming territory.
And yet, because the inclusion model enjoys so much currency, previously
unthinkable free speech claims gain traction in this context. At the same
time, an alternative model of pluralism based on accommodation and
grounded in parental rights and free exercise claims fails to resonate in a
world in which Christian Right advocates have framed their movement in
terms of participation and engagement. On the other side, gay rights lawyers
are facing the limitations of their own model of left multicultural pluralism.
While successful in defending discretionary inclusion based on a stable iden-
tity-based understanding of lesbians and gay men, the left multicultural
model of pluralism flounders when it strikes a more normative chord that
seeks affirmative state recognition through First Amendment rights.
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